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ABSTRACT
DOES INFLATED RESPONSIBILITY MODERATE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THOUGHT-ACTION FUSION BELIEFS AND NEUTRALIZING BEHAVIORS?
Brenda Ellen Bailey, Ph.D.
Department of Psychology
Northern Illinois University, 2016
Kevin D. Wu, Director
This study sought to empirically assess the theoretically suggested relationship—
according to the cognitive-behavioral model—among cognitive beliefs in producing obsessivecompulsive behaviors. Two beliefs were identified: the belief that one is responsible for negative
effects of thoughts and behaviors by either failing to prevent or acting to cause harm (inflated
responsibility) and the belief that thoughts about negative events happening to others can
increase their likelihood of occurring (thought-action fusion likelihood-others [TAF-LO]). A
sample of N = 102 students participated in a manipulation of inflated responsibility by
completing a linguistically altered measure of responsibility that either encouraged (high
responsibility [HR]) or discouraged (low responsibly [LR]) views of oneself as overly
responsible for negative outcomes and reading corresponding feedback; the control group
completed a distraction task. Next, participants completed the sentence “I hope (loved one) is in
a car accident today” followed by in vivo ratings of anxiety, likelihood, moral wrongness, urge to
neutralize, responsibility, blame, and guilt if the event were to occur. Participants then reported
any behavioral or cognitive responses to the task. Results suggest that the manipulation was
unsuccessful based on the stringent definition of changes in total scores on a 30-item
responsibility and threat estimation beliefs questionnaire. One-tailed t-test demonstrated that the

HR condition reported significantly higher ratings of responsibility following the task compared
to LR condition. A one-way ANOVA found that the HR condition reported significantly higher
ratings of post-sentence anxiety (vs control), guilt (vs LR), and urge to neutralize (vs control) as
well as significantly greater increases in anxiety from baseline (vs control). The moderation
analyses comparing the strength of the relationship of baseline TAF-LO to the urge to neutralize
or number of self-reported neutralizing responses were nonsignificant. Using transformed
variables, in vivo appraisals of the likelihood of the negative event occurring mediated the
relationship between baseline TAF-LO and the outcome variables of (1) the urge to neutralize,
(2) number of self-reported neutralizing responses, and (3) whether a person did or did not
neutralize. However, conditional process analyses examining the moderation of the relationship
between the mediating variable of in vivo likelihood appraisals and any of the three outcome
variables were not supported. Methodological limitations, theoretical implications, and future
research directions are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The Cognitive Model of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder

The last three decades Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) research have focused
particular attention on the cognitive variables that play a role in the disorder’s development and
maintenance. Building on the existing broad cognitive-behavioral theory (CBT) of anxiety
disorders, the specific cognitive-behavioral model for OCD proposes that certain enduring,
longstanding beliefs influence the way in which individuals appraise their intrusive thoughts
(Obsessive-Compulsive Cognitions Working Group [OCCWG], 1997). Such interpretations were
hypothesized to elicit distress and anxiety that is relieved by maladaptive, counterproductive
behaviors in the form of compulsions (Rachman, 1997; Salkovskis, 1985).
Starting with the work of Salkovskis (1985), a cognitive model for OCD was proposed
that emphasized the misinterpretation of commonly occurring intrusive thoughts as indicative of
personal responsibility over potential negative outcomes from the thought (i.e., inflated
responsibility). Additionally, individuals who are high in inflated responsibility beliefs feel they
have the power to provoke or prevent future disastrous events (Salkovskis, 1985). Therefore,
they see themselves as responsible for the dangerousness of their thoughts, or any potential harm
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resulting from their failure to prevent harm (i.e., omission) or by being the direct cause of harm
(i.e., commission). Such beliefs, perhaps understandably, lead these individuals to appraise their
intrusive thoughts in a manner that causes distress and anxiety. Later, Rachman (1997) proposed
that individuals diagnosed with OCD engage in “catastrophic misinterpretations of the
significance of intrusive thoughts” (p. 793), in which the mere presence of a thought indicates its
importance and/or is a revelation about their underlying character. From these beliefs, anxiety
and distress are produced when confronted with a natural, commonly occurring negative
intrusive thought (Rachman, 1997; Salkovskis, 1985). As is characteristic of OCD, the distress
brought about by the enduring belief and subsequent misappraisal of the intrusive thoughts is
alleviated by engaging in compulsive behaviors that serve to counteract the thought and potential
future negative outcomes (i.e., neutralizing the thoughts), resulting in decreased distress and
anxiety in the short-term. However, these behaviors serve to maintain the intrusive thoughts and
compulsive behaviors via operant conditioning; the distress is alleviated (i.e., negative
reinforcement) and increases the likelihood that the behaviors will be used again to reduce stress
(Salkovskis, 1985). Given that intrusive thoughts are universal (Morillo, Belloch, & GarciaSoriano, 2007; Rachman & de Silva, 1978), and appraisals that follow from beliefs are thought to
produce initial distress, investigating the influence of beliefs on compulsive behavior is a
fundamental area of inquiry.

Relations Among Obsessive-Compulsive Beliefs

Since the inception of the cognitive-behavioral model of OCD, research has sought to
understand the relationship among the prominent obsessive-compulsive (OC) beliefs. Moreover,
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the OCCWG formed with the primary purpose of measuring these beliefs and assessing the
relationship among them. The understanding of these beliefs has evolved over the last 30 years
and has gained favor among therapists and researchers in the field of OCD. Yet, the relations
among these beliefs and how they interact to produce anxiety and later compulsions remain
relatively unclear. Differences in appraisal, not the content, of intrusive thoughts are
hypothesized to produce distress (Rachman, 1997; Salkovskis, 1985), whereas the maintenance
of the distress and beliefs is the product of OC behaviors (Rachman, 2002; Salkovskis, 1985).
Thus, the primary aim of this study was to investigate the cognitive conditions that influence the
likelihood of using compulsive responses to an intrusive thought to maintain the cycle of
distress.
Reviews of the status of the cognitive-behavioral model of OCD begin with the explicit
recognition that the nature of OC beliefs is complex (OCCWG, 1997; Taylor et al., 2010).
Although the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ; OCCWG, 2001; 2005) provides an
assessment of several beliefs thought to be integral to the development and maintenance of OCD,
it is not without limitations. First, it is acknowledged that the original OBQ content is not an
exhaustive assessment of potentially important domains (OCCWG, 2001). In addition, the
shortening of the OBQ from 87 to 44 items provided mainly psychometric improvement, but also
has some disadvantages, including the scope of its assessment. For example, after accounting for
the 44-item OBQ (OBQ-44; OCCWG, 2005), a measure of thought-action fusion (TAF)—a
belief related to OC symptoms—significantly predicted remaining variance in OC symptoms
(Bailey, Wu, Valentiner, & McGrath, 2014). The near-ubiquitous use of this measure may
unintentionally confine research to only what the OBQ assesses. Such limitations may extend to
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the treatment domain by increasing the risk of not addressing these biases through cognitivebehavioral therapy (i.e., Type II error).
A further limitation is that the exact nature of the relationships among these beliefs is
unclear. A unified measure of OC beliefs may have led some to conclude, perhaps prematurely,
that the beliefs directly and independently influence OC symptoms. However, high correlations
among factors and limited replication of the published factor structure of the OBQ suggest that
the relationships among the beliefs are complex and variable (OCCWG, 2001; 2003; 2005; Wu
& Carter 2008a). These beliefs are often characterized as main effects, with each belief
independently influencing OC symptoms; however, high correlations among beliefs suggest that
these beliefs may contribute to and exacerbate others. Thus, only assessing direct effects may
obscure the complex and interactive nature of the cognitive model of OCD. One study to date
has attempted to assess the influence of the interaction of OBQ-44 belief subscales in predicting
OC symptoms (Taylor, Abramowitz, & McKay, 2005). Although none of the interaction terms
was significant, the study was limited by its cross-sectional sample of individuals diagnosed with
OCD who were utilized in the validation of the OBQ-44 (Taylor et al., 2005). The current study
attempted to experimentally evaluate the interactive influence of two prominent OC beliefs on
OC behavior.

The Thought-Action Fusion Sentence Task

To begin this clarification process, this project sought to investigate whether heightened
inflated responsibility beliefs will produce more neutralizing responses to a task that is designed
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to activate TAF appraisals (i.e., viewing your thoughts as influencing reality). Research has
demonstrated the use of this task to evoke obsessive-like thoughts, related TAF appraisals, and
increased neutralizing efforts (Berman, Abramowitz, Wheaton, Pardue, & Fabricant, 2011; Bocci
& Gordon, 2007; Rachman, Shafran, Mitchell, Trant, & Teachman, 1996). The TAF sentence
task (or paradigm), requires participants to complete a sentence that reads “I hope that
_________ is in a car accident” with the name of a loved one. This procedure is said to activate
TAF likelihood-others—the belief that thinking of a negative event befalling a loved one
increases the likelihood that the negative event will happen—which then leads to appraisals of
the activity as potentially influencing the reality of the loved one (Berman et al., 2011; Shafran et
al., 1996). Performing this task has been associated with increases in reported anxiety (Berman et
al., 2011; van den Hout, Kindt, Weiland, & Peters, 2002), perceived likelihood that the event will
occur (Berman et al., 2011; Rachman et al., 1996), and engaging in neutralizing behavior (Bocci
& Gordon, 2007). Furthermore, all of these increases in negative experiences (anxiety, perceived
likelihood, and neutralizing responses) were significantly associated with subscales of the
Thought-Action Fusion Scale (TAFS; Shafran et al., 1996) but not related to general distress or
anxiety sensitivity (Berman et al., 2011). This outcome suggests that appraisals of the task were
more strongly related to TAF beliefs than general factors, demonstrating relative discriminant
validity to TAF (Berman et al., 2011).
Although the TAF paradigm has demonstrated a relationship to in vivo appraisals of
morality and likelihood perceptions, these studies have also demonstrated that TAF beliefs—the
Likelihood-others subscale of the TAFS in particular—are not significantly associated with the
urge to neutralize in response to the TAF paradigm (Berman et al., 2011; Rachman et al., 1996)
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or self-reported anxiety after engaging in the task (van den Hout, et al., 2002; van den Hout, von
Pol, & Peters, 2001). In fact, the broader TAFS Likelihood subscale score was unrelated to the
increase in anxiety post-sentence completion, and the decrease in anxiety post-neutralization for
a sample of undergraduate students (Bocci & Gordon, 2007). In light of the design of the TAF
sentence task intending to evoke TAF appraisals of obsessive-like thoughts, the absence of a
relationship with TAFS Likelihood-others beliefs is perplexing. Such findings have led some to
conclude that TAF beliefs do not potentiate either anxiety from writing the sentence or the urge
to neutralize following the obsession-like induction (van den Hout et al., 2001). These null
findings run counter to what the cognitive-behavioral model would predict; a task designed to
elicit specific appraisals from broader beliefs should also demonstrate a relationship between the
pan-situational belief and changes in emotional and behavioral responses. Still others have
questioned whether the conditions are present to elicit OC appraisals and related behaviors in a
nonclinical sample to model the cognitive processes as they operate with OCD (van den Hout et
al., 2002).
The cognitive model of OCD may be more complex than simple main effects (Taylor et
al., 2010). Compared to nonclinical individuals, those diagnosed with OCD highly endorse a
variety of dysfunctional beliefs concerning the occurrence and meaning of intrusive thoughts
(OCCWG, 2001, 2005). Because individuals who are diagnosed with OCD engage in a number
of maladaptive interpretations of intrusive thoughts, these individuals typically do not dismiss
such activities as writing a sentence bearing misfortune on a loved one, whereas a nonclinical
sample may rationalize that the sentence will not influence reality. In their analysis of the TAF
sentence task, van den Hout et al. (2002) speculated that attempts to assess an OC response
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among non-OCD participants may require manipulating them to believe that their thoughts may
be threatening. As such, investigating the effects of writing the sentence may require that the
nonclinical participants believe (either naturally or experimentally) that thoughts may engender
negative consequences for which they feel responsible. Previous experimental methods aimed at
eliciting neutralizing responses or urges may have been too reductionistic in their view of the
complex cognitive-behavioral model of OCD when using a nonclinical sample. In addition, it has
been suggested that mental neutralizing, which is often not accounted for in these experimental
designs, may be utilized for decreasing anxiety in response to the TAF sentence task in a
nonclinical sample (Berman et al., 2011; Rachman et al., 1996). As such, the current study
examined whether cognitive neutralization is present in a nonclinical sample after engaging in
the TAF sentence task and whether these responses are influenced by heightened inflated
responsibility.
The Current Study

The current cognitive-behavioral model of OCD posits that maladaptive, pan-situational
beliefs lead to distress-inducing appraisals of intrusive thoughts. Although there is a great deal
known about the main effects of these beliefs on OC outcomes, there is a dearth of experimental
work assessing the interactive effects of maladaptive beliefs on OC responses. Among this
research, an inflated sense of responsibility is a key contributing factor to the development of
obsessions and later compulsive behaviors (Salkovskis et al., 2000). In a review of TAF, Berle
and Starcevic (2005) offer that the nature of the relationship between TAF likelihood-others and
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inflated responsibility is not well understood, and future research should evaluate what role
inflated responsibility may play in the occurrence of distress and anxiety from TAF.
The absence of a relationship between TAF beliefs and emotional and behavioral
outcomes from the TAF sentence task suggests that there may be an important element missing
from the experimental designs utilizing nonclinical samples. The current study sought to
investigate if a sense of inflated responsibility for negative outcomes moderates the relationship
between TAF likelihood-others beliefs and overt or covert neutralizing behaviors in response to
engaging in the TAF sentence task (i.e., a task that aims to elicit TAF likelihood-others
appraisals). A broad aim of this study was to clarify the cognitive-behavioral model of OCD to
improve the conceptualization of the disorder. The primary psychological treatment for OCD,
Exposure and Response Prevention (ERP), draws heavily on the cognitive-behavioral model of
OCD (Abramowitz & Jacoby, 2015). This individualized treatment addresses the specific
functional relationship between a person’s obsessions and compulsions by exposing the person to
feared thoughts and situations (e.g., thoughts of daughter getting into a car accident) without the
use of compulsions (e.g., prayer) to reduce distress and perceived feared outcomes (e.g.,
daughter dying). The ERP approach facilitates inhibitory learning and the development of more
adaptive beliefs about the occurrence and outcome of intrusive thoughts (Abramowitz & Jacoby,
2015). Thus, understanding the conditions that increase the likelihood of using a compulsive
response to intrusive thoughts may improve the understanding of these functional relationships
and enhance later exposures.
Additionally, the findings from this study may also offer methodological improvements
for empirical studies utilizing nonclinical samples. OCD is regarded as a dimensional disorder,
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suggesting that OCD arises from normal processes gone awry and can be observed to a lesser
degree in the general population. However, the presentation of the disorder may be more
complicated and require more “steps” in the laboratory methodology in order to study these
pathological processes in nonclinical samples.
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CHAPTER 2
THE COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF OBSESSIVECOMPULSIVE DISORDER
An Introduction to Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder

OCD has been previously recognized as the tenth most disabling illness (i.e., loss of
earnings and diminished quality of life), behind conditions such as unipolar depression, and
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (Murray & Lopez, 1996). Currently, OCD affects
approximately 1.2% of the U.S. population (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013).
The disorder is characterized by the presence of obsessions, most often followed by
compulsions. Obsessions are defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5; APA,
2013) as thoughts, urges, or images that are experienced as intrusive or unwanted and cause
marked distress. A compulsion is recognized as an intentional stereotyped act or behavior, which
is attributed to internal pressure to perform the behavior, and generally is performed by an
individual to relieve the distress and anxiety that is derived from an obsession (Rachman, 2002).
Individuals who perform compulsive behaviors may report that the behavior is aimed at avoiding
some dreaded event (APA, 2013). Compulsions can take the form of overt repetitive behavior
(e.g., repeated checking) or covert mental acts (e.g., prayer, counting). To meet formal DSM-5
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criteria for an OCD diagnosis, obsessions and/or compulsions must take up more than one hour a
day and be distressing.
There is general agreement that OC symptoms are best viewed on a continuum
(Abramowitz et al., 2010; Burns, Formea, Keortge, & Sternberger, 1995; Mataix-Cols, RosarioCampos, Leckman, 2005). This dimensional conceptualization allows for symptoms of the
disorder (i.e., intrusive thoughts and/or compulsive-like behavior) to be observed with low
severity in the general population, such that individuals in the general population may exhibit
OC symptoms to a lesser degree compared to those diagnosed with OCD, or not at all. Research
supports that there are “classic” behavioral symptoms that typically include checking, washing,
and rituals/ordering/symmetry (Abramowitz et al., 2010; APA, 2013; Burns, Keortge, Formea,
Sternberger, 1996; Foa, Kozak, Salkovskis, Coles, & Amir, 1998; Watson & Wu, 2005; Wu &
Carter, 2008b). The behaviors associated with OCD are often performed in a rigid manner using
feelings as internal criteria to temporarily discontinue the compulsion (Rachman, 2002). The
majority of behaviors are internally signaled to begin by distress that is brought on by obsessions
(APA, 2013), and, thus, can be seen as functionally related to obsessive cognitions. For example,
an individual who experiences an intrusive thought regarding impulsive violence toward a
passerby may alleviate distress by saying a prayer regarding the safety of people in his/her
presence.
In regard to “classic” symptoms, checking behaviors are excessive reassurance checks of
stoves, locks, lights, etc., to ensure that the items are switched off or secure, in order to prevent
future harm (Sookman, Abramowitz, Calamari, Wilhelm, & McKay, 2005). Washing behaviors
usually are performed in response to concerns about germs and contamination (Sookman et al.,
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2005; Watson & Wu, 2005). Moreover, individuals who engage in washing compulsions report
frequently washing themselves, others, and/or objects repeatedly, and often washing oneself to a
point of personal injury (Sookman et al., 2005). Further, ritualistic ordering behaviors in OCD
are observed as common tasks that are performed in a rigid manner (Watson & Wu, 2005).
Lastly, neutralizing is a term used to characterize many compulsive cognitive or behavioral acts
that are performed to set right, or cancel out feared consequences of obsessive thoughts and
reduce distress (Freeston & Ladouceur, 1997; Salkovskis, 1999).
Over the years, many theories have been offered to understand and conceptualize this
debilitating disorder. Freud’s account of Obsessive-Compulsive Neurosis presumed that id
impulses were the material for obsessions, and compulsions arose as ego defense mechanisms for
containing the id impulses (Comer, 2013). Later, McFall and Wollersheim (1979) attempted to
combine the psychoanalytic perspective of OCD with the gains of the behavioral model, but it
was unappealing to researchers and practitioners due to the limitations for studying and treating
unconscious processes (Salkovskis, 1985). A more palatable cognitive account of depression and
anxiety was presented in the late 1960s that provided a coherent theoretical framework for
understanding and treating these disorders. This theoretical model was later modified to be more
specific to OCD phenomena. The cognitive-behavioral account of obsessions and compulsions
has gained considerable favor in research and practice.
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The Cognitive-Behavioral Theory of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder

Early cognitive formulations of OCD proposed by Beck (1976) suggested that obsessive
content centered on feelings and interpretations of danger and doubt. However, Beck’s early
cognitive model of OCD was found to be nonspecific to the disorder, and more aligned with a
generalized model of anxiety disorders. To offer specificity, Salkovskis (1985) extended Beck’s
cognitive framework and proposed a cognitive-behavioral model of obsessions. Namely,
Salkovskis (1985) suggested that misappraisals of intrusive thoughts involved misperceptions of
the degree of responsibility one has for future negative outcomes.
To illustrate this nuanced cognitive formulation of obsessions, Salkovskis (1985) drew
distinctions between intrusive thoughts and negative automatic thoughts (NATs) that are central
to Beck’s cognitive theory. He suggested that whereas NATs are seen as part of a natural flow of
consciousness and congruent with one’s beliefs, intrusive thoughts are regarded as inconsistent
with the individual’s belief systems (i.e., ego dystonic). Furthermore, intrusive thoughts function
as stimuli that provoke NATs. In order to make this assumption, Salkovskis (1985) offered
evidence supporting disturbing intrusions as common experiences (Rachman & de Silva, 1978),
and such common intrusions may only become a source of mood disturbance if the intrusions
counter the individual’s belief system to elicit NATs. The implications of NATs are well defined
in Beck’s cognitive model of anxiety (Beck, 1976) and are purported to occur quickly, are
immediately accepted by the individual, and result in distress.
Thus, what separates normal intrusive thoughts from abnormal obsessions is the
interpretation of the meaning of the intrusive thought (i.e., the misappraisal), which correspond
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with the NATs that produce distress. Salkovskis (1985) further proposed that the NATs
generated from a disturbing intrusive thought concern the individual’s responsibility for the
damage and/or harm to oneself or others, which is driven by a general schema for the fear of
causing harm. Whereas non-OCD and OCD individuals express feeling responsible for situations
in which they are implicated as a causal agent in negative outcomes, individuals diagnosed with
OCD report feeling a sense of responsibility for even neutral events where responsibility is not
apparent (Forrester, Wilson, & Salkovskis, 2002). This bias permits those diagnosed with OCD
to be more susceptible to experiencing distress when confronted with common intrusive
thoughts; these individuals will appraise the content and/or the occurrence of the thought as
indicative of potential harm for which the possessor would be culpable if s/he did not act to
prevent it. Subsequently, the distress generated from the misappraisal of intrusive thoughts is
alleviated via counter-productive compulsive behaviors, which reduces anxiety and distress in
the short-term but propagates long-term anxiety (Salkovskis, 1999).
Recall from above that neutralizing behaviors are aimed at “setting right” feared
situations and/or averting possible harm. It is suggested that the performance of neutralizing
behaviors is driven by perceptions of inflated responsibility and the desire to mitigate one’s
responsibility for potential negative outcomes (Forrester et al., 2002). However, compulsive
behaviors, such as neutralizing, are proposed to increase the frequency of the intrusive thoughts
and related discomfort (Forrester et al., 2002; Freeston & Ladouceur, 1997; Salkovskis et al.,
2000; Tolin, Abramowitz, Prezworski, & Foa, 2002). In addition, compulsive behaviors may
serve to reinforce and strengthen the individual’s perceived responsibility for diverting
potentially disastrous events; the unlikely outcome does not materialize after neutralizing,
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suggesting that the compulsive behaviors were effective at preventing harm and reinforces
beliefs about responsibility (Salkovskis, 1999). According to Salkovskis’s (1985) model, if
intrusive thoughts are not appraised in a way that suggests direct (i.e., cause harm) or indirect
(i.e., failure to prevent harm) responsibility, neutralizing responses are unlikely to occur. In the
absence of the OCD-relevant beliefs, such as inflated responsibility, intrusive thoughts are more
easily ignored, which prevents the escalation into obsessions and the use of neutralizing
behaviors (Julien, O’Connor, & Aardema, 2007).
For example, a man touches a garbage can and has an intrusive thought of bacteria being
on his hands. He then has a NAT that he may cause his child to become ill, for which he would
be responsible. Such a NAT will elicit distress, which may be alleviated via washing. In this
example, washing serves to alleviate the person’s interpreted responsibility as a potential cause
of illness. Although this scenario seems innocuous, in combination with the noted consequences
of compulsive behaviors, he may then be confronted with more frequent intrusions of germs on
other surfaces, as well as more frequent NATs about being the cause illness, which produces
distress and anxiety. Consequently, he may rely upon washing to relieve the distress brought
about by contamination fears. Furthermore, the non-occurrence of feared outcomes after
performing washing behaviors (i.e., child does not become ill) serves to reinforce the belief that
harm was avoided due to his behavioral response.

Empirical Evidence Supporting the Cognitive-Behavioral Model of Obsessive-Compulsive
Disorder

The widely accepted definition of inflated responsibility is:
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The belief that one has power which is pivotal to bring about or prevent subjectively
crucial negative outcomes. These outcomes are perceived as essential to prevent. They
may be actual, that is, having consequences in the real world, and/or at a moral level.
(Salkovskis et al., 1996; as cited in Salkovskis, 1999)
Studies have demonstrated that the element of perceived pivotal influence that the person has
over negative outcomes, compared to the crucial aspects of the situation (severity and
probability), is a stronger indicator of responsibility ratings. For example, a sample of nonclinical
participants read vignettes that incorporated the OC themes often expressed among those
diagnosed with OCD and rated the following: personal relevance of each vignette, the severity of
the perceived outcome, the probability that the event would occur, the pivotal influence the
participant feels s/he has over the negative outcome, and how responsible s/he feels. Using only
interpretations from highly relevant vignettes, Rhéaume et al. (1995) found that participants’
subjective interpretation of the severity of the outcome (β = 0.09, p < .001) and the probability
that the event would occur (β = -0.10, p > .05) were not as strong predictors of responsibility
ratings (i.e., each accounted for 4% of the total variance), whereas ratings of pivotal influence to
provoke or prevent harm significantly predicted responsibility ratings (β = 0.71, p <.001;
accounting for 28% of the total variance). Furthermore, within-subject comparison of high and
low responsibility vignettes of equivalent personal relevance demonstrated that ratings of pivotal
influence were significantly different for high and low ratings of responsibility (t41 = 8.03, p <
.001), along with probability of the event occurring (t41 = 2.65, p < .05), but not the severity of
the negative outcome. Although these data suggest that pivotal influence over negative outcomes
is a powerful component of perceived responsibility, it does not speak to the relevance of inflated
responsibility interpretations to OC symptoms.
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Extent literature supports Salkovskis’s (1985) assertion that inflated responsibility
interpretations are relevant to the performance of OC behaviors. For example, using a sample of
nonclinical individuals, Ladouceur, Rhéaume, and Aublet (1997) demonstrated that participants
who were told that they had a significant influence over negative outcomes were more likely to
check whether they performed a sorting task accurately (F3,76 = 4.44, p < .01) and modify their
sorting decisions (F3,76 = 6.43, p < .001) compared to those who were not told they had a
significant influence over the outcomes. Thus, beliefs about one’s pivotal influence over negative
outcomes appear to elicit OC-relevant behavior. In addition, Ladouceur, Léger, Rhéaume, and
Dubé (1996) investigated whether specifically targeting inflated responsibility beliefs and
developing balanced responsibility interpretations in cognitive therapy would lead to an
improvement in OC symptoms. Four individuals with primary checking compulsions
demonstrated at least a 52% decrease in the Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (YBOCS; Goodman et al., 1989) scores and decreased perceived responsibility, as well as clinically
significant decrease in reports of interference in daily activities when inflated responsibility
beliefs were addressed in cognitive therapy (Ladouceur et al., 1996). However, because of the
small sample size and lack of a comparison treatment group, conclusions as to the importance of
addressing this belief are limited.
After the creation of the accessible and cohesive OBQ (OCCWG, 2001), understanding
the occurrence and influence of OC beliefs on OC symptoms grew substantially. In particular,
examining the direct relationships between beliefs and symptoms has increased. Data support
that Responsibility and Threat Estimation subscales of the 87-item version of the OBQ (OBQ-87;
OCCWG, 2001) correlated significantly more strongly with the Padua Inventory—Revised (PI-
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R; van Oppen, Hoekstra, & Emmelkamp) compared to its relation with depression, anxiety
sensitivity, and worry (ts97 ≥ 2.48, ps < .01; Steketee, Frost, & Cohen, 1998). Using the OBQ-44,
which combined and reduced the Responsibility and Threat Estimation subscales of the original
OBQ-87, Tolin, Brady, and Hannan (2008) demonstrated that the condensed
Responsibility/Threat Estimation subscale correlated significantly with the ObsessiveCompulsive Inventory—Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002) Washing (r = .40, p < .003), Mental
Neutralizing (r = .32, p < .003), and Obsessing (r = .43, p < .003) subscales. Furthermore, the
Responsibility/Threat Estimation subscale predicted Washing and Mental Neutralizing subscales
beyond depression and anxiety (βs ≥ 0.27, ps < .05; Tolin et al., 2008). In a large sample of
nonclinical participants, structural equation modeling was used to demonstrate that the OBQ-44
Responsibility/Threat Estimation subscale predicted all six OCI-R subscales (βs ≥ 0.24, ps < .01;
Taylor et al., 2010). However, using the OBQ-87, the Responsibility subscale did not emerge as
a significant multivariate predictor for any of the OCI-R subscales among a nonclinical sample
(F6, 520 = 1.79, p = .098; Tolin, Woods, & Abramowitz, 2003). Taken together, data suggest that
responsibility beliefs are related to OC symptoms, but it does not appear to be the only belief that
influences these symptoms.
Of note, the reduction of the six theoretically created OBQ-87 subscales to the three
OBQ-44 subscales may inadvertently hinder understanding of the relationships between beliefs
and OC symptoms, because multiple beliefs are incorporated within a single subscale. Although
these subscales are highly related, there is some distinction with regard to content, which may
mask relationships among individual beliefs and symptom. With this limitation in mind,
empirical evidence gathered from the OBQ supports Salkovskis’s (1985) emphasis on inflated
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responsibility as a key cognitive variable in the development and maintenance of OCD (Forrester
et al., 2002; Steketee et al., 1998; Taylor et al., 2010).
Although the cognitive model of obsessions proposed by Salkovskis (1985; 1989)
emphasizing inflated responsibility as a key misappraisal has established empirical evidence
supporting its influence on OC behaviors, this model is not without limitations. First, the
cognitive model of OCD is complex. The inflated belief that one is responsible for any direct or
indirect effects of intrusive thoughts appears to be important to the cognitive model of OCD;
however, there may be other variables that are equally important, and the additive or interactive
effect of these other cognitive beliefs may be key for eliciting OC behavior. For example, Wilson
and Chambless (1999) found support for a partial mediation model in which responsibility
appraisals (β = 0.17, p < .05) partially mediated the relationship between responsibility schemas
and OC symptoms (β = 0.27, p < .01). This result suggests that the responsibility schema
operates in part due to responsibility appraisals in enhancing OC severity, which is not fully
consistent with Salkovskis’s (1985) model. Salkovskis’s (1985) model posits that automatic
thoughts regarding responsibility are triggered exclusively by thoughts that are filtered through a
responsibility schema to increase OC symptom severity. In addition, the relationship between
responsibility schemas and appraisals, although significant, demonstrated small effect sizes for
predicting OC severity after accounting for negative affect (ΔR2 < .10; Wilson & Chambless,
1999). This research leaves room to speculate whether other cognitive variables may exacerbate
OC symptom severity indirectly or interactively. Investigating other third variables would yield a
more comprehensive cognitive model of the development and maintenance of OCD.
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Thought-Action Fusion

The theoretical concept of TAF has been recognized informally since the 1930s, when
individuals who exhibited obsessional complaints were reported to fuse their thoughts with their
actions (Shafran & Rachman, 2004). The construct of TAF was formally recognized by
Rachman (1993) as a key cognitive bias within the cognitive model of OCD. The dysfunctional
belief of TAF is defined as the tendency of an individual to believe his/her internal thoughts can
influence external reality (Shafran et al., 1996). Two major aspects of TAF consistently emerge
empirically and have been termed TAF moral and TAF likelihood. TAF moral is the cognitive
bias through which a person believes that thinking about an immoral action is equivalent to
actually performing the immoral action (Shafran et al., 1996). As an example of TAF moral, a
person may believe that thinking about committing an adulterous act is equal to actually
engaging in an infidelity. TAF likelihood refers to an individual believing that his/her thoughts
about an event can increase the likelihood of the event actually occurring (Shafran et al., 1996).
For example, if an individual has a thought about a loved one being in a car accident, s/he
believes having the thought actually increases the likelihood of the loved one being in a car
accident. TAF likelihood itself has been found to separate into two components in student and
nonclinical samples, as well as mixed anxiety disorder patients corresponding to beliefs
concerning self and others (Bailey et al., 2014; Shafran et al., 1996). For instance, a person who
endorses TAF likelihood-self may believe that having harmful thoughts about oneself becoming
ill increases the likelihood of her/him becoming ill. Similarly, TAF likelihood-others involves
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the belief that harmful thoughts about another person increases the likelihood of actual harm to
that person.

Measurement of TAF

The construct of TAF was first assessed by a subscale of a measure of inflated
responsibility (Rachman, Thordarson, Shafran, & Woody, 1995), and shortly thereafter as standalone content using the TAFS (Shafran et al., 1996). The measurement of TAF relies heavily on
self-report of the experience of TAF and a participant’s perception of his/her thoughts, feelings,
and beliefs related to TAF. Consequently, research on TAF relies primarily on the self-report
TAFS as the only assessment of TAF beliefs.
The TAFS is a 19-item self-report scale that was validated using both individuals
diagnosed with OCD and nonclinical participants. Interestingly, the TAFS has demonstrated a
differential factor structure for OCD versus non-OCD samples (Shafran et al., 1996).
Specifically, in nonclinical samples, a 2-factor solution reflecting Moral and Likelihood factors
accounted for less variance (59%-65% student and 66% community) compared to a 3-factor
solution consisting of Moral, Likelihood-others, and Likelihood-self (66%˗69% student, 75%
community, 63% anxiety disorder; Bailey et al., 2014; Shafran et al., 1996). Conversely, only the
2-factor solution was supported in a sample of individuals diagnosed with OCD, and accounted
for 71% of the variance (Shafran et al., 1996). The TAFS facets intercorrelate moderately to
strongly (3-factor solution r = .25˗.73; 2-factor solution r = .32), but are best viewed as distinct
due to (a) the generally moderate values and (b) differential correlations with measures of mood

22
and anxiety (Abramowitz, Whiteside, Lynam, & Kalsy, 2003; Bailey et al., 2014; Coles, Mennin,
& Heimberg, 2001; Rassin, Merckelbach, Muris, & Schmidt, 2001; Shafran et al., 1996). For
example, Abramowitz et al. (2003) demonstrated that TAFS Moral was significantly related to
the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) when
controlling for scores on the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Speilberger et al., 1983; r =
.22, p < .05), whereas TAFS Likelihood-self and Likelihood-others were significantly related to
the STAI while controlling for the BDI (Self, r = .34, p < .001; Others, r = .38, p < .001).
Additionally, controlling for the reverse sequence did not yield significant correlations for any of
the three subscales of the TAFS. Furthermore, recent research has demonstrated that the three
factors of the TAFS have relatively specific and distinct relationships to various measures of
psychopathology (Bailey et al., 2014). For example, TAFS Moral and TAFS Likelihood-others
were relatively specific to OC symptoms, whereas TAFS Likelihood-self was similarly related to
depression, worry, panic, and social anxiety symptoms compared with its relationship to OC
symptoms (Bailey et al., 2014). Given that the facets of the TAFS appear to be distinct, using a
total score for this measure may mask more nuanced relations.

Relationship of TAF to Other OC Beliefs.

As noted, the relationships among OC beliefs are complex. Although several OC beliefs
are represented as distinct subscales of the OBQ, the intercorrelations among the subscales and
limited evidence for a consistent structure (Wu & Carter, 2008a) make for an ill-defined
cognitive model of OCD. The contemporary cognitive model posits that dysfunctional OC
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beliefs lead to a maladaptive misappraisal of intrusive thoughts to produce distress that is
subsequently alleviated via compulsive behaviors. The direct influence of these dysfunctional
beliefs on OC symptoms has gained empirical support (Berman et al., 2011; Ladouceur et al.,
1997; Rassin, Merckelbach, Muris, & Spaan, 1999; Taylor et al., 2010).
For example, Rassin et al. (1999) attempted to experimentally induce TAF likelihood to
assess whether it directly promoted discomfort, perceived intrusiveness of thoughts, and OC
symptoms. To simulate TAF likelihood-others, high school students were informed that thinking
of the word “apple” would produce an electroencephalography (EEG) recording that would
result in a small electrical shock delivered to a confederate participant. Control participants were
told that the EEG would monitor whether they thought of the word “apple,” but no consequences
for the thought were implied (Rassin et al., 1999). The participants then were informed that
pressing a button would interrupt the shock so that the other participant would not be shocked.
Results revealed that signal-interrupting behaviors were significantly correlated with the number
of intrusions reported post-experiment (r = .94, p < .01; Rassin et al., 1999). In addition, Rassin
et al. (1999) found that those who received the TAF induction reported significantly more
intrusions (t44 = -2.8, p = .006), discomfort (t44 = -4.2, p < .001), and efforts to avoid thinking of
the word (t44 = -4.6, p < .001). However, pre-experimental induction TAFS subscale scores were
uncorrelated with the number of intrusions and discomfort reported post-experiment (Rassin et
al., 1999). Thus, altering in vivo appraisals concerning the influence of one’s thoughts on others
has a direct impact on OC-like responses, but pre-existing levels of the belief were not related to
the OC symptom outcome measures.
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The indirect influence of these dysfunctional beliefs on OC symptoms, such as the
interaction of these beliefs in producing OC behaviors, has garnered little attention in the extant
literature (Taylor et al., 2010). To date, only one study has examined whether beliefs interact to
predict OC symptom severity (Taylor et al., 2005). In a secondary data analysis using a crosssectional sample of individuals diagnosed with OCD, interactions among OC beliefs of the
OBQ-44 did not account for significant variance in OC symptoms beyond direct influences of
OC beliefs and general distress (Taylor et al., 2005). However, this finding has yet to be
replicated, and an alternative approach to assessing the interactions among OC beliefs is
warranted.
Empirically assessing direct, indirect, and interactive influences of OC beliefs and
resultant appraisals on later OC behaviors will help to clarify the cognitive-behavioral model of
OCD, aid in correctly modeling OC experiences in a laboratory setting, and address all relevant
OC belief influences in treatment. It is hypothesized here that a cognitive-behavioral perspective
that only accounts for direct influences is too reductionistic and may omit relevant information,
ultimately obscuring the complex nature of these beliefs in relation to OC symptoms.
Establishing whether indirect influences, such as the interactions among OC beliefs, are present
may enhance the cognitive-behavioral model of OCD and improve treatment and research within
this domain.
The relationship of TAF facets to other established OC beliefs is unclear (Berle &
Starcevic, 2005; Rassin et al., 1999; Shafran & Rachman, 2004). Initially, the OBQ-87
theoretically placed all content assessing TAF beliefs under the domain of Importance of
Thoughts. Later, the 44-item OBQ used factor analysis to reduce the number of item on the OBQ
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and combine the six rationally-derived subscales, wherein TAF content was said to remain under
the Importance/Control of Thoughts subscale. However, research has demonstrated that the TAF
likelihood beliefs may not be represented on the OBQ-44, raising questions about the
relationship between TAF likelihood and other OC beliefs (Bailey et al., 2014). The issue of
representativeness may also be complicated by the presence of distinct facets of TAF. Although
facets of TAF are often grouped within importance of thoughts beliefs, these facets, particularly
likelihood facets, may have conceptual relations with inflated responsibility beliefs (Amir et al.,
2001; Berle & Starcevic, 2005; Rachman et al., 1995; Salkovskis, 1985; Salkovskis et al., 2000).
Nevertheless, TAF continues to be reported as represented under the domain of
Importance/Control of Thoughts on the OBQ-44, and there is limited research assessing the exact
nature of how TAF is related to the more prominent OC beliefs.
Theoretical distinctions of TAF facets. Distinctions between TAF moral and TAF
likelihood beliefs may lie in the internal or external focus of perceived threat and the emotional
outcomes of the intrusive thoughts. For TAF moral, believing that one’s immoral intrusive
thoughts are equal to performing the act in reality threatens one’s self-concept—one possesses
poor moral character—and not a threat of imminent danger (Berle & Starcevic, 2005). In
essence, the awful outcome of thinking a bad thought has already occurred and cannot be
revoked. The threat becomes internal and the focus turns to preventing that thought from
occurring again (e.g., avoidance, suppression). In this scenario, shame and guilt may be the
primary emotional outcomes of possessing elevated TAF moral, which may invoke depressivelike distress symptoms (i.e., feeling helpless/hopeless). In contrast, believing that thoughts about
negative events can influence the likelihood of those events characterizes an impending, external
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threat. One may encounter emotional responses of anxiety and looming blame if the event were
to occur, which may potentiate behaviors aimed at reducing future harm and liability (i.e.,
neutralizing, reassurance-seeking).
Emotional consequences of blame have been associated with inflated responsibility
beliefs, in that one has the responsibility to prevent any harm that may come about because of
his/her intrusive thoughts and evidence compulsive acts to reduce his/her culpability for future
negative events (Berle & Starcevic, 2005). Accordingly, it is suggested here that individuals who
are high in TAF likelihood-others may also endorse inflated responsibility beliefs, and the
interaction of the two produce perceived blame, distress, and anxiety when confronted with a
threatening, intrusive thoughts regarding others’ safety. As such, the individual may be at a
higher likelihood for engaging in neutralizing behaviors to reduce perceived blameworthiness
and future harm.

Experimental TAF Inductions

There are two general approaches for experimental inducing of TAF in the extant
literature. First is the innovative study design by Rassin et al. (1999) who induced TAF
likelihood-others using a sample of high school students who were assumed to be naïve
regarding study procedures. Participants who experienced the TAF induction—thinking “apple”
would lead to an electric shock of a fellow participant—indicated more intrusive thoughts of the
word “apple,” more discomfort, and increased resistance to having the thoughts “apple”
compared to those who did not receive the TAF induction (Rassin et al., 1999).
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The second research design to manipulate TAF is a sentence task (or paradigm) wherein
participants write that they hope harm befalls a loved one, which is used to induce obsessive
characteristics to examine neutralizing behavior. This task was first performed by Rachman et al.
(1996) with undergraduate participants who were recruited for the study based on their elevated
proneness to TAF. Participants were excluded from the study if they (a) had a baseline score on
the visual analogue scale (VAS) for anxiety above a 20, (b) scored above a 16 on the BDI, and
(c) did not evidence TAFS Moral and TAFS Likelihood. After completing a questionnaire
battery, participants engaged in a brief relaxation exercise until they verbally indicated that their
anxiety was below a 30 on a verbal analogue scale (VeAS) ranging from 0 (not at all) to 100
(extremely high). Prior to the manipulation, participants were also asked to rate their feelings of
guilt on the VeAS. Next, participants were asked to think of a loved one and write a sentence that
provoked obsession-like unacceptable thoughts. The specific procedure required participants to
write in the name of the loved one into the following sentence: “I hope __________ is in a car
accident.”
After completing the sentence task, participants were asked to use the VeAS to answer
the following questions: “(1) How much guilt do you feel right now? (2) How much anxiety do
you feel right now? (3) What is the likelihood of the event occurring in the next 24 hours? (4)
How much control do you have over the event occurring? (5) How responsible would you feel if
the event did occur in the next 24 hours? (6) How morally wrong was it to write out the
sentence? (7) How strong is your urge to reduce or cancel out the effects of writing the
sentence?” (Rachman et al., 1996, p. 891). Participants who reported anxiety below and 50 or an
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urge to neutralize below 20 on the VeAS after the sentence task were then excluded from
analyses (Rachman et al., 1996).
Following the sentence task and ratings, participants experienced one of two conditions.
In the neutralize first condition, participants were told that they “may do whatever they wish to
reduce or cancel the effects of writing the sentence” (Rachman et al., 1996, p. 892). It is unclear
how long participants were given in the neutralize first condition, but, based on later
investigations of this task (i.e., van den Hout et al., 2001), it is assumed that participants were
given approximately two minutes to perform any neutralizing behaviors. For the delay first
condition, participants were instructed to engage in a distraction task (i.e., read a magazine
article) for 20 minutes. After their assigned condition experience, participants again were asked
to rate their response to the above mentioned seven questions using the VeAS (Rachman et al.,
1996). After making their second rating, participants in the delay condition were given the
instructions for neutralizing while participants in the neutralize first condition were asked to
engage in the distraction task for 20 minutes (Rachman et al., 1996). Participants again provided
VeAS ratings after experiencing the second condition.
The results of the Rachman et al. (1996) study demonstrate that after completing the
sentence task, all participants experienced increased anxiety (t62 = 24.6, p < .001) and guilt (t62 =
13.3, p < .001). Participants who were given the opportunity to neutralize immediately following
the sentence task experienced significant declines in six of the seven outcome variables: mean
anxiety (t28 = 11.9, p < .001), guilt (t28 = 6.9, p < .008), estimates of probability of the event
occurring (t28 = 3.1, p < .008), responsibility (t28 = 3.7, p < .008), judgments of immorality of the
task (t28 = 3.5, p < .05), and urge to neutralize (t28 = 6.3, p < .008). However, in the neutralize
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first condition, there were no significant changes in feelings of control over the threat (t28 = 0.9, p
> .008). Anxiety continued to decline (t28 = 3.6, p < .008) during the distraction condition that
followed the opportunity to neutralize.
A similar pattern of results was observed in the delay first condition: significant decline
in anxiety following the 20 minute delay without neutralizing (t33 = 17.8, p < .008), guilt,
estimates of event occurring, responsibility, immorality, urge to neutralize, along with no
significant changes in feelings of control over the threat (t33 = 0.01, p > .05). The nonsignificant
change in VeAS rating for control over the threat in both conditions may be explained by floor
level VeAS ratings of this variable. The broad conclusion was that both conditions produced
similar results when participants were given the opportunity to engage in neutralization
immediately following the sentence task or instructed to engage in a distraction task for 20
minutes following the manipulation (Rachman et al., 1996).
Interestingly, the urge to neutralize remained high in the delay first condition although
anxiety significantly decreased after the 20-minute delay, and this urge was significantly higher
for the delay condition compared to the immediate neutralization condition following each initial
phase (F1,60 = 7.4, p < .008; Rachman et al., 1996). The authors posit that although anxiety may
decrease during the 20-minute delay, feelings of responsibility may only be relieved through the
act of neutralizing (Rachman et al., 1996). Consistent with this speculation, the urge to neutralize
in the delay condition significantly decreased after performing a neutralizing act after the 20minute delay (t31 = 6.1, p < .008). Notably, correlational analyses revealed that pre-existing
TAFS Likelihood-others scores were significantly correlated with evoked anxiety (r = .26, p <
.05), feeling of responsibility if the event occurred (r = .38, p < .05), and estimates of control (r =
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.32, p < .05), but not with the urge to neutralize (r = .22, p > .05). Although not very much lower
in absolute terms compared to the other obtained correlations, this nonsignificant association of
the urge to neutralize and TAFS Likelihood-others is unusual given that participants were
selected for this study based on their self-reported proneness to engage in TAF and participated
in a task that is said to evoke TAF related appraisals. One may consider whether a third variable,
such as inflated responsibility beliefs, may be associated with the urge to cancel out any
perceived negative future events following appraisals of increased likelihood of the negative
event.
To establish the use of the sentence task to evoke OC behaviors such as neutralizing, van
den Hout et al. (2001) replicated Rachman et al. (1996) and compared the “natural decay” of
anxiety against the immediate mitigation of anxiety using neutralizing behaviors. To assess the
natural decay of anxiety, van den Hout et al. (2001) prompted participants for VAS reports of
anxiety and the urge to neutralize at the same time intervals for both the neutralization and delay
conditions: pre-TAF task; immediately after TAF task; and 2 minutes, 18 minutes, and 20
minutes post-TAF task. This study did not assess the behaviors of the participants following the
sentence task and used time as the main variable of interest.
Using an unselected undergraduate sample, van den Hout et al. (2001) were able to
replicate the findings from Rachman et al. (1996). Specifically, participants displayed an
increase in anxiety (F1, 77 = 210.2, p < .001) and an urge to neutralize (t39 = 6.7, p <.001)
regardless of immediate or delayed neutralizing. In addition, an immediate opportunity to
neutralize resulted in a significant decrease in both anxiety (t39 = 9.3, p <.001) and urge to
neutralize (t39 = 6.7, p <.001). The observed decrease in anxiety after the 2-minute opportunity to
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neutralize was significantly greater than ratings taken two minutes into the delay condition (F1, 76
= 4.2, p = .05). Similarly, the urge to neutralize declined to a greater extent after the 2-minute
opportunity to neutralize compared to ratings taken after two minutes into the delay condition
(F1, 76 = 6.1, p = .02). However, the calculated effect sizes for the urge to neutralize in both
conditions were almost identical (2-minute neutralizing condition d’ = 1.07; 2-minute delay
condition d’ = 1.08). The effect of neutralizing after two minutes on anxiety (d’ = 1.49), while
not identical, was comparable to anxiety ratings after a 2-minute delay post-TAF task in the
neutralizing condition (d’ = 1.10). The authors concluded that neutralizing does not yield a
greater effect on anxiety and the urge to neutralize compared to natural decay of anxiety during
the same interval in a sample of nonclinical participants (van den Hout et al., 2001).
However, it remains that the effect of neutralizing on anxiety was larger, and one may
wonder what factors led individuals to engage in neutralizing? The authors contend that
neutralizing does not go beyond doing nothing to alleviate anxiety and reduce the urge to
neutralize. What would motivate individuals to engage in such behavior if it does not appear to
benefit them compared to doing nothing? Does performing neutralizing behaviors relieve other
concerns (e.g., feeling responsible for negative outcomes, looming blame for negative events)?
When faced with the appraisals of increased likelihood of the negative event occurring, will
individuals who feel more responsible for future negative events be more likely to perform
neutralizing responses? The study conducted by van den Hout et al. (2001) also revealed no
relationship between any of the TAFS subscale with changes in anxiety (all rs < .20, ps > .16) or
the decrease in the urge to neutralize after performing the acts (all rs < .12, ps > .49). Thus,
initial TAFS scores were not an adequate forecast for the effects of writing the sentence or
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neutralizing behaviors (van den Hout et al., 2001). The limited variability of TAF in a
nonclinical sample prior to the provocation of TAF may attenuate these correlations.
Additionally, it may be the case that TAF likelihood beliefs lead to neutralizing responses more
often when other beliefs are activated. For instance, nonclinical samples may require provocation
of a third variable, such as inflated responsibility, in order for TAF beliefs to influence responses
to the sentence task. If a predisposition to TAF beliefs is inconsistently related to changes in
anxiety and the urge to neutralize, then what prompts these effects? It is hypothesized here that
responsibility beliefs, TAF beliefs, and TAF appraisals may interact to produce neutralizing in
response to the TAF sentence task.
In a follow-up study, van den Hout et al. (2002) investigated whether undergraduates
would spontaneously neutralize when there were no explicit instructions given about
neutralization. The authors were also interested in whether visual imagery increased anxiety
beyond writing the sentence and whether baseline TAFS Likelihood-others scores moderated the
emotional effects of writing the sentence and neutralizing. Participants were asked to complete
the sentence manipulation and imagery of the sentence. After writing the sentence, participants
gave immediate VAS rating of anxiety. Next, participants were instructed to close their eyes and
think about the situation they just wrote. Once participants felt that they had a clear image of the
situation, they provided a VAS anxiety rating. Following this task, participants were randomly
assigned to one of three conditions: (a) told that they “may do whatever they wish to try to
reduce or cancel the effects of the sentence” (van den Hout et al., 2002, p. 182) and given
explicit examples of neutralizing behavior; (b) given no instruction and asked to wait for two
minutes; and (c) asked to perform arithmetic aloud for two minutes as a distraction. After
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engaging in one of these three conditions, participants were asked to think about the sentence
they wrote in the beginning of the study to determine whether those who engaged in distraction
had a greater rebound in anxiety because of a lack of neutralizing. This assessment allowed van
den Hout et al. (2002) to test their hypothesis that neutralization goes beyond the natural decay
of anxiety; the authors predicted that individuals who were prevented from neutralizing would
feel more threatened by re-exposure to the thought and experience a greater rebound in anxiety.
Notably, individuals who were given neutralization instructions engaged in a similar
number of neutralizing behaviors as those who were given no instructions (t79 = 0.26, p = .40;
van den Hout et al., 2002). It was found that, regardless of group, anxiety increased significantly
after writing the sentence with a loved one’s name (ES = 0.67) and visualization of the sentence
led to a further increase in anxiety (ES = 0.08), and VAS reports of anxiety significantly
decreased after two minutes (ES = 1.07). Taken together, the authors concluded that neutralizing
behaviors do not account for the decrease in anxiety beyond a natural decay in anxiety over time.
When participants were asked to think about the sentence again, all three groups had a similar
increase in anxiety (F2, 117 = 1.3, p > .05), suggesting that preventing neutralizing does not make
an intrusive thought more anxiety producing compared to those who engaged in neutralizing
(van den Hout et al., 2002). Lastly, there was no association between change in anxiety from
baseline to after both writing and visualizing the sentence and TAFS Likelihood-others
(Spearman’s rho = .01, p > .05). However, there was a significant association between the
change in anxiety after writing the sentence and TAFS Likelihood-others (rho = .19, p < .05). In
addition, those who indicated spontaneous neutralization efforts in the no instruction group
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tended to have higher TAFS Likelihood-others scores (rho = .40, p < .01; van den Hout et al.,
2002).
Given the pattern of associations and the conclusion that neutralization provides no added
benefit (e.g., increased anxiety reduction) compared to natural decay, then what factors are
involved in the production and reduction of anxiety and urge to neutralize? Why do individuals
not diagnosed with OCD often choose to engage in neutralization when given the opportunity?
One factor on which individuals diagnosed with OCD and nonclinical samples differ are beliefs
about their intrusive thoughts (OCCWG, 2001; 2005). Furthermore, the relationship among the
prominent OC beliefs is convoluted (OCCWG, 1997). A single belief, TAFS Likelihood-others,
has demonstrated an inconsistent relationship with anxiety and the urge to neutralize after
completing the sentence task. As such, a potential area of investigation is whether a prerequisite
of believing that one has pivotal power in causing and preventing harm (i.e., inflated
responsibility) is necessary to activate TAF likelihood-others beliefs and related in vivo
appraisals to produce the urge to neutralize. The belief that the action is associated with personal
responsibility for future harm may be necessary to potentiate a neutralizing response to TAF
likelihood beliefs and appraisals. When this task is implemented in a nonclinical group, natural
decay of anxiety partly accounts for reductions in anxiety, rather than neutralization efforts,
perhaps because beliefs of personal responsibility for preventing future danger to others have not
been activated. Thus, nonclinical individuals are able to rationalize that they would not be
responsible for future negative events because of their thoughts about harm to others. The
absence of these beliefs may result in less impact of neutralizing behaviors in relieving anxiety
compared to natural decay of anxiety over time in response to the TAF sentence task.
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To investigate the contribution of magical thinking (i.e., illogical attributions of causality)
to neutralizing behaviors, Bocci and Gordon (2007) utilized the Rachman et al. (1996) TAF
sentence task to elicit such behaviors. Unselected undergraduate participants first completed a set
of questionnaires that included the TAFS, the Magical Ideation Scale (MIS; Eckblad &
Chapman, 1983), the STAI, and the Padua Inventory—Washington State University Revised (PIWSUR; Burns et al., 1996). Next, participants were asked to rate their initial levels of anxiety
using a VAS. From there, participants engaged in the TAF sentence task. Once the task was
completed, participants were instructed to visualize the event for 30 seconds. Participants then
used the VAS to respond to the following: feelings of distress, moral wrongness for writing the
sentence, likelihood of harm arising as a consequence, responsibility for consequences, urge to
cancel thoughts, and state anxiety (Bocci & Gordon, 2007). Those participants who did not
indicate on the VAS a level of anxiety above 50 following the sentence task were excluded from
the study. Next, participants were told they did not have to, but could do anything during that
time, and they could include the sheet of paper in their actions (Bocci & Gordon, 2007).
Results of the study indicate that all participants displayed a significant increase in
anxiety from baseline to immediately following the TAF sentence task according to their VAS
responses (z = -6.08, p <.001). There was no significant association between increases in anxiety
during that time and TAFS Likelihood (r = -.12, p > .05), MIS (r = -.04, p > .05) and PI-WSUR
(r = -.06, p > .05; Bocci & Gordon, 2007). Of the 49 participants, 48 described both overt and
covert behaviors performed in response to the sentence task. The authors went on to code the
self-reported behaviors into neutralizing and non-neutralizing behaviors. Using the definition for
neutralizing provided by Freeston and Ladouceur (1997), behaviors that were (a) not logically
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connected to the intrusive thought provided by the sentence task and (b) determined not to be a
normal coping behavior were considered neutralizing behaviors; behaviors that did not meet
these criteria were considered non-neutralizing behaviors (Bocci & Gordon, 2007).
Comparing the neutralizing and non-neutralizing groups, those in the neutralizing group
had significantly greater TAFS Likelihood scores (t47 = 2.12, p < .05) and MIS scores (t46 = 2.63,
p < .05), but were not significantly different on OC symptoms, depression, TAFS Moral and
state anxiety. Furthermore, Mann Whitney U-tests of differences (U) revealed that the
neutralizing group demonstrated higher VAS ratings of likelihood (U = 105.0, p < .01), distress
(U = 115.0, p < .01), responsibility (U = 97.0, p <.005), and urge to cancel the thought (U =
100.0, p < .005) following the sentence task. However, Bocci and Gordon (2007) found no
association between decreases in either anxiety or the urge to neutralize following the
opportunity to do so and TAFS Likelihood (r = .02/.10, p > .05), TAFS Moral (r = .07/-.15, p >
.05), MIS (r = .07/.22, p > .05), or PI-WSUR (r = -.11/-.15, p > .05).
Thus, those participants who engaged in neutralizing behaviors reported significantly
higher TAFS Likelihood scores than those who did not engage in neutralizing behavior (Bocci &
Gordon, 2007). In addition, prior to the opportunity to neutralize, VAS ratings of responsibility
and perceived likelihood of the event occurring were significantly higher for those who did
neutralize compared to those who were deemed to have not neutralized. In addition, those who
engaged in neutralizing behaviors evidenced a significantly greater urge to neutralize (U = 122.0,
p = .02) and greater feelings of responsibility should the accident occur (U = 112.5, p = .01) even
after neutralizing (Bocci & Gordon, 2007). Yet, the broader TAFS Likelihood subscale and OC
symptoms were unrelated to increased anxiety following the TAF sentence task, and decreases in
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both anxiety and the urge to neutralize after the opportunity to neutralize among all of the
participants. In sum, TAF beliefs do not appear to potentiate anxiety and the belief-related
concerns are not completely quelled by neutralizing. Future studies may seek to address whether
other variables may be influencing the response the sentence task. Given that participants’
ratings of VAS responsibility were significantly higher in the neutralizing group, this variable
may also influence emotional and behavioral responses to the sentence task.
The most recent published study regarding the TAF sentence task sought to assess the
convergent and discriminant validity of behavioral indicators of TAF (i.e., neutralizing
behaviors) and the TAFS (Berman et al., 2011). The authors modified the sentence task to
include both TAF likelihood-others and a TAF moral manipulation. The sentence task for TAF
likelihood-others aligned with Rachman et al.’s (1996) application, wherein participants thought
of a loved one, then wrote a sentence indicating that they hoped the beloved were to be in a car
accident. The sentence task was modified to activate TAF moral by instructing participants to
insert a loved relative’s name into the following sentence: “I hope I have sex with ________.”
Prior to the study, participants completed online self-report measures that consisted of the
Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 (ASI-3; Taylor et al., 2007), the Center of Epidemiological Studies
Depression Scale (CESD; Radloff, 1977), and the TAFS. As a measure of discriminant validity,
the ASI-3 and CESD were expected to be unrelated to in vivo ratings of current level of anxiety,
perceived likelihood of the event occurring due to their behaviors of thinking and writing about
the event, and the perceived moral wrongness of their behaviors. To assess convergent validity,
the TAFS was expected to be positively related to the in vivo appraisal ratings (Berman et al.,
2011).
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After post-sentence ratings of anxiety, likelihood of the event occurring because of
writing the sentence, and moral wrongness of writing the sentence were recorded using a VAS,
participants read on a computer screen “You may now do anything you wish to reduce or cancel
the effects of writing or thinking about the sentence” (Berman et al., 2011, p. 158). It was
expected that the instruction would give participants the opportunity to perform behaviors that
were functionally equivalent to neutralizing that could be recorded and coded as such (Berman et
al., 2011). Participants performed both the TAF likelihood-others and TAF moral sentence tasks.
The results of this study provided mixed support for the specificity of the TAFS to the in
vivo ratings. The discriminant validity assessment for both tasks was supported; the in vivo
rating for the likelihood of the event occurring, the anxiety produced by the task, moral
wrongness of performing the task, and neutralizing behaviors in response to the task were
uncorrelated with the CESD and the ASI-3. In regards to convergent validity for the TAF
likelihood-others task, in vivo ratings of likelihood of the event occurring (r = .26, p < .01) and
anxiety (r = .37, p < .001) were significantly correlated with the TAFS Likelihood-others
subscale and were not significantly correlated with TAFS Moral (rs > .17, ps > .05). However,
neutralizing behavior in response to the Likelihood-others task was uncorrelated with TAFS
Likelihood-others (point-biserial correlation = -.03, p > .05), whereas neutralizing after the TAF
likelihood-others task was correlated with the TAFS Moral subscale (r = .23, p < .05).
Turning to the validity of the TAF moral task, results of this manipulation were more
consistent with the study’s hypotheses; in vivo rating of anxiety (r = .23, p < .05), moral
wrongness (r = .26, p < .01), and neutralizing behavior were correlated with the TAFS Moral
subscale (point-biserial correlation = .25, p < .05). However, participants’ rating of anxiety
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following the TAF moral sentence task also significantly correlated with TAFS Likelihood
others (r = .33, p < .001) and TAFS Likelihood-self (r = .23, p < .05).
As discussed by Berman et al. (2011), there was no assessment of covert neutralizing
behaviors, and it is possible that those in the TAFS Likelihood-others task engaged in more
covert than overt neutralizing behaviors. Perhaps a feeling of moral wrongness is easily
activated, in which an incestuous statement would lead a person to feel a more powerful need to
overtly neutralize the thoughts. Furthermore, neutralizing behavior(s) may have the desired
effect (i.e., relieving discomfort) in response to the incest sentence. Conversely, when attempting
to elicit neutralizing behaviors in response to the TAF likelihood-others task, one may need to be
primed to believe s/he is responsible for any harm that may result from having a thought.
Without an inflated responsibility activation, participants may feel more removed from the
activity of writing the sentence and may not feel a strong need to perform an overt behavior to
reduce his/her anxiety. In this case, either performing a covert neutralizing may suffice in
reducing anxiety, and overt action may not be required to reduce anxiety.
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CHAPTER 3
PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY

In sum, the TAF task is established in the extant literature as a method that elicits
“obsession-like” anxiety and appraisals regarding an intrusive thought (Rachman et al., 1996). In
addition, if given the opportunity, participants will often engage in behaviors to neutralize their
increased anxiety and relieve an urge to cancel out harm that may arise because of writing the
sentence (Berman et al., 2011; Bocci & Gordon, 2007; van den Hout et al., 2002). However,
findings from the TAF likelihood-others sentence task have been inconsistent with predictions
from a cognitive-behavioral perspective. Numerous studies using this methodology have
demonstrated that TAFS Likelihood-others scores are unrelated to participants’ ratings of the
urge to neutralize following the TAF likelihood-others sentence task (Rachman et al., 1996),
decreases in the urge to neutralize following the opportunity to neutralize (Bocci & Gordon,
2007; van den Hout et al., 2002), and overt neutralizing behaviors (Berman et al., 2011). Such
results are counter to the cognitive-behavioral model of OCD. When engaging in a task proposed
to stimulate TAF likelihood-others interpretations, it is surprising that the assessment of this
belief prior to the task is unrelated to outcome variables proposed in the cognitive-behavioral
model of OCD (e.g., urge to neutralize, neutralizing).
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The proposed research sought to address these anomalies. It is unknown if (a) heightened
inflated responsibility beliefs among nonclinical participants produces a stronger urge to
neutralize in response to the TAF task in comparison to those whose responsibility beliefs are not
activated, (b) individuals with activated inflated responsibility beliefs engage in more
(overt/covert) neutralizing behaviors compared to those who do not have activated responsibility
beliefs, and (c) inflated responsibility moderates the association between TAF beliefs and
neutralizing responses.
In addressing the above three issues, the proposed research aimed to contribute to OCD’s
conceptualization, treatment, and research methods. A major objective of this study was to assess
variables that enhance the likelihood of using neutralization as an anxiety reduction strategy,
which may enhance knowledge of development and maintenance factors of OCD and bolster
CBT methods utilized in the treatment of OCD. Extent research has demonstrated that
neutralization efforts have little benefit beyond natural decay in a nonclinical sample. Yet, many
participants choose to employ neutralizing behaviors following the TAF sentence task (Bocci &
Gordon, 2007). As noted, baseline TAF beliefs often are unrelated to changes in anxiety
following neutralization and the heightened urge to neutralize. Using an experimental approach,
this study examined whether enhancing a person’s beliefs in his/her responsibility for future
negative events contributed to anxiety and covert and overt neutralizing behaviors following the
TAF sentence task and intensified the relationship between TAFS Likelihood-others and OC
outcomes. Results of this study may offer a nuanced understanding of what conditions influence
the use of neutralizing to reduce anxiety in response to maladaptive TAF appraisals of intrusive
thoughts.
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Regarding research methods, this project assessed whether the OC experience is being
appropriately modeled in experimental designs. For a nonclinical sample, the TAF sentence task
may be too reductionistic to adequately represent the complex experience of those diagnosed
with OCD. Although TAF appraisals may be elicited from the TAF sentence task, the indirect
influence from pre-existing beliefs on in vivo appraisals to stimulate neutralizing has not been
examined. Specifically, high responsibility beliefs may have a conditional influence on the
indirect relationship of TAF beliefs on neutralizing behavior. In particular, the indirect effect of
TAF likelihood-others beliefs on neutralizing urges and behaviors via likelihood appraisals may
only be significant for those who experience heightened responsibility beliefs (i.e., a conditional
indirect effect). Additionally, the current study attempted to assess cognitive neutralizing efforts,
which are often neglected in experimental designs using the TAF sentence task (Berman et al.,
2011).

Hypotheses

ollowing the TAF sentence task and compared to individuals manipulated to experience low
responsibility beliefs (low responsibility condition; LR) and control participants (control
condition), individuals manipulated to experience high responsibility beliefs (high responsibility
condition; HR) would evidence:
1. Significantly higher VAS anxiety ratings
2. Significantly higher VAS rating of likelihood
3. Significantly higher VAS rating of moral wrongness
4. Significantly higher VAS rating of responsibility
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5. Significantly higher VAS rating of blame
6. Significantly higher VAS rating of guilt
7. Significantly higher VAS rating of urge to neutralize
8. Significantly greater increase in anxiety ratings from baseline
9. Significantly greater decrease in anxiety ratings from immediately following the TAF
sentence task to post-neutralization period.
10. Significantly more self-reported cognitive and behavioral neutralizing responses
11. TAFS Likelihood-others beliefs will significantly predict the urge to neutralize (i.e.,
moderation)
12. TAFS Likelihood-others beliefs will significantly predict the number of neutralizing
responses (i.e., moderation)
Conditional Process Analysis:
13. VAS likelihood appraisals will mediate the relationship between TAFS likelihood-others.
However, the relationship between VAS likelihood appraisals and the urge to neutralize
(i.e., mediation b path) will be moderated by responsibility condition.
14. VAS likelihood appraisals will mediate the relationship between TAFS-likelihood-others.
However, the relationship between VAS likelihood appraisals and neutralizing behavior
(i.e., mediation b path) will be moderated by responsibility condition.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODS
Participants

Based on a G-Power analysis (power = .80) examining the fixed effects ANOVA
(special, main, and interaction effects) and established effects from the literature (partial η2 =
0.28; Rosen & Knäuper, 2009), this study initially aimed to recruit 90 participants from the
introductory psychology class at Northern Illinois University (NIU). Ultimately, a total of 173
participants were recruited via SONA systems on a volunteer basis to earn partial credit toward a
course research exposure requirement. Forty participants were excluded for not meeting
eligibility criteria (i.e., CESD > 30, n = 27; baseline anxiety VAS ratings ≥ 50, n = 13).
Additionally, participants were excluded from analyses if they did not appropriately complete the
manipulation (n = 6), did not believe manipulation feedback (n = 3), refused to write the
sentence (n = 10), failed too many validity items (n = 3), or had greater than 5% missing data (n
= 3). Six additional participants were removed due to errors in procedure. As such, a final sample
of n = 102 was retained for analysis. Comparing those who were removed from the analysis to
those who were retained, there were no significant differences in age (t166 = -0.85, p = .397), sex
(χ21, N = 170 = 0.04, p = .851), self-identified race (χ26, N = 124 = 4.77, p = .190), or self-identified
ethnicity (χ21, N = 167 = 0.06, p = .804). Seven of the 10 participants who refused to write the
sentence were assigned to the control condition, and the remaining three were assigned to the LR
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condition; there were significantly more refusals to write the sentence in the control condition
versus the HR condition (F2, 165 = 3.36, p = .04). The mean age of the final sample (M = 19.29,
SD = 1.7; MHR = 18.86, SDHR = 1.00; MLR = 19.69, SDLR = 2.33; MControl = 19.32, SDControl =
1.35), percent female (47.1%), percent Caucasian (51.0%), and percent Hispanic/Latino(a)
(10.8%) all were consistent with previous data reported for NIU’s PSYC 102 samples. Table 1
shows the group-based comparisons that indicated there were no significant differences among
conditions on any of these demographic variables (Age: F2, 99 = 2.22, p = .114; Sex: χ22, N = 102 =
0.71, p = .701; Self-identified race χ26, N = 102 = 3.01 p = .807; Ethnicity χ22, N = 102 = 1.10, p =
.576).
Table 1
Total Sample Characteristics

Characteristic
Sex
Male
Female
Age: M (SD)
Race
Caucasian/White
African American/Black
Bi-racial/Multi-racial
Other
Decline To Answer
Asian American
Ethnicity
Hispanic/Latino
Note. N = 102.

Total
n % (SD)

High
n
% (SD)

Low
n % (SD)

Control
n
% (SD)

54
52.9
48
47.1
19.29 (1.70)

17
48.5
18
51.4
18.86 (1.00)

21
58.3
15
41.7
19.69 (2.33)

16
51.6
15
48.4
19.32 (1.35)

52
25
10
8
4
3

51.0
24.5
9.8
7.8
3.9
2.9

19
8
1
3
3
1

54.3
22.9
2.9
8.6
8.6
2.9

18
8
6
4

50.0
22.2
16.7
11.1

15
9
3
1
1
2

48.4
29.0
9.7
3.2
3.2
6.5

15

14.7

7

20.0

4

11.1

4

12.9
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Measures

Thought-Action Fusion Scale (TAFS; Shafran et al., 1996)

This 19-item questionnaire assesses three facets of TAF using 5-point scales that range
from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). The TAFS has 12 items assessing TAF moral
(“if I wish harm on someone, it is almost as bad as doing harm”), 4 items assessing TAF
likelihood-other (“if I think of a relative/friend being in a car accident, this increases the risk
he/she will have a car accident”), and 3 items assessing TAF likelihood-self (“if I think of myself
falling ill, this increases the risk that I will fall ill”). Higher scores indicate more endorsement of
TAF. Shafran et al. (1996) reported adequate internal consistency with coefficient  ranging
from .85-.96 in student, non-clinical, and OC samples. This instrument demonstrates convergent
validity via moderate subscale correlations with the cleaning and checking subscales of the
Maudsley Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory (MOCI; Hodgson & Rachman, 1977; r = .28-.38, p
< .005) in a student sample (Shafran et al., 1996). Relative discriminant validity was exhibited
via lower subscale correlations with the BDI (r = .16-.28; Shafran et al., 1996). Further, partial
correlations between the TAFS subscales and the MOCI cleaning and checking subscales
remained significant after controlling for the BDI. See Appendix A.
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Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ; OCCWG, 2001, 2003)

This study used the original, rationally-derived OBQ-87. Participants self-report how
much they agree with a statement that is reflective of an OC belief on a 7-point scale ranging
from 1 (disagree very much) to 7 (agree very much). Higher scores indicate higher levels of OC
beliefs. The OBQ-87 consists of 6 belief domains (importance of thoughts, control of thoughts,
inflated responsibility, threat estimation, intolerance of uncertainty, and perfectionism). Sample
items are “for me, having bad urges is as bad as actually carrying them out” (importance of
thoughts), “if I don’t control my thoughts, I’ll be punished” (control of thoughts), “harmful
events will happen unless I am very careful” (threat estimation), “if I don’t act when I foresee
danger, then I am to blame for any consequences” (responsibility), “if I can’t do something
perfectly, I shouldn’t do it at all (perfectionism), and “if something unexpected happens, I will
not be able to cope with it” (intolerance of uncertainty).
Coefficient  ranged from .82-.93 for the six subscales in a student sample (OCCWG,
2003). The OBQ-87 evidenced good convergent validity with the PI-WSUR, with each subscale
of the OBQ-87 correlating with the PI-WSUR (r = .54-.74, p < .001) in a mixed sample of
individuals diagnosed with OCD, non-OCD anxiety disorders, and healthy controls (n = 245;
OCCWG, 2001). Furthermore, correlations of the six OBQ-87 subscales with the PI-WSUR total
score remained significant after controlling for general anxiety and depression (r = .25-.47, p <
.001; OCCWG, 2001). In the non-OCD sample, all subscales of the OBQ-87 correlated
significantly with the PI-WSUR (r = .49-.60, p < .001; OCCWG, 2003). To assess discriminant
validity, the partial mean subscale correlation of the OBQ-87 with the PI-WSUR was examined,
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after controlling for PSWQ scores in the non-OCD sample. The partial correlation for the mean
subscales correlation of the OBQ-87 with the PI-WSUR remained significant at p < .001(r = .37;
OCCWG, 2003). It appears that the subscales of the OBQ-87 have a specific relation of OC
symptoms in the non-OCD sample after accounting for self-reported worry. Additionally,
individuals diagnosed with OCD scored higher on all subscales of the OBQ-87 than anxiety
disorder and nonclinical controls, F(4,4456) = 14.21-48.26, p < .001 (OCCWG, 2001). However,
all belief domains of the OBQ-87 obtained significant correlations with the BDI (r = .32-.55, p <
.001; OCCWG, 2003). Partial correlations of the subscales of the OBQ-87 and the BDI
decreased substantially (r = .09-.34) after controlling for participants scores on the PI-WSUR,
although all but one of the correlations—inflated responsibility—remained significant (OCCWG,
2001). See Appendix B.
In 2005, the OCCWG reported on a revised version of the OBQ to address certain
limitations. Factor analysis supported a 3-factor solution comprising three “two-belief
composites” of the original six belief domains of the OBQ-87: responsibility/threat estimation
(16 items)1, importance/control of thoughts (12 items), and perfectionism/certainty (16 items).
The OCCWG (2005) found that a sample of individuals diagnosed with OCD scored
significantly higher than non-OCD anxious group on responsibility/threat estimation (F3, 3713 =
60.36, p < .001) and importance/control of thoughts (F3, 3713 = 59.13, p < .001). However, in a
sample of individuals diagnosed with OCD, the importance/control of thoughts domain did not
significantly predict any subscale of the PI-WSUR after controlling for general distress, whereas
the responsibility/threat estimation and perfectionism/certainty beliefs domains did. The OBQ1

An item originally designated as assessing intolerance of uncertainty on the OBQ-87 (item #53) became a
responsibility/threat estimation item on the OBQ-44 (item #23).
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44 represents an improvement in terms of factor structure and brevity, but may have sacrificed
information pertaining to OC beliefs. The OBQ-87 was completed for this study, allowing access
to both the 87-item and 44-item version subscales.

Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002)

The OCI-R is a short form of the original Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory (OCI; Foa et
al., 1998) and contains 18 self-report items rated on 5-point scales that range from 0 (not at all)
to 4 (extremely). Items assess the degree to which an individual has felt bothered or distressed
about each statement on the measure during the past month. Higher scores indicate more distress.
The OCI-R has six subscales; (1) Washing, (2) Obsessing, (3) Ordering, (4) Checking, (5)
Hoarding, and (6) Mental Neutralizing. The OCI-R coefficient s ranged from .34-.89 in a nonclinical sample, with the Mental Neutralizing and Checking subscales being the lowest (.34 and
.65, respectively; Foa et al., 2002). Despite the initial evidence of poor internal consistency, Wu
and Carter (2008a) found the coefficient  of the OCI-R subscales to range from .76-.88 in an
undergraduate sample (n = 778-805). The OCI-R demonstrated adequate convergent validity
with the MOCI (r = .85, p < .01) in a combined group of OCD and control participants (Foa et
al., 2002). Similarly, the measure evidences modest convergence with the Y-BOCS (r = .53, p <
.01; Foa et al., 2002). Note, the Y-BOCS is an assessment of OC symptom severity and is
intended for use in clinical populations, whereas the OCI-R is a measure of the presence of OC
symptoms, which is somewhat distinct from symptom severity. This may be a potential reason
for a comparatively smaller correlation with the Y-BOCS compared to the MOCI.
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Additionally, Wu and Carter (2008a) found the corresponding subscale correlations of the
OCI-R and PI-WSUR range from r = .65-.83 (p < .001) in an undergraduate sample. Foa et al.
(2002) found discriminant validity to be questionable, with the OCI-R correlating significantly
with the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (Spearman’s r = .58, p < .01; Hamilton, 1960)
and BDI (Spearman’s r = .70, p < .01). Yet, Wu and Carter (2008b) found the correlation of the
OCI-R subscales with measures of general distress related to anxiety and depression ranged from
.14-.46, p < .001. Although still significant, the magnitude of the correlation was substantially
lower than correlations demonstrated by Foa et al. (2002). See Appendix C.

Center for Epidemiological Studies-Depression Scale (CESD; Radloff, 1977)

The CESD is a 20-item self-report assessment designed to measure a participant’s current
level of depressive symptoms. Participants indicate how often in the last week they have felt the
symptoms associated with each item from 0 (less than 1 day/rarely or none of the time) to 3 (5 7 days/ most or all of the time). Example questions are “I felt depressed,” “I was bothered by
things that usually don’t bother me,” and “I felt lonely.” Internal consistency ranged from  =
.84-.90 in patient and community samples (Radloff, 1977). The CESD was found to have
adequate discriminative validity in detecting the presence or absence of a mood disorder: 70% of
a clinical population (versus only 21% of the general population) scored above a cutoff of 16
(Radloff, 1977). Convergent validity was established with both adult controls (total n = 4,996)
and clinical samples (n = 70). The CESD correlated with other measures of depression at r = .37.70, p < .01 (Radloff, 1977). Additionally, and as would be expected conceptually, the CESD
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correlated significantly negatively with a measure of positive affect (r = -.21 to -.55, p < .01) in
all samples (Radloff, 1977). However, Buckby, Yung, Cosgrave, and Killackey (2007) found
that the CESD also assessed a substantial degree of general distress symptomatology, requiring a
careful evaluation of relative discriminant validity. For example, the CESD was significantly
correlated with Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (MASQ; Watson & Clark, 1991)
General Distress: Depression (r = .83, p < .001) and, although lower in absolute terms, with
MASQ Anhedonic Depression (r = .72, p < .001). In addition, the CESD was significantly
associated with the MASQ General Distress: Anxiety (r = .79, p < .001) and was modestly lower
in its correlation with MASQ Anxious Arousal (r = .65, p < .001). Thus, the overall pattern of
findings is as expected with regard to distinguishing depression from anxiety, but the strong
general distress presence is notable. See Appendix D.

Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson & Clark, 1994)

The PANAS is a 20-item self-report questionnaire assessing the degree of positive and
negative affect. Participants rate the extent to which they have felt various affective terms at this
moment on a 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely) scale. The positive affect (PA) and
negative affect (NA) scales contain 10 items each. In a sample of undergraduates, the PA scale
had a coefficient  ranging from .83-.88 (Watson & Clark, 1994). In the same sample, the NA
scale obtained coefficient s ranging from .85-.91 (Watson & Clark, 1994). The PA and NA
scale intercorrelations ranged from r = -.06 to -.23 in undergraduate samples (Watson & Clark,
1994). Using Zevon and Tellegen’s (1982) 60 mood descriptor ratings, a 2-factor solution was
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produced to assess convergent and discriminant validity. Using these two factors—considered to
represent positive and negative mood factors—in an undergraduate sample (n = 660), Watson
and Clark (1994) found that the PA scale correlated r = .95 with the corresponding positive
mood factor and r = -.02 with the negative mood factor. Furthermore, the NA scale correlated
with the negative mood factor at r = .91 (p < .05) and at r = -.15 with the positive mood factor in
the same sample (Watson & Clark, 1994). To further establish convergent and discriminant
validity, participants were rated by their dating partners on their degree of positive and negative
affect. Results demonstrated that partners’ PA scale ratings correlated at r = .35 (p < .025) with
participants self-reported PA and nonsignificantly with self-reported NA (r = -.09, p > .025;
Watson & Clark, 1994). Additionally, partners’ NA scale rating correlated significantly with
self-reported NA (r = .21, p < .025) and nonsignificantly with self-reported PA (r = -.03, p >
.025; Watson & Clark, 1994). These results indicate adequate convergent and discriminant
validity in distinguishing self-reported positive and negative affect. See Appendix E.

Procedure
Informed Consent

When participants arrived to the laboratory, they were greeted by a proctor (either the
principal investigator or a research assistant trained in the study’s protocol) and received an
informed consent document that outlined the purpose of the study, study procedures, risks,
benefits, and participant rights. Participants were given time to review the document and the
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opportunity to ask questions. Consenting participants signed and dated the document. No
prospective participant declined to participate at this stage of the study.

Questionnaire Battery

After consenting, participants used a desktop computer in the laboratory to complete the
TAFS, OCI-R, CESD, PANAS, and OBQ-87 in a randomized order using the LimeService
matrix platform. The purpose of this assessment was to gain baseline information regarding
beliefs and symptoms and to screen for individuals whose CESD total scores were above the
designated cutoff of 30.

Random Assignment and Responsibility Manipulation

Prior to arriving to the lab, packets designating the HR, LR, or control condition were
prepared. Upon arrival, the study proctor used the next available study packet to achieve matched
random assignment to condition. The responsibility manipulation was based on Rosen and
Knäupers’ (2009) two-part manipulation of intolerance of uncertainty. Participants in the
manipulation conditions first were asked to complete a version of the RAS altered to reflect a
true/false response style. In addition, the RAS was altered linguistically such that a qualifier was
added to all items: occasionally for all items in the HR condition (see Appendix F) or almost
always for all items in the LR condition (see Appendix G). The qualifiers are intended to lead
participants to differently endorse responsibility belief items. It is grounded in the idea that
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participants form cognitions based on the linguistic information they are given, such that
responding to an item that inquires whether the individual occasionally performs a behavior will
lead that person to generate instances of performing that behavior, wherein that person would
respond “true.” Conversely, being asked if one almost always performs a behavior will lead that
person to generate instances wherein s/he did not perform that behavior, in turn leading the
participant to respond “false.”
The second part of the manipulation involves false feedback. Participants were asked to
total and record the number of “true” responses provided, which specifies the feedback the
participant received. The threshold for receiving response-consistent feedback was set according
to the experimental condition. That is, for the HR (occasionally) condition, the participant only
requires 5 (of 26) true responses to receive feedback suggesting that the individual often feels
responsible for causing and preventing harm (see Appendix H). Individuals in the LR (almost
always) condition, require a high number of true responses (20 of 26) to receive false feedback
that the participant feels responsible for causing and preventing harm (see Appendix I).
Participants in the control condition completed a word search for five minutes to account for
time in the manipulation conditions. The word search was “herb” themed and of moderate
difficulty. Participants were told “do the best you can on this word search for the next five
minutes, and it is not expected that you will complete the task.”

Manipulation Check and Post-Manipulation Questionnaires

Following feedback in the manipulation conditions, participants completed a single item
assessing how much the participant believed the feedback s/he received on a scale from 1 (not at
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all characteristic of me) to 7 (very characteristic of me) as a way of assessing the effectiveness
of the manipulation (again following Rosen & Knäuper, 2009). Next, all participants were asked
to complete the PANAS and OBQ-87 Responsibility and Threat Estimation subscales (30 items).

TAF Sentence Task

Participants were asked to complete the TAF likelihood-others sentence task that closely
aligns with the method used by Berman et al. (2011). The proctor provided two blank notecards
for the task and a numbered sheet of paper to record their VAS ratings. The proctor remained in
the room to “answer any questions and facilitate the activity.” Via a full screen PowerPoint
presentation displayed on the computer, participants were given general instructions regarding
advancing through the activity and a general scale for VAS ratings (0-100). Participants pressed
the spacebar to advance the instructions. Participants were first asked to provide a VAS rating of
baseline anxiety. Those who reported a VAS rating of 50 or greater were told that they would not
need to complete the remaining task, and were instead given a “positive mood induction” task.
For those who were not disqualified at this point of the study, the instructions then asked them to
think of a loved one, and write that person’s name on the notecard. Once completed, the proctor
placed the notecard next to the computer monitor in view of the participant. Next, the
instructions requested that the participant write the following sentence, inserting the name of the
loved one in the blank space: “I hope ________________ is in a car accident today.” Those who
complied with the task then advanced the slides and provided seven VAS ratings: (1) What is
your current level of anxiety? (2) How strong is the urge to reduce or cancel out any potential
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effects from writing the sentence? (3) How likely is it that the event you wrote will occur in the
next 24 hours because of thinking and writing down the thought? (4) How morally wrong was it
for you to think and write down the thought? (5) How responsible would you feel if the event did
occur in the next 24 hours? (6) How much blame would you feel for the event if it were to take
place in the next 24 hours? and (7) How much guilt would you experience if the event were to
take place in the next 24 hours? Participants who chose not to complete the TAF sentence moved
on to the positive mood induction task.
After completing the first set of VAS ratings, the computer screen displayed the
following text, which was read aloud by the proctor: “You may now do anything you wish to
reduce or cancel the effects of writing or thinking about the sentence. Please list any mental or
actual activities you engage in during the next two minutes, and please be as detailed as you
can.” The participant was given a lined sheet of paper and the opportunity to clarify the
instructions. The proctor then left the participant alone in the room for two minutes, before
returning to record the final seven VAS rating and collect study materials.

Positive Mood Induction

Following the sentence task and VAS ratings, participants were given a sheet of jokes
and a rating sheet. They were asked to read each joke and rate how funny they think the joke is
on a scale of 0 (not at all funny) to 5 (extremely funny). Previous research conducted at NIU has
used this approach to achieve a “positive mood” subsequent to a negative mood manipulation
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(Cortesi-Raza, 2011). This phase of the research design was implemented to mitigate any
potential negative affect experienced during the course of the study.

Debriefing

Participants were fully debriefed regarding the specific nature of the study and the
rationale for the use of deception. Participants were asked to rate on a scale from 0 (no distress)
to 100 (extreme distress) how they felt at that moment. Those who reported 50 or above were
given the opportunity to engage in a short relaxation exercise. All participants were offered the
printed referral information for counseling services in the DeKalb area.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS

Coding the Outcome Variables

Participants’ self-reported lists of thoughts and behaviors during the 2-minute
neutralizing period were transcribed to an Excel spreadsheet. Five mutually exclusive categories
were utilized for coding responses: neutralizing, urges, reassurance, expressed emotion, and
distraction. Neutralizing was defined as any thought or action aimed at reducing or canceling out
the effects of writing or thinking about the sentence. Examples included physically
altering/scribbling out the sentence, indicating that participant “take back what [they] wrote,”
and flipping over the card. Urges were categorized as any wording that told of future behavior
that was aimed at ensuring the safety of the loved one (e.g., “I am going to call him to tell him to
drive safe,” or “I am going to offer to drive her anywhere today.”). The reassurance category
included thoughts or actions that downplayed the participant’s role in the writing activity (e.g.,
“This is just a psychology study.”) or assessing the current or future safety of the object of the
sentence (e.g., “She doesn’t drive usually,” or “He is on a submarine right now.”). Expressed
emotions was created to categorize self-reported regret or unease about having written the
sentence (e.g., “I wish I did not write that,” or “I’m mad that I wrote that.”). The distraction
category was defined as any thoughts or behaviors that distracted the person from the sentence

59
(e.g., “Take deep breaths,” or “I thought about my schedule for the day.”). The principal
investigator and a trained research assistant independently coded all responses. The two
individually categorized excel files were compared to identify discrepant coding. The agreement
between the two coded files was 56% overall for the five categories and 59% for neutralizing
responses. All discrepancies were discussed and resolved by the two independent coders; for 10
responses, a third rater was consulted to achieve consensus for how the particular response
would be coded.

Data Screening

Missing Data and Outliers

All analyses except for the missing values analysis were conducted using SPSS 20.
Missing values (from the N = 102) were analyzed and imputed using SPSS 23 missing values
add-on feature. The data displayed 0.49% missing values that were analyzed for missingness
using Little’s MCAR test, which produced a nonsignificant χ2 (χ25089 = 140.79, p > .999). This
result suggested that the missing data points were missing completely at random. As such, the
data were imputed using expectation maximization (EM).2 EM is a two-step, iterative procedure
for replacing missing values. First, means, variances, and covariances are estimated from those
who have complete data available. Next, maximum likelihood procedures are used to estimate
regression equations based on the relationship among the available data. The imputation is

2

The PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013) to be used for data analysis is incompatible with multiple imputation
procedures for handling missing data.
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repeated until the most likely value is obtained for a missing data point. Missing values were
obtained in fewer than 25 iterations.3
To assess for outliers, standardized total scores for all measured variables and subscales
were examined. Absolute standardized values greater than 3.29 were deemed outliers (Field,
2005). A total of 14 scores among the 35 subscale and total scores were identified as outliers
based on their standardized total scores. Those identified scores were reduced to the next highest
non-outlier score on that measure. Additionally, while conducting primary analyses using
regression, the regression diagnostics, including leverage indices (cutoff > 3[parameters+1]/n),
studentized deleted residuals (i.e., to measure discrepancy; cutoff absolute values > 3.0), Cook’s
distance (i.e., to measure influence, cutoff > 1.0), and Standardized DfFit (i.e., to measure
influence, cutoff > 1.0), were examined as an additional screen for the presence of outliers
(Howell, 2010). The vast majority of cases did not exceed the designated cutoffs for each index;
however, four cases produced leverage values greater than the designated cutoff. Yet, these cases
did not yield values on other measures of discrepancy and influence outside of their respective
proposed cutoff. Thus, the four leverage values were not corrected. Finally, tolerance diagnostics
were assessed for each predictor variable, with no value falling below 0.10; thus,
multicollinearity was not a concern (Norusis, 1998).

3

EM missing values estimated from the following three groups of questionnaires: (1) pre- and post-manipulation
OBQ-87, TAFS; (2) OCI-R; (3) Pre- and post-manipulation PANAS and CESD.
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Evaluating Assumptions

Prior to conducting the primary analyses, the assumptions of linearity, independence,
normality, and homoscedasticity were examined. For linearity, scatterplots demonstrated linear
relationships among the independent (i.e., TAFS Likelihood-others) and dependent (i.e.,
response to TAF sentence task and VAS ratings) variables. Independence of residuals was
established by examining the Durbin-Watson statistic; no value was outside the range of 1.5˗2.5,
suggesting independence. Homoscedasticity of the residuals was examined by plotting the
predicted values of the dependent variable against the standardized residuals when available. No
instances of “funneling” or non-uniform distribution were detected. Additionally,
heteroscedastic-consistent standard error estimators (HC3) were implemented when available
(Hayes, 2013; Hayes & Cai, 2007). Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance was also used to
assess for unequal variance across groups when performing the t tests, and its related statistic
was used if the variance was deemed unequal between the two groups. Similarly, Welch’s F’ is
reported when variance is unequal between the three experimental groups when using one-way
ANOVA. To assess the normality assumption, Q-Q plots, histograms, skew and kurtosis were
examined. A number of variables were deemed non-normal by producing a ratio of their
skewness value to standard error greater than 2.58. It has been argued that ANOVA and
regression are robust against violations of normality (Hayes, 1996, 2013; Howell, 2010:
Schmider, Ziegler, Danay, Beyer, & Bühner, 2010). When skew is not deemed substantial and
the samples size is greater than 20, non-normal distribution may not preclude further analysis
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using regression (Hayes, 2013). Additionally, if the groups have distributions similar in shape
and the largest variance is less than four times the smallest variance, an ANOVA will most likely
be valid in the presence of non-normal data (Howell, 2010). Regardless, this research project
analyzed both non-transformed and transformed values; discrepancies between the models will
be discussed. Tables 2 through 5 display the Ms and SDs for the independent and dependent
variables for the entire sample and across conditions. The Ms and SDs of the current sample were
generally slightly lower than other samples collected from NIU and were within the expected
range for a non-clinical sample.

Reliability

To test for measurement error, internal consistency (coefficient alpha) and average interitem correlations (AICs) were computed for each measure and related subscales (see Tables 2
and 3). Notably, for scales with greater than 40 items, coefficient alpha may not be an adequate
estimate of reliability (Cortina, 1993). For the overall samples, all alphas were above .80, except
for five of the OCI-R subscales and post-sentence PANAS-NA. The AIC of the measures ranged
from .23-.92. The TAFS Likelihood-others (AIC = .92) and TAFS Likelihood-self (AIC = .87)
scales obtained the highest AICs, which were notably higher than the next highest value (AIC =
.57 for OCI-R Ordering).
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Table 2
Total Sample Descriptive Statistics and Internal Consistency Reliability
Scale (# of items)
OCI-R (18)
Checking (3)
Neutralizing (3)
Ordering (3)
Washing (3)
Obsessing (3)
Hoarding (3)
OBQ-87 (87)
Importance of Thoughts (14)
Control of Thoughts (14)
Perfectionism (16)
Intolerance of Uncertainty (13)
Pre-Responsibility (16)
Post-Responsibility (16)
Pre-Threat Estimation (14)
Post-Threat Estimation (14)
Pre-RT (30)
Post-RT (30)
OBQ-44 (44)
ICT (12)
PU (16)
Pre-RT (16)
Post-RT (15)+
TAFS (19)
Moral (12)
Likelihood-Others (4)
Likelihood-Self (3)
CESD (20)

M
11.98
2.02
1.15
3.44
1.54
1.71
2.11
232.38
28.59
37.71
43.46
39.75
48.41
51.94
34.18
33.87
82.58
85.81
124.21
25.69
52.30
46.07
43.66

SD
8.66
1.95
1.66
2.53
2.01
2.13
1.93
69.38
11.96
12.45
14.42
12.20
17.22
17.42
14.75
13.66
29.18
28.82
36.25
10.79
15.55
16.59
16.17


.87
.56
.65
.80
.76
.71
.51
.97
.88
.85
.88
.84
.88
.90
.89
.86
.93
.93
.93
.88
.87
.87
.89

AIC
.27
.31
.42
.57
.52
.46
.29
.25
.35
.30
.34
.28
.32
.35
.38
.32
.31
.30
.25
.43
.31
.31
.35

23.14
18.03
2.19
2.92
11.26

12.56
9.68
3.22
3.26
7.43

.90
.90
.98
.95
.84

.34
.44
.92
.87
.23

(Continued on following page)
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Table 2 (Continued)
Scale (# of items)
M
SD
 AIC
Pre-PANAS-PA (10)
33.57
7.80
.89 .46
Pre-PANAS-NA (10)
18.11
5.19
.80 .30
Post-PANAS-PA (10)
28.76
8.94
.89 .46
Post-PANAS-NA (10)
12.33
2.63
.77 .28
Note. N = 102;  = coefficient alpha; AIC = average inter-item correlation; OCI-R = Obsessive
Compulsive Inventory Revised; OBQ = Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire; OBQ-44 = 44-item
version; OBQ-87 = 87-item version; ICT = Importance and Control of Thoughts; PU =
Perfectionism and Intolerance of Uncertainty; RT = Responsibility and Threat Estimation;
TAFS) = Thought-Action Fusion Scale; CESD = Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression
Scale; PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; PA = positive affect; NA = negative
affect; Pre- = baseline measure; Post- = assessed after manipulation.
+

Due to an inconsistency between the 87-item and 44-item OBQ, one OBQ-44 RT subscale
item was lost on the manipulation check assessment when examining the 44-item
construction of that subscale.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics and Internal Consistency Reliability by Condition

Scale (# of items)
OCI-R (18)
Checking (3)
Neutralizing (3)
Ordering (3)
Washing (3)
Obsessing (3)
Hoarding (3)
OBQ-87 (87)
Importance (14)
Control (14)
Perfectionism (16)
Uncertainty (13)
Pre-Resp (16)
Post-Resp (16)
Pre-TE (14)
Post-TE (14)
Pre-RT (30)
Post-RT (30)
OBQ-44 (44)
ICT (12)

Low Responsibility (n = 36)
M
SD
Alpha AIC
12.09
8.94
.87 .26
2.06
1.74
.33 .08
1.10
1.71
.77 .57
3.63
2.74
.82 .60
1.75
2.09
.65 .40
1.81
1.80
.81 .60
1.67
2.26
.62 .38
232.52 70.92
.97 .26
27.44 12.23
.88 .37
38.52 12.34
.82 .26
43.99 15.17
.87 .32
39.55 12.45
.85 .29
50.33 17.70
.88 .32
52.57 19.59
.92 .41
32.69 13.81
.88 .36
32.25 13.73
.86 .32
83.02 28.82
.92 .30
84.82 31.08
.94 .33
125.00 38.69
.94 .27
25.48 11.06
.87 .40

High Responsibility (n = 35)
Control (n = 31)
M
SD Alpha AIC
M
SD Alpha AIC
12.51 9.48
.88
.30
11.25
7.52 .84 .24
2.09 2.03
.73
.54
1.90
2.15 .56 .29
1.34 1.71
.43
.24
1.00
1.58 .75 .55
3.29 2.61
.85
.65
3.39
2.23 .71 .46
1.49 2.92
.89
.73
1.35
1.56 .65 .38
1.97 2.46
.70
.45
1.29
1.47 .44 .21
2.40 2.23
.50
.29
2.31
1.65 .32 .20
231.11 71.73
.97
.26
233.65 67.11 .96 .23
28.61 12.04
.89
.39
29.89 11.81 .87 .33
36.60 11.54
.84
.30
38.03 13.83 .87 .36
47.72 16.02
.92
.45
42.54 11.98 .80 .21
40.04 13.19
.86
.32
39.67 13.73 .79 .21
48.10 16.34
.86
.29
46.51 17.94 .90 .37
53.54 13.94
.83
.23
49.39 18.53 .81 .40
33.21 16.54
.93
.47
37.00 13.73 .86 .31
34.29 14.00
.88
.35
35.29 13.43 .86 .32
81.31 29.47
.93
.31
83.51 30.16 .93 .32
87.83 25.19
.90
.25
84.68 30.69 .94 .35
122.16 36.34
.93
.25
125.60 34.24 .92 .22
25.08 10.57
.91
.51
26.60 11.02 .87 .40
(Continued on following page)
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Table 3 (continued)
Low Responsibility (n = 36)
High Responsibility (n = 35)
Control (n = 31)
Scale (# of items)
M
SD
Alpha AIC
M
SD Alpha AIC
M
SD Alpha AIC
52.50 16.15
.87 .31
52.41 17.14
.91
.39
51.94 13.29 .82 .21
PU (16)
47.02 16.95
.88 .31
44.21 16.06
.86
.29
47.06 17.11 .89 .34
Pre-RT (16)
43.01 18.22
.91 .41
43.86 12.92
.82
.25
44.19 17.42 .91 .41
Post-RT (15)
22.94 12.82
.91 .37
25.34 12.51
.89
.30
20.89 12.27 .92 .39
TAFS (19)
18.05
9.42
.89 .40
19.76 9.92
.91 .45
16.05
9.65 .92 .49
Moral (12)
1.69
2.98
.99 .97
2.80 3.95
.98 .92
2.06
2.48 .95 .84
Likelihood-Others (4)
2.06
3.54
.97 .92
2.77 3.32
.96 .88
2.77
2.94 .91 .77
Likelihood-Self (3)
10.46
6.95
.82 .20
13.16 8.07
.86 .26
10.06
7.01 .84 .24
CESD (20)
34.47
7.71
.90 .49
33.17 8.40
.92 .54
32.98
7.37 .85 .36
Pre-PANAS-PA (10)
28.92
9.15
.90 .48
28.77 9.25
.91 .50
28.58
8.62 .88 .41
Post-PANAS-PA (10)
17.97
4.66
.72 .20
19.02 5.91
.84 .34
17.24
4.92 .82 .35
Pre-PANAS-NA (10)
11.86
2.34
.52 .13
12.34 2.66
.81 .29
12.87
2.88 .80 .37
Post-PANAS-NA (10)
Note. N = 102.  = coefficient alpha; AIC = average inter-item correlation; OCI-R = Obsessive Compulsive Inventory Revised;
OBQ = Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire; OBQ-44 = 44-item version; OBQ-87 = 87-item version; Resp = Responsibility; TE =
Threat Estimation; RT = Responsibility and Threat Estimation; Importance = Importance of thoughts; Uncertainty = Intolerance
of Uncertainty; ICT = Importance and Control of Thoughts; TAFS = Thought-Action Fusion Scale; CESD = Center for
Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale; PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; PA = positive affect; NA =
negative affect; Pre- = baseline measure; Post- = assessed after manipulation.
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Table 4
Total Sample Descriptive Statistics and Internal Consistency Reliability for Dependent Variables
Variable
VAS 1—Baseline anxiety
Post-TAF Sentence Task
VAS 2—What is your current level of anxiety?
VAS 3—How strong is the urge to reduce or cancel out any potential effects from writing the sentence?
VAS 4—How likely is it that the event you wrote will occur in the next 24 hours because of thinking and
writing down the thought?
VAS 5—How morally wrong was it for you to think and write down the thought?
VAS 6—How responsible would you feel if the event did occur in the next 24 hours?
VAS 7—How much blame would you feel for the event if it were to take place in the next 24 hours?
VAS 8—How much guilt would you experience if the event were to take place in the next 24 hours?
Post-Neutralizing Period
VAS 9—What is your current level of anxiety
VAS 10—How strong is the urge to reduce or cancel out any potential effects from writing the sentence?
VAS 11—How likely is it that the event you wrote will occur in the next 24 hours because of thinking and
writing down the thought?
VAS 12—How morally wrong was it for you to think and write down the thought?
VAS 13—How responsible would you feel if the event did occur in the next 24 hours?

M
8.76

SD
10.39

36.40
53.34
10.80

25.54
35.37
19.71

52.65
45.17
41.01
47.27

34.55
35.36
36.62
36.92

15.28
29.46
8.72

18.46
32.62
16.03

39.93
31.72

34.69
33.44

(Continued on following page)
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Table 4 (continued)
Variable
VAS 14—How much blame would you feel for the event if it were to take place in the next 24 hours?
VAS 15—How much guilt would you experience if the event were to take place in the next 24 hours?
Coded Outcome Variable
Self-reported Neutralizing (N)
Self-reported Urges (U)
Self-reported Reassurance (R)
Self-reported Distraction (D)
Self-reported Expressed Remorse (E)
Combined (N,U,R)
Combined (N,U,R,E)

M
32.42
36.05

SD
34.10
35.16

0.73
0.32
1.12
0.64
0.17
2.17
2.33

0.99
0.73
1.14
1.24
0.47
1.39
1.52

Change Scores (Pre-manipulation minus Post-manipulation scores)
PANAS-NA Change
5.78
4.82
PANAS-PA Change
4.81
6.77
OBQ-87 Responsibility Change
-3.53
9.97
OBQ-87 Threat Estimation Change
0.31
6.62
OBQ-87 Responsibility and Threat Estimation Change
-3.23 14.06
Note. N = 102; VAS = Visual Analogue Scale; PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; NA = negative affect; PA =
positive affect; OBQ-87 = 87-item Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire.
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Table 5
Group Means and Standard Deviations for the Dependent Variable by Condition
Low (n = 36)
M
SD
8.86a 11.04

High (n = 35)
M
SD
8.86a
9.48

Control (n = 31)
M
SD
8.52a
10.92

Scale
VAS 1—Baseline Anxiety
Post-TAF Sentence Task
37.94ab 26.24
43.34a 28.02
26.77b
18.64
VAS 2—Anxiety
49.72ab 38.13
65.74a 31.61
43.55b
32.99
VAS 3—Urge to neutralize
12.36
21.43
12.00 21.29
7.65
15.62
VAS 4—Likelihood
49.86
33.13
60.57 36.68
46.94
33.11
VAS 5—Moral wrongness
38.33
35.11
53.06 34.17
44.19
36.31
VAS 6—Responsible
33.06
35.54
51.71 36.58
38.39
36.16
VAS 7—Blame
37.22a 36.30
59.34b 35.76
45.32ab 36.15
VAS 8—Guilt
Post-Neutralizing Period
14.31
19.97
16.51 19.47
15.00
15.81
VAS 9—Anxiety
31.71 30.61
29.68
32.32
VAS 10—Urge to neutralize 27.08 a 35.40
5.83
13.39
10.83 18.18
9.68
16.28
VAS 11—Likelihood
36.89
33.31
48.71 36.27
33.55
33.52
VAS 12—Moral wrongness
23.89
31.74
39.29 33.57
32.26
34.23
VAS 13—Responsible
23.47
31.07
42.20 34.60
31.77
34.99
VAS 14—Blame
27.64 a 32.22
47.63b 36.27
32.74ab 34.73
VAS 15—Guilt
Coded Outcome Variable
0.53
0.77
0.91
1.07
0.74
1.09
Neutralizing (N)
0.36
0.80
0.14
0.36
0.48
0.93
Urges (U)
1.19
1.21
1.00
0.91
1.16
1.29
Reassurance (R)
0.83
1.28
0.49
1.20
0.58
1.26
Distraction (D)
0.17
0.57
0.17
0.45
0.16
0.45
Expressed Remorse (E)
2.08
1.44
2.06
1.33
2.39
1.43
Combined (N,U,R)
2.25
1.66
2.23
1.42
2.55
1.48
Combined (N,U,R,E)
Change Scores
6.11
3.85
6.68
5.82
4.37
4.40
PANAS-NA Change
5.56
7.40
4.40
6.12
4.40
6.84
PANAS-PA Change
-2.24
9.60
-5.44 12.24
-2.87
7.08
OBQ-87 Resp Change
0.44
4.94
-1.08
8.55
1.71
5.64
OBQ-87 TE Change
-1.80
11.81
-6.52 18.26
-1.16
10.28
OBQ-87 RT Change
Note. N = 102; VAS = Visual Analogue Scale; Change = pre-manipulation minus postmanipulation scores; PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; PA = positive affect;
(Continued on following page)
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Table 5 (continued)
NA = negative affect; OBQ-87 = 87-item Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire; Resp =
Responsibility; TE = Threat Estimation; RT = Responsibility and Threat Estimation; The
absence of a subscript denotes nonsignificant difference between columns for that row;
Discrepant subscript denotes significant difference between columns for that row at p ≤ .05.

Zero-Order Correlations

A correlation matrix showing relations among all measures is presented in Table 6.
Evidence of convergent and discriminant validity was demonstrated by, with few exceptions,
cognitive vulnerabilities for OCD displaying higher absolute correlations with OC symptoms
than with the CESD. As would be expected, the CESD demonstrated a moderate negative
correlation with baseline PANAS-PA and strong, significant, positive correlation with baseline
PANAS-NA scores. There were weak associations between PANAS-PA and PANAS-NA for the
pre- and post-sentence task scores, which is consistent with the premise that these dimensions are
orthogonal (Watson & Clark, 1994).
Turning to the TAFS subscales, there was evidence of inconsistency with previous
literature (Bailey et al., 2014; Shafran & Rachman, 2004; Shafran et al., 1996), in that the three
subscales intercorrelated weakly to moderately. Specifically, whereas Likelihood-others and
Likelihood-self significantly correlated (r = .58, p < .01), Moral and Likelihood-self
demonstrated a non-significant correlation (r = .18, p > .05). Moreover, Likelihood-others
demonstrated weak correlations with the OCI-R subscales (.14 ≤ r ≤ .26). Given the clear
relevance of Likelihood-others to OC symptoms (Shafran & Rachman, 2004), this finding is
concerning. Likelihood-others and Likelihood-self correlated more strongly with OBQ-87
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Table 6
Total Sample Correlations Among Measures of Cognitive Vulnerabilities, Symptoms of Psychopathology, and Affect
1 2
1. TAFS-M
--2. TAFS-LO
.32 --3. TAFS-LS
.18 .58
4. OCI-R
.09 .24
4a. OCI-R Check
.07 .21
4b. OCI-R Clean
.13 .26
4c. OCI-R Neut
.10 .14
4d. OCI-R Order
.06 .16
4e. OCI-R Obsess
.00 .17
4f. OCI-R Hoard
.02 .15
5. OBQ-87
.24 .42
5a. Pre-OBQ-87 R
.19 .25
5b. Post-OBQ-87 R
.25 .29
5c. Pre-OBQ-87 TE
.05 .41
5d. Post-OBQ-87 TE .05 .34
5e. Pre OBQ-87 RT
.14 .35
5f. Post OBQ-87 RT .17 .34
6. OBQ-44
.28 .38
6a. OBQ-44 ICT
.50 .39
6b. OBQ-44 PU
.12 .32
6c. Pre -OBQ-44 RT .14 .29
6d. Post-OBQ-44 RT .18 .26
7. CESD
-.19 .10
8. Pre-PANAS-PA
.20 -.15
9. Pre-PANAS-NA
-.11 .20
10. Post-PANAS-PA
.16 -.13
11. Post-PANAS-NA -.08 -.09

3

4

4a

--.30
.25
.37
.23
.21
.16
.11
.34
.27
.25
.30
.27
.31
.28
.32
.22
.29
.30
.29
.08
-.02
.18
.07
.02

--.66
.78
.68
.78
.64
.68
.52
.35
.34
.48
.47
.45
.43
.51
.40
.48
.42
.39
.43
.07
.39
.08
.15

--.40
.37
.40
.22
.47
.32
.17
.16
.31
.29
.26
.24
.33
.29
.31
.24
.24
.22
.08
.25
-.01
.07

4b

--.45
.52
.42
.56
.47
.35
.33
.43
.29
.42
.42
.46
.44
.36
.38
.38
.25
.05
.28
.10
.02

4c

4d

4e

4f

5

5a

5b

5c

5d 5e

5f

--.53
.34
.22
.25
.17
.15
.28
.46
.24
.23
.25
.12
.27
.23
.19
.26
-.02
.13
.07
.14

--.40
.36
.38
.31
.25
.33
.28
.35
.27
.41
.24
.43
.35
.24
.27
.11
.35
.18
.10

--.35
.29
.16
.21
.32
.33
.26
.28
.25
.22
.20
.22
.23
.39
.07
.28
.06
.15

--.47
.32
.35
.37
.39
.38
.40
.47
.43
.43
.34
.39
.42
-.05
.36
-.09
.16

--.83
.77
.87
.78
.93
.83
.98
.76
.80
.89
.78
.27
-.05
.16
-.09
-.04

--.83
.66
.60
.93
.79
.55
.57
.57
.93
.78
.09
.16
.05
.06
-.11

--.67 --.72 .89 --.83 .90 .81 --.94 .83 .91 .88 --.75 .81 .72 .90 .79
.53 .57 .53 .61 .57
.50 .62 .52 .65 .55
.82 .83 .76 .97 .85
.93 .76 .85 .85 .97
.12 .37 .36 .24 .24
.12 -.17 -.10 .01 .02
.07 .22 .20 .14 .13
.03 -.16 -.16 -.05 -.06
-.05 .01 .01 -.06 -.03

6

6a

6b

6c

6d

7

8

9

10

--.78
.83
.89
.76
.22
-.02
.14
-.08
-.02

--.46
.59
.56
.14
-.07
.04
-.12
-.02

--.59
.47
.23
-.06
.19
-.07
-.02

--.96
.20
.05
.11
-.04
-.01

--.20
.05
.12
-.05
.02

---.31
.67
-.27
.33

---.07 --.68 -.13 --.04 .39 .14
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Table 6 (continued)
Note. N = 102. Boldface correlations indicate significant at p < .01; Italicized correlations indicate significant at .01 < p < .05. TAFS
= Thought-Action Fusion Scale; M = Moral; LO = Likelihood Others; LS = Likelihood Self; OCI-R = Obsessive Compulsive
Inventory Revised; Neut = Neutralizing; Obsess = Obsessing; OBQ = Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire; OBQ-44 = 44-item version;
OBQ-87 = 87-item version; Resp = Responsibility; TE = Threat Estimation; ICT = Importance and Control of Thoughts; RT =
Responsibility and Threat Estimation; CESD = Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale; PANAS = Positive and
Negative Affect Schedule; PA = positive affect; NA = negative affect. Pre- = baseline measure; Post = assessed after manipulation.
Triangles represent within measure correlations. Solid rectangle represent correlations among measures of obsessive-compulsive
(OC) cognitive variables. Dashed rectangles represent correlations among OC symptoms and OC cognitive variable measures.
.20 ≤ r ≤ .25, p < .05
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Responsibility and Threat Estimation (.25 ≤ r ≤ .42) and OBQ-44 subscales (.26 ≤ r ≤
.39) compared to their correlation with the CESD (Likelihood-others: r = .10; Likelihood-self: r
= .08), which is expected given that both are conceptualized as cognitive experiences relevant to
OCD. However, Moral demonstrated lower than anticipated absolute correlations with the OBQ87 subscales (.05 ≤ r ≤ .24) and OBQ-44 subscales (.12 ≤ r ≤ .28), with one exception: Moral
correlated r = .50 (p < .01) with OBQ-44 Importance and Control of Thoughts, which is known
to include TAF moral content (Bailey et al., 2014; OCCWG, 2005).
Overall, there are a few issues to contend with when examining TAFS Likelihood-others.
First, the 4-item subscale demonstrated high coefficient alpha and AIC. Although higher
reliability indicators generally are preferred, too high of a value suggests redundancy and may
have a negative impact on the overall validity of the scale (i.e., attenuation paradox; Loevinger,
1954). Second, TAFS Likelihood-others demonstrated a high positive skew, with the majority of
the participants endorsing little to none of the belief. Third, TAFS Likelihood-others displayed a
pattern of correlations that is somewhat inconsistent with the previous literature (i.e., weak
correlations with OC symptoms and other TAFS subscales). As such, TAFS Likelihood-others
may prove to be problematic when conducting primary analyses.

Baseline Differences Across Conditions

To confirm that there were no pre-existing group differences among the participants in
each of the study conditions, seven one-way ANOVAs were run with condition as the
independent variable and baseline OBQ-87 Responsibility, OBQ-87 Threat Estimation, OBQ-44
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Responsibility and Threat Estimation, TAFS Likelihood-others, OCI-R Neutralizing, PANASPA, or PANAS-NA as the dependent variables. These analyses confirmed that there were no
significant differences across groups on these baseline variables (Fs2,99: 0.33˗1.08; ps:
.719˗.343).4

Primary Analyses

Overall Effectiveness of the Manipulation

Participants in the HR and LR condition who indicated less than a 3 on the manipulation
check item (a 1˗7 scale) were excluded from data analysis (n = 3). In addition, six participants
answered either too few or too many of the true/false RAS items and received the incorrect
feedback for their intended study condition, and were excluded from further analyses. A series of
t tests was employed to examine whether individuals who did or did not believe the feedback
differed on any measured variable. Those who did not believe the feedback had significantly
lower OBQ-87 Responsibility (t35.16 = 13.58, p < .001) and OBQ-44 Responsibility/Threat
Estimation (t16.92 = 9.00, p < .001) scores. Two of the three participants had been randomly
assigned to the HR condition.
To assess the effectiveness of the manipulation, eight one-way ANOVAS were used to
examine (1) differences in post-manipulation OBQ-87 Responsibility, OBQ-87 Threat
Estimation, combined OBQ-87 Responsibility and Threat Estimation, and PANAS-NA, as well
4

The three groups were assessed for baseline differences on all available baseline measures and subscales. No
significant differences were observed on these measures, Fs2, 99: 0.011-1.797; ps: .989-.171. Additionally, there were
no significant differences among the groups when transformed variables were used as the dependent variable for the
ANOVAs, Fs2, 99: 0.005-1.279; ps: .995-.283.
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as (2) the changes in these variables from pre-manipulation to post-manipulation (negative
values representing an increase from baseline to post-manipulation). For all comparisons, the F
statistic was nonsignificant, indicating that the HR condition did not demonstrate either
statistically significant higher scores or increases in any of the four variables (Fs2, 99: 0.13˗2.07;
ps: .879˗.132, η2: .003˗.040) compared to the LR and control conditions. As such, the
manipulation was deemed unsuccessful based on these measured variables.

Group Comparisons

Given that the manipulation was unsuccessful, this may preclude further analysis of
group differences. Yet, it is plausible that the groups may exhibit different outcomes on the
dependent variables of VAS ratings and self-reported neutralizing based on their experiences
during the manipulation period. Thus, planned analyses were executed, but the results should be
interpreted cautiously.
A series of one-way ANOVAs was conducted to test Hypotheses 1˗10. Significant
differences emerged for post-sentence VAS ratings of anxiety (hypothesis 1: Welch’s F’2, 65.42 =
4.63, p = .013, η2 = .071), guilt (hypothesis 6: F2, 99 = 3.40, p = .037, η2 = .064), urge to
neutralize (hypothesis 7: F2, 99 = 3.72, p = .028, η2 = .070), and increase in anxiety from baseline
to post-sentence task (hypothesis 8: Welch’s F’2, 64.42 = 5.07, p = .009, η2 = .074).
Post hoc analyses utilized Games-Howell comparison for violations of homogeneity of
variance and Fisher’s LSD comparison. For ratings of anxiety following the TAF sentence task
(hypothesis 1), participants in the HR condition (M = 43.34, SD = 28.02) reported significantly
greater VAS ratings compared to the control condition (M = 26.77, SD = 18.64; 95% CI [2.62,
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30.51]; p = .016, Cohen’s d = 0.70), but not compared to the LR condition (M = 37.94, SD =
26.24; p = .681, Cohen’s d = 0.20). As predicted in hypothesis 6, those in the HR condition also
reported significantly higher VAS ratings of guilt (M = 59.34, SD = 35.76) compared to the LR
condition (M = 37.22, SD = 36.30; 95% CI [5.13, 39.11]; p = .011, Cohen’s d = 0.61), but not the
control condition (M = 45.32, SD = 36.15; p = .118, Cohen’s d = 0.39). For hypothesis 7,
participants in the HR condition reported a significantly higher VAS rating of the urge to
neutralize/cancel out the sentence following the TAF sentence task (M = 65.74, SD = 31.61)
compared to the control condition (M = 43.55, SD = 32.99; 95% CI [5.33, 39.06]; p = .010,
Cohen’s d = 0.69), but not compared to the LR condition (M = 49.72, SD = 38.13; p = .053,
Cohen’s d = 0.46). Lastly, examining changes in VAS ratings of anxiety from baseline to after
writing the sentence predicted for hypothesis 8 (i.e., negative values representing an increase
from baseline to post-sentence), the HR condition reported significantly greater increases in VAS
anxiety ratings (M = -34.49, SD = 28.06) compared to the control condition (M = -18.26, SD =
16.28; 95% CI [29.65, 2.81]; p = .040, Cohen’s d = 0.71), but not the LR condition (M = -29.08,
SD = 24.51; p = .875, Cohen’s d = 0.21).

Moderation

Hypotheses 11 and 12 predicted that there would be a moderating effect of responsibility
condition on the relationship between TAFS Likelihood-others and VAS ratings of the urge to
neutralize following the sentence task, as well as the relationship between TAFS Likelihoodothers and number of self-reported neutralizing behaviors. Specifically, it was hypothesized that
those in the HR condition would evidence a significantly stronger positive association between
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TAFS Likelihood-others and the VAS rating of the urge to neutralize immediately following
the sentence task (hypothesis 11) as well as a significantly stronger positive relationship between
TAFS Likelihood-others and the number of self-reported neutralizing behaviors (hypothesis 12).
First, scores on TAFS Likelihood-others were mean-centered. In addition, responsibility
condition was recoded using dummy coding; the HR condition was used as the referent group in
order to compare the effects of TAFS Likelihood-others on urge to neutralize and self-reported
neutralizing responses for LR vs HR conditions and control vs HR conditions. An interaction
term was created by multiplying the new mean-centered TAFS Likelihood-others variable by
each dummy coded vector; thus, two interaction terms were entered into the hierarchical
regression. To assess hypothesis 11, VAS ratings of the urge to neutralize following the sentence
task were entered as the dependent variable. Next, using hierarchical regression (enter method),
mean-centered TAFS Likelihood-others and the two dummy coded variables for condition were
entered into the first block. Finally, the two interaction terms (mean-centered TAFS Likelihoodothers X dummy coded condition) were entered into the second block. This analysis was
repeated using the number of self-reported number of neutralizing behaviors as the dependent
variable to assess hypothesis 12.
As presented in Table 7, results of the moderation analysis reveal nonsignificant
interactions of the conditions and TAFS Likelihood-others (ΔR2 = .015, p = .444). Similarly, the
interactions for TAFS Likelihood-others and the conditions were nonsignificant when predicting
the number of self-reported neutralizing responses (ΔR2 = .027, p = .256). Thus, the
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manipulation conditions did not influence the relationship between TAFS Likelihood-others
and the urge to neutralize or self-reported neutralizing behaviors following the TAF sentence
task.5

Moderation Using Poisson Regression

Although the self-reported neutralizing behaviors outcome variable was proposed to be a
continuous variable, this variable may be statistically more appropriately modeled as a count
variable. Count variables often follow the non-normal Poisson distribution. The outcome
variable of number of self-reported neutralizing thoughts and behaviors produced a
nonsignificant Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z of 0.66, p = .783, which suggests that the distribution of
this variables likely follows a Poisson distribution; thus, the Poisson regression model was
implemented to examine the interaction of TAFS Likelihood-others and manipulation condition
in predicting number of self-reported neutralizing responses.
To test moderation effects, mean-centered TAFS Likelihood-others, condition (HR
condition as the referent condition), and the TAFS Likelihood-others by condition interaction
terms were entered into Poisson regression of the generalized linear model predicting selfreported number of neutralizing responses. The same model was repeated using the meancentered Log10 transformed TAFS Likelihood-others predictor variable and interactions. Each
model obtained a nonsignificant Likelihood Ratio 2 value (Nontransformed variables: 25 =
8.14, p = .149; Transformed variables: 25 = 10.77, p = .056) indicating that the proposed

5

The moderation analyses were repeated with transformed variables (see Table 8). The interactions remained
nonsignificant.
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Table 7
Results for Moderation Using Hierarchical Regression
Dependent Variable
VAS Urge

Self-reported
Neutralizing

Predictor Variable(s)
Enter 1 TAFS-LO
HR vs LR Condition
HR vs Control
Condition
Enter 2 TAFS-LO
HR vs LR Condition
HR vs Control
Condition
TAFS-LO X HR vs
LR Condition
TAFS-LO X HR vs
Control Condition
Enter 1 TAFS-LO
HR vs LR Condition
HR vs Control
Condition
Enter 2 TAFS-LO
HR vs LR Condition
HR vs Control
Condition
TAFS-LO X HR vs
LR Condition
TAFS-LO X HR vs
Control Condition

B
2.84
-12.87
-20.10
1.90
-15.52
-28.34

SE B

∆R2

1.04 .136*
8.01
8.27
1.45 .015
9.48
10.5
1

t

P

2.73 .008
-1.61 .111
-2.43 .017
1.31 .193
-1.64 .105
-2.70 .008

0.95

2.39

0.40 .692

3.66

2.86

1.28 .203

0.03

0.03 .036

0.94 .348

-0.35
-0.15

0.24
0.24

-1.50 .136
-0.62 .537

0.03
-0.28
-0.37

0.04 .027
0.28
0.31

0.54 .554
-1.00 .321
-1.12 .238

-0.05

0.07

-0.69 .491

0.10

0.08

1.23 .224

Note. N = 102. Continuous predictor variables are mean centered. Condition variables dummy
coded with the High Responsibility condition (HR) coded as the referent group. VAS Urge =
visual analogue scale rating taken after completing the sentence of the urge to reduce or cancel
out the effect of writing or thinking about the sentence; TAFS-LO = Thought-Action Fusion
Scale—Likelihood-others subscale; LR = Low responsibility condition.
* p < .01
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Table 8
Results for Moderation with Transformed Variables Using Hierarchical Regression
Dependent Variable
VAS Urge

Predictor Variable(s)
Enter 1

Enter 2

Self-reported
Neutralizing(SQRT)

Enter 1

Enter 2

TAFS-LO L10
HR vs LR Condition
HR vs Control Condition
TAFS-LO L10
HR vs LR Condition
HR vs Control Condition
TAFS-LO L10 X HR vs
LR Condition
TAFS-LO L10 X HR vs
Control Condition
TAFS-LOL10
HR vs LR Condition
HR vs Control Condition
TAFS-LO L10
HR vs LR Condition
HR vs Control Condition
TAFS-LO L10 X HR vs
LR Condition
TAFS-LO L10 X HR vs
Control Condition

B
24.13
-13.03
-21.53
15.40
-16.40
-28.94
9.46
21.19

SE B

∆R2

8.50 .141*
7.97
8.21
13.38 .009
10.01
11.10
20.10
21.27

0.28

0.16 .056

-0.22
-0.17
0.32
-0.12
-0.28
-0.41

0.15
0.16
0.25 .030
0.19
0.21
0.38

0.33

0.41

t

P

2.84
-1.63
-2.62
1.15
-1.64
-2.61
0.47

.006
.105
.010
.253
.105
.011
.639

1.00 .322

1.69 .093
-1.45
-1.07
1.26
-0.62
-1.33
-1.07

.151
.287
.210
.540
.188
.287

0.82 .414

Note. N = 102. Continuous predictor variables are mean centered. Condition variables dummy
coded with the High Responsibility condition (HR) coded as the referent group. VAS Urge =
visual analogue scale rating taken after completing the sentence of the urge to reduce or cancel
out the effect of writing or thinking about the sentence; TAFS-LO = Thought-Action Fusion
Scale—Likelihood-others subscale; LR = Low responsibility condition; SQRT = square root
transformation; L10 = Log10 transformation.
* p < .01
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models did not adequately represent the data beyond the null (intercept only) model.
Furthermore, the interaction terms were nonsignificant in both models (see Table 9). Based on
nontransformed values, for those in the LR condition compared to the HR condition, there was a
nonsignificant 7% decrease in the expected number of reported neutralizing responses for a one
point increase in the TAFS Likelihood-others. For those in the control condition, there was a
nonsignificant 13% increase in the expected number of reported neutralizing responses for a one
point increase in TAFS Likelihood-others compared to those in the HR condition.

Conditional Process Analysis

Hypotheses 13 and 14 were assessed using conditional process analysis (i.e., moderated
mediation; Hayes, 2013) for the outcome variables of VAS ratings of the urge to neutralize
following the TAF sentence task (hypothesis 13) and number of self-reported neutralizing
responses (hypothesis 14). Although not a prerequisite for moderated mediation, two separate
mediation models were tested to assess the indirect effect of VAS likelihood appraisals (i.e.,
VAS ratings of the likelihood of the event occurring in the next 24 hours following the TAF
sentence task) on the relationship between preexisting TAFS Likelihood-others beliefs and the
VAS ratings of the urge to neutralize as well as number of self-reported neutralizing responses.
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Table 9
Results for Moderation Transformed and Non-transformed Variables Using Poisson Regression
Dependent Variable Predictor Variable(s)
Self-Reported
Neutralizing

Self-Reported
Neutralizing

B

SE B

Exp(B)

0.03
-0.56
-0.24
-0.08

0.18
0.30
0.29
0.10

1.03
0.57
0.78
0.93

0.13

0.09

1.13

2.06

.151

.056
.336
.073
.263
.367
.159

0.39
-0.54
-0.34
-0.70

0.41
0.30
0.31
0.77

1.48
0.58
0.71
0.50

10.77
0.92
3.22
1.26
0.81

1.02

0.72

2.78

1.99

Model Fit
TAFS-LOL10
HR vs LR Condition
HR vs Control Condition
TAFS-LO L10 X HR vs LR
Condition
TAFS-LO L10 X HR vs
Control Condition

P

8.14
0.37
3.45
0.73
0.59

Model Fit
TAFS-LO
HR vs LR Condition
HR vs Control Condition
TAFS-LO X HR vs LR
Condition
TAFS-LO X HR vs
Control Condition

2 

.149
.544
.063
.394
.444

Note. N = 102. Continuous predictor variables are mean centered. Condition variables dummy
coded with the High Responsibility condition (HR) as the referent group. VAS Urge = visual
analogue scale rating taken after completing the sentence of the urge to reduce or cancel out the
effect of writing or thinking about the sentence; TAFS-LO = Thought-Action Fusion Scale—
Likelihood-others subscale; LR = Low responsibility condition; L10 = Log10 transformation.
 Model fit = Likelihood Ratio 2 df = 5; Else = Wald 2 df = 1

83
For the simple mediation analysis, template four of the PROCESS macro developed by Hayes
(2013) was used, which employs ordinary least squares path analysis. Unstandardized estimates
are reported herein. Because regression diagnostics cannot be examined using the PROCESS
macro, the assumption of heteroscedasticity cannot be formally evaluated; as such, HC3 standard
error estimators were used in the analyses that follow (Hayes & Cai, 2007). Furthermore, the
bias-corrected bootstrapping methodology with 5,000 replaced samples was used to establish
95% confidence intervals for the direct and indirect effects. The indirect effect is believed to
occur if the confidence interval does not contain zero (i.e., there is a 95% probability that the true
effect is included within the range that does not include zero). Furthermore, Preacher and Kelly
(2011) propose a standardized effect size estimate of the indirect effect, kappa-squared (k2),
which corresponds to the ratio of the obtained indirect effect to the maximum possible value of
the indirect effect. The k2 statistic ranges from 0-1 and is not influenced by sample size.
Associations between the independent and dependent variables were assessed, with the
understanding that a significant correlation is not a condition of mediation, moderation, or
moderated mediation. Using the overall sample of N = 102, TAFS Likelihood-others correlated
at r = .29, p = .004, with VAS ratings of the urge to neutralize and r = .12, p = .246, with selfreported neutralizing.

Mediation

Two separate mediation models were predicted hypothesizing an indirect effect of preexisting TAFS Likelihood-others beliefs (independent variable X) on (1) VAS ratings of the urge
to neutralize (dependent variable Y) and (2) number of self-reported neutralizing behaviors
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(dependent variable Y) through VAS ratings taken after the TAF sentence task of the
likelihood of the participant’s loved one being in a car accident in the next 24 hours (mediating
variable M).
Mediation: Urge to neutralize as the outcome variable. As can be seen in Table 10,
participants’ baseline TAFS Likelihood-others scores did not significantly predicted VAS
likelihood ratings (path a = 1.29, t = 1.77, p = .079). However, VAS likelihood appraisal
significantly predicted participants’ VAS ratings of their urge to neutralize (path b = 0.75, t =
6.14, p < .001). Multiplying path a by path b gives an estimate of the indirect effect of the
mediator, VAS likelihood appraisal. The 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect (ab =
0.98) did not include zero (0.08, 2.31); as such, the indirect effect is deemed significant (Hayes,
2013). The current model demonstrated a medium effect size for the indirect effect, with k2 = .09
(95% CI [.01, .18]). The direct effect of TAFS Likelihood-others beliefs on VAS rating of the
urge to neutralize remained significant independent of its effect on VAS ratings of likelihood of
the event occurring (path c’ = 2.16, t = 2.52, p = .013).
When analyzing the same model in PROCESS using Log10 transformed TAFS
Likelihood-others (XL10) and VAS likelihood appraisal (M L10), a significant mediation was also
observed. First, path a, TAFS Likelihood-others predicting VAS likelihood appraisals, was
significant (path a = 0.49, t = 2.72, p = .008). Additionally, path b remained significant, with
VAS likelihood appraisals significantly predicting VAS ratings of the urge to neutralize (path b =
25.49, t = 4.37, p < .001). Furthermore, the 95% confidence interval estimating of the indirect
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Table 10
Results of Mediation: Urge to Neutralize as Dependent Variable
Path Variable(s)
a
VAS Likelihood (M) regressed on TAFS-LO (X)
R2 = .045; F(1,100) = 3.15, p = .079
b
VAS Urge (Y) regressed on M
c'
Y regressed on X controlling for M
R2 = .250; F(2,99) = 26.19, p < .001

B
1.29

SE B
0.73

t
1.77

P
.079

0.75
2.16

0.12
0.86

6.14
2.52

<.001
.013

Effect Bootstrap SE 95% CI Limits
0.98
0.58
0.08 2.31

a*b Indirect effect = Path a * Path b
Path Variable(s)
B
a
VAS Likelihood (M L10) regressed on TAFS-LO (X L10) 0.49
R2 = .085; F(1,100) = 7.42, p = .008
25.49
b
VAS Urge (Y) regressed on M L10
12.66
c'
Y regressed on X L10 controlling M L10
R2 = .289; F(2,99) = 25.15, p < .001

SE B
0.18

t
2.72

P
.008

4.37
7.79

5.84
1.63

<.001
.107

Effect Bootstrap SE 95% CI Limits
12.57
5.37
3.91 25.11

a*b Indirect effect = Path a * Path b
Note. N = 102. Continuous predictor variables are mean centered. VAS = visual analogue
scale rating taken after completing the sentence; Likelihood = the likelihood of the event
occurring in the next 24 hours; Urge = the urge to reduce or cancel out the effect of writing or
thinking about the sentence; TAFS-LO = Thought-Action Fusion Scale—Likelihood-others
subscale; CI = confidence interval; L10 = Log10 transformation.
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effect (ab = 12.57) did not include zero (3.91, 25.11). This model also produced a medium
effect size for the indirect effect, with k2 = .14 (95% CI [.05, .27]). Taken together, the indirect
effect TAF Likelihood-others beliefs on the urge to neutralize appears to operate through
appraisals of the likelihood of the event occurring.
Mediation: Self-reported neutralizing as the outcome variable. Next, the second proposed
mediation model was evaluated using model four of the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013) with
self-reported neutralizing responses as the outcome variable (Y; see Table 11). As demonstrated
in the previous mediation analysis, participants’ baseline TAFS Likelihood-others scores did not
significantly predict VAS likelihood appraisals (path a = 1.29, t = 1.77, p = .079). Additionally,
VAS likelihood appraisals did not significantly predict participants self-reported neutralizing
responses following the sentence task (path b = 0.00, t = 0.82, p = .412). Moreover, the 95%
confidence interval for the indirect effect (ab = 0.01) included zero (-0.01, 0.03).
When testing this mediation model using transformed variables, with the addition of the
square root transformation of self-reported neutralizing (YSQRT), discrepant results were
demonstrated compared to the model using non-transformed variables (see Table 11). In this
model, TAFS Likelihood-others beliefs significantly predicting VAS likelihood appraisals (path
a = 0.49, t = 2.72, p = .008) was replicated. Moreover, VAS likelihood appraisals significantly
predicted self-reported neutralizing (path b = 0.32, t = 3.04, p = .003). The 95% confidence
interval for the indirect effect (ab = 0.16) did not contain zero (0.05, 0.36), and the effect size for
the indirect effect was medium, with k2 = .10 (95% CI [.03, .20]). Thus, when using the
transformed variables and heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors estimates, VAS likelihood
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Table 11
Results of Mediation: Neutralizing as Dependent Variable
Path Variable(s)
a
VAS Likelihood (M) regressed on TAFS-LO (X)
R2 = .045; F(1,100) = 3.15, p = .079
b
Self-reported neutralizing (Y) regressed on M
c'
Y regressed on X controlling for M
R2 = .021; F(2,99) = 1.36, p = .260

B
1.29

SE B
0.73

t
1.77

P
.079

0.00
0.03

0.01
0.03

0.82
1.01

.412
.316

Effect Bootstrap SE 95% CI Limits
0.01
0.01
-0.01 0.03

a*b Indirect effect = Path a * Path b
Path Variable(s)
B
a
VAS Likelihood (M L10) regressed on TAFS-LO (X L10) 0.49
R2 = .085; F(1,100) = 7.42, p = .008
0.32
b
Self-reported neutralizing (YSQRT) regressed on M L10
0.15
c'
YSQRT regressed X L10 controlling for M L10
R2 = .134; F(1,100) = 6.84, p = .002

SE B
0.18

t
2.72

P
.008

0.11
0.17

3.04
0.87

.003
.387

Effect Bootstrap SE 95% CI Limits
0.16
0.08
0.05 0.36

a*b Indirect effect = Path a * Path b
Note. N = 102. Continuous predictor variables are mean centered. VAS Likelihood = visual
analogue scale rating taken after completing the sentence of the likelihood of the event occurring
in the next 24 hours; TAFS-LO = Thought-Action Fusion Scale—Likelihood-others subscale; CI
= confidence interval; SQRT = square root transformation; L10 = Log10 transformation.
appraisals mediated the relationship between pre-existing TAFS Likelihood-others beliefs and
the number of self-reported neutralizing behaviors.
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Mediation: Self-reported neutralizing as a dichotomous outcome variable. Given the
non-normal distribution of self-reported neutralizing behaviors, the proposed analysis of the
mediation model using number of self-reported neutralizing behaviors as the outcome variable
may not be statistically suitable. Therefore, a new variable was created to indicate whether a
participant did or did not report neutralizing thoughts or behaviors (nneut = 46; 45.1%). This new
variable was entered as the outcome variable in template 4 of the PROCESS macro. Results are
presented in Table 12. Dichotomous outcomes are automatically detected by the PROCESS
macro, and logistic regression is substituted for ordinary least squares regression for the paths
that include the dichotomous outcome. One limitation when using a logistic regression for a
binary outcome variable in PROCESS is that a measure of effect size of the indirect path is not
calculable. Additionally, the total effects may not equal the sum of direct and indirect effects.
Parallel to the proposed mediation analyses, participants’ baseline non-transformed TAFS
Likelihood-others scores did not significantly predict VAS likelihood appraisals (path a = 1.29, t
= 1.77, p = .079). Additionally, non-transformed VAS likelihood appraisals did not significantly
predict the odds of a participant being categorized as neutralizing following the sentence task
(path b = 0.01, z = 1.13, p = .259). Moreover, the 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect
(ab = 0.02) included zero (-0.01, 0.11).
When testing the dichotomous outcome mediation model using transformed variables
(see Table 12), discrepant results were again demonstrated. Again, the Log10 transformed TAFS
Likelihood-others beliefs significantly predicted Log10 transformed VAS likelihood appraisals
(path a = 0.49, t = 2.72, p = .008). The transformed VAS likelihood appraisals significantly
predicted the odds of self-reported neutralizing responses (path b = 1.00, z = 2.95, p = .003).
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Table 12
Results of Mediation: Dichotomous Neutralizing as Dependent Variable
Path Variable(s)
a
VAS Likelihood (M) regressed on TAFS-LO (X)
R2 = .045; F(1,100) = 3.15, p = .079
b
Dichotomous neutralizing (Y) regressed on M
c'
Y regressed on X controlling for M

B
1.29

SE B
0.73

t/z
1.77

P
.079

0.01
0.09

0.26
0.07

1.13
1.35

.259
.178

Effect Bootstrap SE 95% CI Limits
0.02
0.03
-0.01 0.11

a*b Indirect effect = Path a * Path b
Path Variable(s)
B
a
VAS Likelihood (M L10) regressed on TAFS-LO (X L10) 0.49
R2 = .085; F(1,100) = 7.42, p = .008
1.00
b
Dichotomous neutralizing (Y) regressed on M L10
0.53
c'
Y regressed X L10 controlling for M L10

SE B
0.18

t/z
2.72

P
.008

0.34
0.56

2.95
0.95

.003
.342

Effect Bootstrap SE 95% CI Limits
0.49
0.28
0.11 1.26

a*b Indirect effect = Path a * Path b
Note. N = 102. Continuous predictor variables are mean centered. VAS Likelihood= visual
analogue scale rating taken after completing the sentence of the likelihood of the event occurring
in the next 24 hours; TAFS-LO = Thought-Action Fusion Scale—Likelihood-others subscale;
Dichotomous = whether a participant did (1) or did not (0) neutralize; CI = confidence interval;
L10 = Log10 transformation.
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With a one unit increase in VAS rating of the likelihood of the event occurring the odds of
neutralizing increased by a factor of 2.70 (or 170% increase). Furthermore, the 95% confidence
interval for the indirect effect (ab = 0.49) did not contain zero (0.11, 1.26). Thus, for the model
with transformed variables, the relationship between TAFS Likelihood-others beliefs and the
increase in the odds of engaging in neutralizing responses is mediated by appraisals of the
likelihood of the even occurring.

Moderated Mediation

For the conditional process analysis, it was hypothesized that the indirect effect of TAFS
Likelihood-others on the urge to neutralize and number of self-reported neutralizing behaviors
via VAS likelihood appraisals would be moderated. Specifically, those in the HR condition
would evidence a stronger association between the mediating variable of VAS likelihood
appraisals and the two separate outcome variables (urge to neutralize and self-reported
neutralizing behavior; path b1). Thus, a dichotomous variable representing condition (b2) and an
interaction term (b3) for path b were added to the model. Using model 14 of the PROCESS
macro, an interaction term was created that represented the mean-centered VAS likelihood
appraisals X responsibility condition (coded either 1 or 0) interaction. The index of moderated
mediations available through the PROCESS macro is a measure of the difference between the
conditional indirect effects at the two different levels of the moderator (Hayes, 2013). Once
more, the conditional indirect effect at the two levels of the moderator are significantly different
when the designated bias-corrected 95% confidence interval based of 5,000 bootstrap samples
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does not contain zero. Because the PROCESS macro can assess only two groups at a time, the
analysis was conducted in separate SPSS data files containing only the two groups of interest
(HR vs LR or HR vs control). All continuous predictor variables were mean-centered. Figures 1
and 2 provide a visual depiction of the conditional process analyses.
HR versus control: Urge to neutralize as the outcome variable. As presented in Table 13,
comparing the HR and control conditions, TAFS Likelihood-others beliefs did not significantly
predict VAS ratings of the likelihood of the event occurring in the next 24 hours (path a = 1.18, t
= 1.69, p = .096). In this model, the control condition is coded as 0. The coefficients b1 and b2
are less directly interpretable, as they do not represent the main effect of VAS likelihood
appraisals or condition on VAS ratings of the urge to neutralize. Rather, b1 (2.11, t = 2.31, p =
.024) denotes the influence of VAS likelihood appraisal on the VAS rating of the urge to
neutralize among those in the control condition while holding pre-existing TAFS Likelihoodothers beliefs constant. Likewise, b2 (19.46, t = 2.15, p = .036) represents the influence of going
from the control condition (coded as 0) to the HR condition (coded as 1) on the VAS ratings of
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VAS Likelihood
appraisals
a

b1

c'

TAFS-LO

Urge to
Neutralize

b2
Responsibility
condition

b3

Responsibility condition
X
VAS Likelihood appraisals

Figure 1
Predicted conditional process model for the urge to neutralize. TAFS-LO = Thought-Action
Fusion Scale—Likelihood-others subscale (Shafran et al., 1996). Likelihood appraisals = visual
analogue scale (VAS) ratings of the likelihood of the event occurring in the next 24 hours
immediately following the sentence task. Urge to Neutralize = VAS ratings of the urge to
neutralize immediately following the sentence task. Responsibility X Likelihood appraisal =
interaction term.
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VAS Likelihood
appraisals
a

b1

c'

TAFS-LO

Neutralizing
behavior

b2
Responsibility
condition

b3

Responsibility condition
X
VAS Likelihood appraisals

Figure 2
Predicted conditional process model for number of self-reported neutralizing behaviors. TAFSLO = Thought-Action Fusion Scale—Likelihood-others subscale (Shafran et al., 1996).
Likelihood appraisals = visual analogue scale (VAS) ratings of the likelihood of the event
occurring in the next 24 hours immediately following the sentence task. Neutralizing behavior =
self-reported cognitive and behavioral neutralizing occurring after the sentence task.
Responsibility X Likelihood appraisal = interaction term.
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Table 13
Results of Conditional Process for HR vs Control: Urge to Neutralize as Outcome Variable
Path
iM
a
iY
b1
b2
b3
c'

a*b3
a*b
a*b
Path
iM
a
iY
b1
b2
b3
c'

Predictor
Outcome
Constant
TAFS-LO (X)
VAS Likelihood (M)
2
R = .044, F(1,64) = 2.85, p = .096
Constant
VAS Urge (Y)
VAS Likelihood (M)
Y
Condition (V)
Y
MxV
Y (controlling M x V)
X
2
R = .287, F(4,61) = 9.89, p < .001
Index of Moderated Mediation
Indirect effect
HR Condition
Indirect effect
Control Condition
Predictor
Outcome
Constant
TAFS-LO (X L10)
VAS Likelihood (M L10)
2
R = .204, F(1,64) = 12.12, p =.001
Constant
VAS Urge (Y)
M L10
Y
Condition (V)
Y
M L10 x V
X L10
Y (controlling M L10 x V)
2
R = .281, F(4,61) = 6.58, p < .001

B
7.05
1.18

SE B
2.67
0.70

t
2.64
1.69

P
.010
.096

33.91
2.11
19.46
-0.15
2.11

6.84
0.91
9.07
0.51
0.91

4.96
2.31
2.15
-0.30
2.31

<.001
.024
.036
.766
.024

Effect
-0.18
0.64
0.82

Boot SE
0.73
0.69
0.80

B
0.31
0.73

SE B
0.09
0.21

31.36
19.24
18.75
-1.51
10.36

8.08
8.47
11.51
11.11
9.46

Effect
-1.10
12.95
14.05

Boot SE
8.20
7.56
8.03

95% CI Limits
-2.27
0.90
-0.04
2.32
-0.08
2.74
t
3.59
3.48

P
.001
.001

3.88
2.27
1.63
-0.14
1.10

<.001
.027
.109
.893
.278

95% CI Limits
-18.11 14.80
2.09 32.72
2.38 34.57

a*b3 Index of Moderated Mediation
a*b Indirect effect
HR Condition
a*b Indirect effect
Control Condition
Note. n = 66. Continuous predictor variables are mean centered. VAS = visual analogue scale
rating taken after completing the sentence; Likelihood = the likelihood of the event occurring in
the next 24 hours; Urge = the urge to reduce or cancel out the effect of writing or thinking about
the sentence; TAFS-LO = Thought-Action Fusion Scale—Likelihood-others subscale; HR =
High Responsibility condition, coded as 1; Control condition, coded as 0; CI = confidence
interval; SQRT = square root transformation; L10 = Log10 transformation.
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the urge to neutralize for those with a mean score on VAS likelihood appraisals holding preexisting TAFS Likelihood-others beliefs constant. Because these coefficients are conditioned on
other variables in the model, they are not paramount in determining whether the indirect effect is
moderated.
As an indication of moderated mediation, the interaction of VAS likelihood appraisals
and condition predicting VAS ratings of participants’ urge to neutralize—path b3—is examined.
In this model, the moderating effect of condition on the relationship between VAS likelihood
appraisal and VAS ratings of the urge to neutralize was nonsignificant (path b3 = -0.15, t = -0.30,
p = .766). Additionally, the 95% confidence intervals for the indirect effect of TAFS Likelihoodothers on the in vivo VAS ratings of the urge to neutralize via VAS likelihood appraisals for both
the HR (-0.04, 2.32) and control conditions (-0.08, 2.74) included zero, suggesting that the
indirect effect was nonsignificant. Furthermore, the index of moderated mediation (-0.18) and its
95% confidence interval (-2.27, 0.90) indicate that the indirect effect of VAS likelihood
appraisals on the relationship between TAFS Likelihood-others and VAS ratings of the urge to
neutralize was not moderated by the HR or control conditions.6
HR versus control: Self-reported neutralizing as the outcome variable. Using the number
of self-reported neutralizing responses as the dependent variables, the conditional process
analysis was repeated, first comparing the HR and control conditions (see Table 14). Similar to
the above, path a was nonsignificant (path a = 1.18, t = 1.69, p = .096). Moreover, the
moderating effect of condition on the relationship between VAS likelihood appraisals and selfreported neutralizing was nonsignificant (b3 = -0.01, t = -0.35, p = .729). Furthermore, the index
of moderated mediation (-0.01; 95% CI [-0.19, 0.03]) was nonsignificant. Lastly, the 95%
6

The indices remained nonsignificant when using transformed variables (see Table 13).
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confidence intervals of the indirect effect of TAFS Likelihood-others on self-reported
neutralizing via VAS likelihood appraisals for both the HR (-0.03, 0.03) and control conditions (0.01, 0.16) both included zero, suggesting that the indirect effect was nonsignificant for each
condition.7
HR versus LR: Urge to neutralize as the outcome variable. As displayed in Table 15,
moderated mediation was not present when comparing the HR and LR conditions with the VAS
ratings of the urge to neutralize as the outcome variable. The interaction of condition and VAS
likelihood ratings was nonsignificant in predicting VAS ratings of the urge to neutralize (path b3
= 0.41, t = 1.36, p = .177). Additionally, the 95% confidence intervals for the index of moderated
mediation (-0.20, 1.86) and the indirect effect within the HR condition (-0.20, 2.31) and LR
condition (-0.40, 2.70) all contained zero.8
HR versus LR: Self-reported neutralizing as the outcome variable. Similar to the above
conditional process models, there was no evidence of moderated mediation when comparing the
HR and LR conditions with the outcome variable of number of self-reported neutralizing
responses (See Table 16). The interaction of condition and VAS likelihood appraisals was
nonsignificant (path b3 = 0.01, t = 0.66, p = .509). Furthermore, the 95% confidence intervals for
the index of moderated mediation (-0.01, 0.06) and the indirect effect within the HR (-0.02, 0.02)
and LR (0.00, 0.04) conditions all contain zero.9 Thus, the mediating effect of VAS likelihood
appraisals between TAFS Likelihood-others beliefs and self-reported neutralizing appeared
uninfluenced by levels of the responsibility or control conditions.

7

The indices remained nonsignificant when using transformed variables (see Table 14).
The indices remained nonsignificant when using transformed variables (see Table 15)
9
The indices remained nonsignificant when using transformed variables (see Table 16).
8
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Table 14
Results of Conditional Process for HR vs Control: Neutralizing as Outcome Variable
Path Predictor
Outcome
iM
Constant
a
TAFS-LO (X)
VAS Likelihood (M)
2
R = .044, F(1,64) = 2.85, p = .096
iY
Constant
b1
VAS Likelihood (M) Neutralizing (Y)
Y
b2
Condition (V)
Y
b3
MxV
Y (controlling M x V)
c'
X
2
R = .041, F(4,61) = 1.18, p = .558
a*b3
a*b
a*b
Path
iM
a
iY
b1
b2
b3
c'

Index of Moderated Mediation
Indirect effect for
HR Condition
Indirect effect for
Control Condition
Predictor
Outcome
Constant
TAFS-LO (X L10)
VAS Likelihood (M L10)
2
R = .204, F(1,64) = 12.12, p =.001
Constant
M L10
Neutralizing (YSQRT)
Condition (V)
YSQRT
M L10 x V
YSQRT
X L10
YSQRT (controlling M L10 x V)
2
R = .189, F(4,61) = 3.18, p = .020

B
7.05
1.18

SE B
2.67
0.70

t
2.34
1.69

P
.010
.096

0.58
0.01
0.23
-0.01
0.04

0.20
0.03
0.31
0.03
0.04

2.88
0.31
0.74
-0.35
1.05

.005
.757
.460
.729
.300

Effect
-0.01
0.00
0.01

Boot SE
0.05
0.02
0.04

B
0.31
0.73

SE B
0.09
0.21

t
3.59
3.48

P
.001
.001

0.24
0.51
0.24
-0.26
0.17

0.12
0.28
0.19
0.32
0.24

2.01
1.78
1.25
-0.82
0.69

.049
.080
.215
.416
.495

Effect
-0.19
0.18
0.37

Boot SE
0.22
0.16
0.21

95% CI Limits
-0.19
0.03
-0.03
0.03
-0.01
0.16

95% CI Limits
-0.69
0.19
-0.45
0.61
0.06
0.92

a*b3 Index of Moderated Mediation
a*b Indirect effect
HR Condition
a*b Indirect effect
Control Condition
Note. n = 66. Continuous predictor variables are mean centered. VAS Likelihood = visual
analogue scale rating taken after completing the sentence of the likelihood of the event occurring
in the next 24 hours; TAFS-LO = Thought-Action Fusion Scale—Likelihood-others subscale;
HR = High Responsibility condition, coded as 1; Control condition, coded as 0; CI = confidence
interval; SQRT = square root transformation; L10 = Log10 transformation.
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Table 15
Results of Conditional Process for HR vs LR: Urge to Neutralize as Outcome Variable
Path
iM
a
iY
b1
b2
b3
c'

a*b3
a*b
a*b
Path
iM
a
iY
b1
b2
b3
c'

Predictor
Outcome
Constant
TAFS-LO (X)
VAS Likelihood (M)
2
R = .020, F(1,69) = 1.15, p = .287
Constant
VAS Urge (Y)
VAS Likelihood (M)
Y
Condition (V)
Y
MxV
Y (controlling M x V)
X
2
R = .310, F(4,66) = 9.87, p < .001
Index of Moderated Mediation
Indirect effect
HR Condition
Indirect effect
LR Condition
Predictor
Outcome
Constant
Log10 TAFS-LO (X)
Log10 VAS Likelihood (M)
2
R = .033, F(1,69) = 1.94, p = .169
Constant
VAS Urge (Y)
M L10
Y
Condition (V)
Y
M L10 x V
X L10
Y (controlling M L10 x V)
2
R = .368, F(4,66) = 13.23, p < .001

B
10.27
0.85

SE B
2.63
0.80

t
3.91
1.07

P
<.001
.287

54.97
0.55
-19.62
0.41
1.50

7.08
0.17
-.22
0.30
0.89

7.76
3.22
-2.13
1.36
1.69

<.001
.002
.037
.177
.097

Effect
0.35
0.47
0.82

Boot SE
0.49
0.67
0.79

95% CI Limits
-0.20 1.86
-0.20 2.31
-0.40 2.70

B
0.53
0.31

SE B
0.10
0.22

t
5.49
1.39

P
<.001
.169

49.22
16.89
-22.38
16.92
14.36

8.85
7.76
11.12
9.56
8.59

5.56
2.18
-2.01
1.77
1.67

<.001
.033
.048
.081
.099

Effect
5.17
5.16
10.34

Boot SE
5.06
4.67
7.59

95% CI Limits
-0.85 20.50
-0.58 19.12
-2.41 27.73

a*b3 Index of Moderated Mediation
a*b Indirect effect
HR Condition
a*b Indirect effect
LR Condition
Note. n = 71. Continuous predictor variables are mean centered. VAS = visual analogue scale
rating taken after completing the sentence; Likelihood = the likelihood of the event occurring in
the next 24 hours; Urge = the urge to reduce or cancel out the effect of writing or thinking about
the sentence; TAFS-LO = Thought-Action Fusion Scale—Likelihood-others subscale; HR =
High Responsibility condition, coded as 0; LR = Low Responsibility condition, coded as 1; CI =
confidence interval; SQRT = square root transformation; L10 = Log10 transformation.
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Table 16

Results of Conditional Process for HR vs LR: Neutralizing as Outcome Variable
Path
iM
a
iY
b1
b2
b3
c'

a*b3
a*b
a*b
Path
iM
a
iY
b1
b2
b3
c'

Predictor
Outcome
Constant
TAFS-LO (X)
VAS Likelihood (M)
2
R = .020, F(1,69) = 1.15, p = .287
Constant
VAS Likelihood (M)
Neutralizing (Y)
Condition (V)
Y
Y
MxV
Y (controlling M x V)
X
2
R = .060, F(4,66) = 1.23, p = .306

B
10.27
0.85

SE B
2.63
0.80

t
3.91
1.07

P
<.001
.287

0.92
0.00
-0.49
0.01
0.00

0.23
0.01
0.26
0.01
0.03

3.93
-0.09
-1.91
0.66
0.08

<.001
.933
.061
.509
.937

Effect
0.01
0.00
0.01

Index of Moderated Mediation
Indirect effect
HR Condition
Indirect effect
LR Condition
Predictor
Outcome
B
0.53
Constant
0.31
TAFS-LO (X L10)
VAS Likelihood (M L10)
2
R = .033, F(1,69) = 1.94, p = .169
0.50
Constant
0.27
M L10
Neutralizing (YSQRT)
-0.21
Condition (V)
YSQRT
-0.03
M L10 x V
YSQRT
X L10
YSQRT (controlling M L10 x V) 0.06
2
R = .121, F(4,66) = 2.26, p = .072

Effect
-0.01
0.08
0.07

Boot SE
0.02
0.02
0.01

95% CI Limits
-0.01 0.06
-0.02 0.02
0.00 0.04

SE B
0.10
0.22

t
5.49
1.39

P
<.001
.169

0.15
0.20
0.19
0.25
0.21

3.25
1.32
-1.08
-0.11
0.29

.002
.190
.282
.911
.772

Boot SE
0.09
0.10
0.07

95% CI Limits
-0.26 0.12
-0.02 0.39
-0.01 0.30

a*b3 Index of Moderated Mediation
a*b Indirect effect
HR Condition
a*b Indirect effect
LR Condition
Note. n = 71. Continuous predictor variables are mean centered. VAS Likelihood = visual
analogue scale rating taken after completing the sentence of the likelihood of the event occurring
in the next 24 hours; TAFS-LO = Thought-Action Fusion Scale—Likelihood-others subscale;
HR = High Responsibility condition, coded as 0; LR = Low Responsibility condition, coded as 1;
CI = confidence interval; SQRT = square root transformation; L10 = Log10 transformation.
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Conditional process analysis using a dichotomous outcome variable. Given the
non-normal distribution of the number of self-reported neutralizing behaviors, the conditional
process analyses were repeated to examine the dichotomous outcome variable of whether a
participant did (coded as 1) or did not (coded as 0) neutralize following the TAF sentence task.
All analyses remained nonsignificant when assessing HR against the control condition, HR
against the LR condition, and using transformed variables or non-transformed variables (see
Tables 17 and 18). These results suggest that the influence of appraisals of the likelihood of the
event occurring on the odds of being identified as neutralizing in response to the sentence task is
not influenced by participation in the responsibility manipulation.

101
Table 17
Results of Conditional Process for HR vs Control: Dichotomous Neutralizing as Outcome
Variable
Path Predictor
Outcome
iM
Constant
a
TAFS-LO (X)
VAS Likelihood (M)
R2 = .044, F(1,64) = 2.85, p = .096
iY
Constant
b1
VAS Likelihood (M) Dichotomous (Y)
Y
b2
Condition (V)
Y
b3
MxV
Y (controlling M x V)
c'
X
McFadden Pseudo R2 = .07, p = .166
a*b3
a*b
a*b
Path
iM
a
iY
b1
b2
b3
c'

Index of Moderated Mediation
Indirect effect for
HR Condition
Indirect effect for
Control Condition
Predictor
Outcome
Constant
TAFS-LO (X L10)
VAS Likelihood (M L10)
2
R = .204, F(1,64) = 12.12, p =.001
Constant
M L10
Dichotomous (Y)
Condition (V)
Y
M L10 x V
Y
X L10
Y (controlling M L10 x V)
McFadden Pseudo R2 = .14, p = .010

B
7.05
1.18

SE B
2.67
0.70

t/z
2.64
1.69

P
.010
.096

-0.89
0.01
0.78
-0.01
0.15

0.45
0.03
0.59
0.03
0.09

-1.97
0.54
1.32
-0.40
1.63

.049
.588
.186
.687
.104

Effect
-0.02
0.00
0.02

Boot SE
0.38
0.17
0.35

B
0.31
0.73

SE B
0.09
0.21

t/z
3.59
3.48

P
.001
.001

-1.43
1.48
0.96
-0.68
0.70

0.57
0.76
0.74
0.92
0.76

-2.52
1.94
1.30
-0.73
0.92

.012
.052
.194
.465
.356

Effect

Boot SE

95% CI Limits
-1.58
0.24
-0.06 0.34
-0.05
1.21

95% CI Limits

a*b3 Index of Moderated Mediation
-0.49
3.37 -13.50 1.45
0.59
1.28
-0.29
2.50
a*b Indirect effect
HR Condition
1.08
3.17
-0.08 12.01
a*b Indirect effect
Control Condition
Note. n = 66. Continuous predictor variables are mean centered. VAS Likelihood= visual
analogue scale rating taken after completing the sentence of the likelihood of the event occurring
in the next 24 hours; TAFS-LO = Thought-Action Fusion Scale—Likelihood-others subscale;
HR = High Responsibility condition, coded as 1; Control condition, coded as 0; Dichotomous =
whether a participant did (1) or did not (0) neutralize; CI = confidence interval; L10 = Log10
transformation.
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Table 18
Results of Conditional Process for HR vs LR: Dichotomous Neutralizing as Outcome Variable
Path
iM
a
iY
b1
b2
b3
c'

a*b3
a*b
a*b
Path
iM
a
iY
b1
b2
b3
c'

Predictor
Outcome
Constant
TAFS-LO (X)
VAS Likelihood (M)
2
R = .020, F(1,69) = 1.15, p = .287
Constant
Dichotomous (Y)
VAS Likelihood (M)
Y
Condition (V)
Y
MxV
Y (controlling M x V)
X
McFadden Pseudo R2 = 0.04, p = .362
Index of Moderated Mediation
Indirect effect
HR Condition
Indirect effect
LR Condition
Predictor
Outcome
Constant
TAFS-LO (X L10)
VAS Likelihood (M L10)
2
R = .033, F(1,69) = 1.94, p = .169
Constant
M L10
Dichotomous (Y)
Condition (V)
Y
M L10 x V
Y
X L10
Y (controlling M L10 x V)
McFadden Pseudo R2 = 0.08, p = .095

B
10.27
0.85

SE B
2.63
0.80

t/z
3.91
1.07

P
<.001
.287

0.13
0.00
-0.89
0.02
0.04

0.43
0.02
0.57
0.02
0.07

0.29
0.21
-1.56
0.65
0.61

.770
.837
.120
.519
.544

Effect
0.01
0.00
0.02

Boot SE
0.12
0.12
0.05

B
0.53
0.31

SE B
0.10
0.22

t/z
5.49
1.39

P
<.001
.169

-0.39
0.87
-0.60
-0.13
0.34

0.52
0.58
0.69
0.77
0.65

-0.75
1.50
-0.87
-0.16
0.52

.454
.135
.382
.870
.602

Effect
-0.04
0.27
0.23

Boot SE
0.65
0.62
0.37

95% CI Limits
-0.08 0.30
-0.03 0.31
-0.02 0.16

95% CI Limits
-1.23 0.54
-0.09 1.73
-0.10 1.08

a*b3 Index of Moderated Mediation
a*b Indirect effect
HR Condition
a*b Indirect effect
LR Condition
Note. n = 71. Continuous variables are mean centered. VAS Likelihood = visual analogue scale
rating taken after completing the sentence of the likelihood of the event occurring in the next 24
hours; TAFS-LO = Thought-Action Fusion Scale—Likelihood-others subscale; HR = High
Responsibility condition, coded as 0; LR = Low Responsibility condition, coded as 1;
Dichotomous = whether a participant did (1) or did not (0) neutralize; CI = confidence interval;
L10 = Log10 transformation.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION

Broadly, the present study sought to address the cognitive-behavioral model of OCD with
particular attention on the cognitive beliefs of inflated responsibility and TAF. Inflated
responsibility is the belief that one is responsible for the dangerousness of his/her thoughts and
any potential harm resulting from failure to prevent harm or by being the direct cause of harm
(Salkovskis, 1985). Of the three facets of TAF, likelihood-others was the primary focus, which is
the belief that having a thought about a negative event happening to another person increases the
likelihood of the event occurring (Shafran et al., 1996). These beliefs are reported to be related
conceptually (Berle & Starcevic, 2005; Shafran & Rachman, 2004), but have not been
empirically assessed. Additionally, previous research has demonstrated TAFS Likelihood-others
beliefs to be unrelated to responses to the TAF sentence task (i.e., a task that elicits obsessionlike content and TAF appraisals; Bocci & Gordon, 2007; Rachman et al., 1996; van den Hout et
al., 2001). This project proposed that inflated responsibility beliefs would moderate the
relationship between TAFS Likelihood-others beliefs and responses to the TAF sentence task.
Moreover, this project aimed to assess the cognitive-behavioral model of OCD by
examining the potential mediating role of in vivo likelihood appraisals on the relationship
between TAF likelihood-others beliefs and the urge to neutralize, as well as self-reported
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neutralizing responses to the TAF sentence task. Building on the mediation hypothesis, a
moderated mediation model was hypothesized wherein inflated responsibility beliefs moderate
the relationship between the mediating variable of likelihood appraisals in predicting OC
outcomes. Evaluating moderating effects of OC beliefs serves to enhance the conceptualization
and treatment of OCD. Although effective cognitive-behavioral treatments exist for OCD, a
substantial portion of clients refuse treatment or remain symptomatic following treatment
(Abramowitz, 1998). Thus, understanding what variables increase the likelihood of using
neutralization to reduce anxiety may enrich knowledge of development and maintenance factors
of OCD and enhance individually-tailored exposure treatments for the disorder.

Effectiveness of the Responsibility Manipulation

Despite the acknowledged importance of inflated responsibility beliefs in the
developmental and maintenance of OCD (OCCWG, 1997), few experimental designs exist to
manipulate this cognitive variable, which limits the examination of its effect on OC neutralizing
outcomes. As such, to assess this study’s hypotheses, a novel experimental manipulation of
inflated responsibility beliefs involving false feedback to a linguistically manipulated
responsibility beliefs questionnaire was implemented. The majority of participants completed the
manipulation in the intended direction and believed the feedback. However, based on the preand post-assessment of inflated responsibility beliefs using the OBQ-87 Responsibility and
Threat Estimation subscales, there were no significant differences in total scores following the
manipulation or changes in these measures from pre- to post-manipulation; despite the means of
the groups differing in the predicted direction there was only a small effect of the manipulation
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on the change in OBQ-87 Responsibility and Threat Estimation. The lack of effect of the
manipulation remained when participants who had not completed the study in the intended
direction (n = 6) and did not believe the feedback (n = 3) were included. Additionally, there were
no significant differences among the LR, HR, or control condition in PANAS-NA total scores or
changes in this variable. As a result, the manipulation was deemed unsuccessful. Although the
exact reason for the ineffectiveness of the manipulation is unknown, this discussion will consider
three hypotheses for the lack of effect in altering perceptions of inflated responsibility: (1)
redundant pre- and post-manipulation assessment, (2) inadequate feedback for the manipulation,
and (3) ineffective manipulation design.

Redundant Assessment

The manipulation was deemed unsuccessful based on the more rigorous assessment of
OBQ-87 Responsibility and Threat Estimation subscales, which consisted of 30 items. Using the
same general manipulation design, Rosen and Knäuper (2009) used the number of “true”
endorsements on the manipulated measure as an assessment of the effectiveness of the
manipulation. Comparably, those in this study’s HR condition endorsed significantly more
manipulated RAS items as “true” (M = 12.23, SD = 3.52) than those in the LR condition (M =
9.36, SD = 4.89; t69 = 2.83, p = .006, Cohen’s d = 0.67).
Often, researchers rely solely on single-item post-manipulation measurement to assess
the effectiveness of a manipulation and do not assess pre- and post-data (Mancini, D’Olimpio, &
Cieri, 2004; Parrish & Radomsky, 2006). If examining the single post-TAF sentence VAS item
assessing how responsible the participant would feel if the event did occur in the next 24 hours, a
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one-tailed t-test revealed that the HR condition (M = 53.06, SD = 34.17) reported
significantly higher VAS ratings than the LR condition (M = 38.33, SD = 35.11, t69= 1.79, p =
.039, Cohen’s d = 0.43). Thus, the manipulation produced significantly different outcomes for
the manipulation conditions on a single-item manipulation check, which aligns with extant
experimental research standards. Nevertheless, this project utilized a more rigorous 30-item preand post-manipulation measure; conceivably, the items may have been redundant and/or
excessive when compared to other experimental research.

Inadequate Feedback

Participants responded to altered items from the RAS, which closely aligns with the
responsibility and threat estimation content from the OBQ-87; however, the feedback may not
have been interpreted by the participants as the construct of inflated responsibility that is
observed among individuals diagnosed with OCD. That is, both forms of the feedback were
generated to be somewhat vague in order to be agreeable for the nonclinical participant; as such,
the feedback may not have aligned seamlessly with the definition of inflated responsibility
beliefs proposed by OCCWG (1997, 2001). As a result, based on the feedback alone, participants
may not have altered their views of their inflated responsibility beliefs. Additionally, the wording
of the feedback may have been interpreted as a reflection of conscientiousness in the HR
condition (e.g., “individuals who score within this category… tend to prefer predictability, and
are more likely to possess personality characteristics similar to people who like organization and
certainty”) and confidence in the LR condition (e.g., “individuals who score within this
category… tend to prefer spontaneity, and are more likely to possess personality characteristics
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similar to people who like excitement and taking risks”). In that case, participant may have
interpreted either form of feedback in a positive light. The notion that the feedback may have
been interpreted as more positive than intended is supported by nonsignificant changes in
negative affect between the groups. As heightened maladaptive beliefs observed in OCD are
often associated with negative emotional states (Abramowitz et al., 2003; OCCWG, 2003), the
feedback may have benefitted by being more negatively toned in the HR condition to produce
changes in responsibility beliefs and negative affect.

Ineffective Design

The experimental design opted for the participant to answer questions and read
corresponding feedback to enhance the believability of the information. However, cognitive
beliefs are known to develop over time and through experience (Salkovskis, Shafran, Rachman,
& Freeston, 1999). As such, one instance of answering items regarding responsibility beliefs
during a psychological experiment may not be sufficient to produce desired, albeit temporary,
changes in beliefs. Moreover, beliefs may reflect a more stable characteristic that may be
difficult to alter over the course of a 90 minutes experiment (i.e., trait vs state variable).
Modifying responsibility beliefs in an adaptive direction via cognitive behavioral therapy
requires multiple 60-90 minutes sessions accompanied by homework assignment of the like.
Thus, such a brief experience addressing these thinking patterns may not generate a great amount
of change.
Furthermore, whereas those retained for analyses all indicated that the feedback was, to
some degree, characteristic of them, the use of deception may have raised suspicions for some
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participants; this may have diluted the impact of the feedback. Future research may consider
using vignettes or hands-on tasks (Lopatka & Rachman, 1995; Parrish & Radomsky, 2006) to
induce feelings of inflated responsibility. These forms of manipulation may be more convincing
to nonclinical participants because their views and appraisals would be influenced by their
individual performance/response, rather than the product of questionnaire feedback. For this
study, previous hands-on manipulations of inflated responsibility were inadequate because they
were exclusively linked to checking-related behavioral outcomes, rather than neutralizing more
broadly. Future research may aim to devise hands-on tasks that induce a sense of inflated
responsibility, but assess a different OC outcome, such as neutralizing, ordering, or cleaning.
Although the manipulation was deemed unsuccessful, an alternative interpretation of the
experimental design and outcome should be noted. As mentioned, there is question of whether
the manipulation is better interpreted as a manipulation of state responsibility interpretations.
Thus, a measure of inflated responsibility beliefs, or changes in this belief, may not represent the
effect of the manipulation. If conceptualized as a state manipulation, in vivo measures of
responsibility interpretations of the TAF sentence task would more precisely measure the effect
of the manipulation. Thus, the significant difference—comparing the LR and HR conditions—in
responsibility VAS ratings following the completion of the TAF sentence may reflect the
effectiveness of the manipulation for altering state responsibility interpretations. Yet, research
has not assessed whether manipulating responsibility as a state variable is an adequate parallel to
inflated responsibility beliefs as observed in OCD.
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Group Differences

Although the experimental manipulation was unsuccessful, I proceeded with conducting
the primary analyses so as to fully examine my data. Nonetheless, any group differences cannot
be attributed to significantly heightened responsibility beliefs as measured by the OBQ-87 and
the remaining results must be interpreted conservatively.
Hypotheses 1–10 proposed that the HR group would evidence heightened responses to
the TAF sentence task, as measured by VAS responses to the items immediately following the
TAF sentence task and self-reported neutralizing responses. Based on the overall F statistic
comparing the three groups, the participants in the HR condition reported significantly higher
post-task VAS ratings regarding: level of anxiety, changes in anxiety from baseline to post-task,
urge to reduce or cancel out the effects of writing the sentence, and how much guilt they would
experience if the event did occur in the next 24 hours. The HR condition was significantly
greater than the LR condition (but not the control condition) when comparing VAS ratings of
guilt, whereas the HR condition was significantly greater than only the control condition when
examining VAS ratings of post-sentence anxiety, changes in anxiety from pre- to post-TAF
sentence, and the urge to reduce or cancel out the sentence.
An interesting pattern emerges when comparing only the HR and LR conditions using
one-tailed independent samples t-tests. Writing the sentence was deemed similarly morally
wrong in both conditions; however, those in the HR condition felt they were more responsible
for potential negative outcomes from writing the sentence (t69 = 1.79, p = .039, Cohen’s d =
0.43) and would experience more guilt (t69 = 2.59, p = .006, Cohen’s d = 0.61) and blame (t69 =
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2.18, p = .017, Cohen’s d = 0.52) if the event were to occur in the next 24 hours compared to
the LR condition. These difference lend some support to the effectiveness of the manipulation
when comparing the HR and LR groups, as feelings of blame and guilt are strongly associated
with feelings of responsibility (Berle & Starcevic, 2005). Additionally, the HR condition
reported a stronger urge to cancel out the effects of writing the sentence than the LR condition
(t69 = -1.92, p = .029, Cohen’s d = 0.46). Yet, the HR and LR conditions did not significantly
differ in their number of self-reported neutralizing responses, the amount of anxiety they
experienced after writing the sentence, or the increase in anxiety from baseline to after writing
the sentence.
Explaining these differences in VAS ratings is difficult, given that the manipulation was
unsuccessful. Yet, there may have been a meaningful amount of exposure to responsibility and
threat estimation content that may have altered perceptions of the TAF sentence task, but not
responses to the OBQ-87 subscales. That is, both of the LR and HR conditions were exposed to
the RAS and the experience of reading, recalling, and indicating whether items regarding
responsibility and threat estimation were true of them. Furthermore, each condition required
participants to answer the pre- and post-manipulation OBQ-87 Responsibility and Threat
Estimation items. Therefore, participants were primed and aware of their threat estimation and
responsibility beliefs. This awareness may have influenced responses to writing the TAF
sentence.
Given the null effect of the manipulation, it is challenging to interpret these data as partial
support for Salkovskis’s (1985) claim that inflated responsibility beliefs yield maladaptive
appraisals that potentiate the urge to neutralize. However, it is interesting that individuals in the
HR condition reported heightened dysfunctional appraisals (including the urge to neutralize) as
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compared to those in the LR condition, but that these appraisals did not lead to an increase in
the number of self-reported behavioral or cognitive neutralizing.

Moderation

In this sample, TAFS Likelihood-others beliefs significantly predicted urge to neutralize
VAS ratings following the TAF sentence task. This finding is contrary to extant research that has
failed to demonstrate a significant association between these two variables (Bocci & Gordon,
2007; Rachman et al., 1996). Likelihood-others was not significantly correlated with selfreported neutralizing. Additionally, neither association was moderated by responsibility
condition, as hypothesized. Thus, belonging to the HR, LR, or control condition did not
influence the relationship of TAFS Likelihood-others beliefs and the urge to neutralize or
number of self-reported neutralizing responses. Self-reported neutralizing was also assessed as a
count variable using the Poisson regression, wherein moderation was also unsupported.
Working under the assumption that the groups do not differ in their responsibility beliefs
based on the condition to which they were assigned, the continuous post-manipulation OBQ-87
Responsibility and Threat Estimation subscales were assessed for their moderating effect. Using
template one of the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013), the interaction of post-manipulation OBQ87 Responsibility and Threat Estimation scores and TAFS Likelihood-others remained
nonsignificant in predicting either VAS ratings of the urge to neutralize or self-reported
neutralizing following the TAF sentence task. Overall, the moderation hypotheses were not
supported.
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Although the range of post-manipulation OBQ-87 Responsibility and Threat
Estimation scores was adequate to assess associations, the upper 25% of the measure was not
accounted for within the current sample. That is, no participant reported a total score above 159,
with an available scale range of 30–210. Perhaps a moderation exists for those with extreme
inflated responsibility scores, which were not present in this nonclinical sample.
One cannot evade the conclusion that inflated responsibility beliefs did not play a strong
role in the relationship between TAF likelihood-others beliefs and the urge to neutralize and selfreported neutralizing outcomes in the current sample. Given the limitations of the manipulation,
this study can neither confirm nor refute whether they do or will under different circumstances. It
is purported that TAF beliefs are a major facet of the importance and control of thoughts domain
of OC beliefs. That is, believing that thoughts have real world influence on a moral or actual
level is a marker of the belief in the over importance of thoughts (OCCWG, 1997). Extant
literature posits that inflated responsibility beliefs play a role in the effect of TAF likelihoodothers beliefs in producing negative emotional states and the use of OC behaviors to reduce
anxiety, but the exact form of this relationship has not been empirically evaluated (Berle &
Starcevic, 2005). Although this study attempted to empirically assess the relationship among
TAF, inflated responsibility, and OC outcomes, future research may consider developing
competing models to assess the influence of OC belief domains to the perpetuation of anxiety
and OC behavior via TAF likelihood-others beliefs.
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Conditional Process Analysis

A conditional process model, also known as moderated mediation, was proposed to
examine the conditional effect of responsibility condition on the mediation, via in vivo likelihood
appraisals, of the relationship between TAF likelihood-others beliefs and OC outcomes.

Mediation

First, a mediation model assessing the general cognitive-behavioral model of OCD was
examined. In particular, appraisals of the likelihood of the loved one getting in an accident were
proposed to mediate the relationship between pre-existing TAFS Likelihood-others beliefs and
(1) the urge to neutralize and (2) number of self-reported neutralizing responses. The ability of
TAFS Likelihood-others beliefs to significantly predict heightened VAS ratings of the likelihood
of the event occurring in the next 24 hours (path a) was supported using the transformed version
of each variable. Furthermore, appraisals of the likelihood of the event occurring significantly
predicted the urge to neutralize (path b). The indirect path constituting the product of paths a and
b was significant when using the original or transformed (TAFS Likelihood-others and VAS
likelihood) versions of the variables to predict urges to neutralize following the TAF sentence
task.
When assessing the mediation model with number of self-reported neutralizing as the
outcome variable, VAS rating of the likelihood of the event occurring was only a significant
mediator when transformed variables (TAFS Likelihood-others, VAS likelihood, and
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neutralizing responses) were used in the model. A follow-up analysis examined the
mediation model using logistic regression to predict the dichotomous outcome of whether a
participant did or did not engage in a neutralizing response. Again, only the model using
transformed variables (TAFS Likelihood-others and VAS likelihood) was supported. Generally,
the mediation model assessing the cognitive-behavioral model that claims beliefs perpetuate
anxiety-provoking, situational appraisals which then lead to the urge and use of compensatory
behaviors was supported.

Moderated Mediation

Next, it was hypothesized that the manipulation condition would moderate the
relationship between the mediating variable of the VAS likelihood rating (i.e., appraisal) and the
outcome variables (i.e., the urge to neutralize, number of self-reported neutralizing responses, or
the dichotomous neutralizing variable). This model was not supported using any of the proposed
outcome variables or the transformed versions of these variables. Assuming that the
manipulation was ineffective, the model was also examined with the continuous post-OBQ-87
Responsibility and Threat Estimation subscales as the moderator of the path between the
mediator (i.e., VAS likelihood ratings) and the proposed outcome variables. However, the model
remained nonsignificant when using original or transformed variables with the continuous
moderator.
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Strengths and Limitations of the Current Study

The experimental approach to assessing the influence of inflated responsibility on TAF
likelihood-others and neutralizing urges and outcomes is both a strength and a limitation of the
current study. Questionnaire-based studies, although useful, do not lend to assessing causal
relationships and in-vivo appraisals. As such, this study opted to employ a novel experimental
approach to examining latent constructs. Unfortunately, the experimental design was ineffective
based on the OBQ-87 Responsibility and Threat Estimation assessment; this limits the
conclusions that can be made regarding group differences on the in vivo appraisals and outcome
variables. A number of hypotheses regarding the lack of effect for the manipulation conditions
were discussed, including redundant/excessive pre- and post-assessment of the inflated
responsibility construct, potential discrepancy between the items assessing inflated responsibility
and the feedback regarding the construct, and the believability of manipulated questionnaire
feedback.
Another consideration of null effects is insufficient power. An a priori G-Power analysis
yielded a desired sample size of N = 90 with intended cell size of n = 30, which was exceeded for
this study. Yet, given the novel approach to the manipulation combined with the TAF sentence
task, the study may yet be underpowered. Many of the means appear in the predicted direction
but remain nonsignificant with small to medium effect size estimates. When comparing the three
groups on changes in their OBQ-87 Responsibility and Threat Estimation scores, the effect size
is small (η2 = 0.03) with an estimated power of .32, which is lower than the intended power
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estimate of .80. Thus, this study design may require more participants to detect significant
differences among the groups and the observed small to medium effects.
Although there is near ubiquitous agreement that many of the constructs assessed in this
study are dimensional in nature, and thus accessible in nonclinical samples, the use of a
nonclinical student sample carries a number of potential limitations. First, results of this study
are not necessarily generalizable to those diagnosed with OCD. It is unknown if individuals
diagnosed with OCD would respond differently to being told they hold inflated responsibility
beliefs, and then asked to write that they hope a loved one is in a car accident today.
Interestingly, writing this sentence has been used for ERP treatment for OCD with the guidance
of a trained therapist because it elicits substantial anxiety. This effect appears to translate to this
nonclinical sample, as there was a significant increase in anxiety from baseline to post-TAF
sentence task among the entire sample (M = -27.65, SD = 24.41; t101 = 11.44, p < .001, Cohen’s d
= 1.42), with those in the HR and LR conditions reporting a significantly greater increases in
anxiety compared to the control condition.
Second, nonclinical samples often report experiences that occupy the non-pathological
end of the continuum, as was the case with the current sample. This produced a number of
problems related to statistical analysis: the two paramount issues being skew and range
restriction. Many of the total scores on the self-report surveys were positively skewed, and
transformations were employed where necessary. Data were analyzed both with and without
transformed data, and alternative, assumption-free approaches to examining the data (e.g.,
Poisson and logistic regressions) were implemented when appropriate. Although regression and
ANOVA are robust against violations of the normality assumption (Hayes, 1996, 2013; Howell,
2010; Schmider et al., 2010), differential results were demonstrated for the mediation analysis
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when using the outcome variable of the number self-reported neutralizing responses or
whether a participant did/did not neutralize. Additionally, although the transformations addressed
severe non-normality, some variables remained significantly skewed after the transformation.
This was especially relevant for the TAFS Likelihood-others 4-item subscale, which is the only
measure available for that construct. Moreover, given the extremely high average inter-item
correlation for this measure, the TAFS Likelihood-others scale may demonstrate the attenuation
paradox; this paradox purports a non-monotonic relationship between validity and reliability,
such that validity deteriorates when reliability is too high (Loevinger, 1954). Taken together, the
primary analyses using TAFS Likelihood-others clearly should be interpreted with caution, if at
all.
Range restriction in the nonclinical sample may have been exacerbated by the
disqualification criteria for the study; participants with high depression and anxiety scores were
unable to complete the study. Comparing those retained for analyses and those deleted due to
disqualification, those who were disqualified evidenced significantly higher total scores on the
majority of the scales used for this study. Furthermore, the majority of the retained sample
scored in the lower, non-pathological end of the continuum of OBQ-87. In all, the study was
limited in terms of the population deemed fit to complete all aspects of the experiment, which
may have reduced the observed range of scores. In this situation, the relationship among the
variables may be attenuated compared to the relationship among variables with a sample whose
scores span the entire range of a measure.
The number of self-reported neutralizing responses variable utilized for this sample
possesses some limitations. This variable was non-normal with a positive skew. As a result,
alternative, follow-up analyses (e.g., Poisson regression) and outcome variables (e.g.,
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transformations, logistic regression with dichotomous outcome variable) were implemented
when appropriate to address the non-normal distribution. Results of these analyses overlapped
with the results of the originally proposed analyses.
Whereas prior studies using the TAF sentence task have documented only overt
neutralizing, many neutralizing efforts are covert. As such, this study opted to use written
accounts of behaviors and thoughts to examine both forms of neutralizing. However, the extent
to which we can rely on participants’ ability to accurately identify and record their neutralizing
thoughts has yet to be established, raising questions regarding internal validity (i.e., how the
instructions were interpreted and what was reported). Although many of the participants reported
cognitive and behavioral responses when left alone for two minutes—an average of three
reported thoughts/behaviors per participant—the average neutralizing response was less than one
per participant. As noted, floor effects may have played a role in the lack of associations found
when examining the neutralizing responses. It remains possible that this was a reporting
problem.
Nevertheless, the author and a trained research participant independently coded the selfreported responses for neutralizing activities and compared their decisions for consensus. It
became apparent early in the coding process that responses were not easily designated as either
neutralizing or non-neutralizing. Instead, five categories were created to capture the breadth of
responses that were reported by the participants: neutralizing, urges, reassurance, expressed
emotion, and distraction. It is notable that in this nonclinical samples, participants reported a
range of responses that could be categorized as an OC-like response (i.e., neutralizing, urges, and
reassurance); thus, engagement in a task that elicits an obsessive-like intrusive thoughts
provoked anxiety and OC-like responses among this nonclinical sample.
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A further limitation to consider is the low agreement between the two independent
raters of written accounts of neutralizing, which is a novel approach to examining neutralizing
responses. Although the independent raters reached consensus regarding discrepancies in coding,
the low initial agreement may be an artifact of attempting to discern intent from written accounts
(i.e., was this behavior performed in order to neutralize discomfort from the sentence?). As
stated, this study is the first to employ written accounts of neutralizing in order to examine both
covert and overt neutralization. Future studies may consider the use of a follow-up question
assessing if a behavior was recorded as an effort to neutralize (i.e., cancel out the effects of
writing the sentence) or for a different reason (reassurance, apathy, distraction, etc.). Such
clarification may yield a higher rate of agreement when coding the outcome variable as
neutralizing and non-neutralizing behaviors.
However, there are a number of aspects of this experimental design that may impact
external validity. First, studies utilizing the TAF sentence task often provide instructions during
the post-sentence neutralizing period. This study modeled its design, including neutralizing
instructions, on previous research (Bocci & Gordon, 2007; Berman et al., 2011). Additionally,
van den Hout et al. (2002) found that rates of self-reported neutralizing “engagement” were
similar with and without instructions prior to the neutralizing period. Yet, this study did not
assess the effects of instructions on participants’ reporting of neutralizing behavior relative to no
instructions. It may be the case that the instructions motivated participants to engage in strategies
for reasons other than to reduce anxiety elicited from writing the sentence (e.g., social
desirability, experimenter demand).
Second, external validity may be influenced by potential qualitative differences of
intrusive thoughts and anxiety-driven, compulsive responses between those who meet criteria for
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OCD versus those who do not. It largely has been accepted that intrusive thoughts among
those diagnosed with OCD are similar in content to intrusive thoughts among nonclinical
samples, but are more distressing, frequent, and intense (Rachman & de Silva, 1978; Salkovskis
& Harrison, 1984). However, some have proposed that abnormal intrusions differ qualitatively
from “normal” intrusive thoughts (Rassin, Cougle, & Muris, 2007; Rassin & Muris, 2007).
Further, pathological compulsions are more frequent, intense, and elicit greater discomfort when
resisted than “rituals” demonstrated in the general population (Muris, Merckelback, & Calvin,
1997). As such, the appraisals and neutralizing demonstrated in this sample may be qualitatively
different from that observed in a population of individuals diagnosed with OCD. Among a
nonclinical sample, perhaps the urge to neutralize most closely represents an OC response, as
both populations may experience the urge to neutralize, but clinical participants may not be able
to override, resist, or dismiss this urge, or are not mollified by self-generated
reassurance/rationalizations. More research is needed to delineate similarities and differences
among OC and non-OC experiences in the general population and clinical samples to improve
the study OC phenomena in nonclinical samples.
Finally, external validity may be impacted by the participant disqualification criteria of
elevated scores on the CESD or VAS ratings of anxiety prior to completing the TAF sentence
task. As a result, the participants who were able to complete the study may not be representative
of the general population and may have been less distressed by the study stimuli. By excluding
these participants, the power to detect the small effects found in this study may be reduced.
Additionally, 10 participants refused to complete the TAF sentence task; when comparing these
individuals to those who completed the task, those who refused were more likely to be in the
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control condition compared to the HR condition (F2, 165 = 3.36, p = .04). However, they did
not differ significantly on any baseline or post-manipulation measure (ts168 > 1.61, ps > .11).

Conclusion and Future Directions

Limitations notwithstanding, this study is an important attempt in advancing the
cognitive-behavioral model of OCD. Endeavoring to address a gap in the literature, this study
employed a novel approach to manipulating responsibility beliefs among a nonclinical, student
sample to assess potential moderating effects on the relationship among TAF likelihood-others
beliefs, in vivo appraisals, and OC outcomes. Deemed ultimately unsuccessful based on the
proposed manipulation check assessment, the moderation and conditional process analyses were
severely limited. Future research may consider alternatives to manipulating this prominent OC
construct, such as vignettes that relate an inflated sense of responsibility over future negative
events (e.g., preventing a drunk driver from driving a vehicle) or hands-on tasks that carry a
significant amount of personal responsibility (e.g., cleaning medical equipment) that may relate
to broadly defined neutralizing responses; these approaches may engender the desired effects on
affective and cognitive states similar to the experience among those diagnosed with OCD.
Lastly, likelihood appraisals following an obsessive-like sentence task mediated the relationship
between preexisting TAFS Likelihood-others beliefs and the urge to neutralize and self-reported
neutralizing. This provides support for the cognitive-behavioral model of OCD that beliefs
engender maladaptive appraisals that propagate neutralizing urges and responses among a
nonclinical sample.
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TAFS
Indicate below the degree to which you agree with each statement. Use the following scale to
guide your decision.
0
Strongly
Disagree

1
Disagree

2
Neutral

3
Agree

4
Strongly
Agree

_____ 1.) Thinking of making an extremely critical remark to a friend is almost as unacceptable
to me as actually saying it.
_____2.) Having a blasphemous thought is almost as sinful to me as a blasphemous action.
_____3.) Thinking about swearing at someone else is almost as unacceptable to me as actually
swearing.
_____4.) When I have a nasty thought about someone else, it is almost as bad as carrying out a
nasty action.
_____5.) Having violent thoughts are almost as unacceptable to me as violent acts.
_____6.) When I think about making an obscene remark or gesture in church, it is almost as
sinful as actually doing it.
_____7.) If I wish harm on someone, it is almost as bad as doing harm.
_____8.) If I think about making an obscene gesture to someone else, it is almost as bad as
doing it.
_____9.) When I think unkindly about a friend, it is almost as disloyal as doing an unkind act.
_____10.) If I have a jealous thought, it is almost the same as making a jealous remark.
_____11.) Thinking of cheating in a personal relationship is almost as immoral to me as actually
cheating.
_____12.) Having obscene thoughts in a church is unacceptable to me.
_____13.) If I think of a relative/friend losing their job, this increases the risk that they will lose
their job.
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_____14.) If I think of a relative/friend being in a car accident, this increases the risk that
he/she will have a car accident.
_____15.) If I think of a friend/relative being injured in a fall, this increases the risk that he/she
will have a fall and be injured.
_____16.) If I think of a relative/friend falling ill this increases the risk that he/she will fall ill.
_____17.) If I think of myself being injured in a fall, this increases the risk that I will have a fall
and be injured.
_____18.) If I think of myself being in a car accident, this increases the risk that I will have a car
accident.
_____19.) If I think of myself falling ill, this increases the risk that I will fall ill.
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OBQ-87
This inventory lists different attitudes or beliefs that people sometimes hold. Read each statement
carefully and decide how much you agree or disagree with it. For each of the statements, choose
the number matching the answer that best describes how you think. Because people are different,
there are no right or wrong answers. To decide whether a given statement is true of your way of
looking at things, simply keep in mind how you feel right now.
Use the following scale:
1
Disagree
very much

2
Disagree
moderately

3
Disagree a
little

4
Neither
agree nor
disagree

5
Agree a
little

6
Agree
moderately

7
Agree very
much

____1. Having bad thoughts or urges means I'm likely to act on them.
____2. Having control over my thoughts is a sign of good character.
____3. If I am uncertain, there is something wrong with me.
____4. If I imagine something bad happening, then I am responsible for making sure that it
doesn't happen.
____5. If I don't control my unwanted thoughts, something bad is bound to happen.
____6. I often think things around me are unsafe.
____7. When I hear about a tragedy, I can’t stop wondering if I am responsible in some way.
____8. Whenever I lose control of my thoughts, I must struggle to regain control.
____9. I am much more likely to be punished than are others.
____10. If I’m not absolutely sure of something, I’m bound to make a mistake.
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1
Disagree
very much

2
Disagree
moderately

3
Disagree a
little

4
Neither
agree nor
disagree

5
Agree a
little

6
Agree
moderately

7
Agree very
much

____11. There is only one right way to do things.
____12. I would be a better person if I gained more control over my thoughts.
____13. Things should be perfect according to my own standards.
____14. The more distressing my thoughts are, the greater the risk that they will come true.
____15. I can have no peace of mind as long as I have intrusive thoughts.
____16. Things that are minor annoyances for most people seem like disasters for me.
____17. I must know what is going on in my mind at all times so I can control

my thoughts.

____18. The more I think of something horrible, the greater the risk it will come true.
____19. In order to be a worthwhile person, I must be perfect at everything I do.
____20. When I see any opportunity to do so, I must act to prevent bad things from happening.
____21. It is ultimately my responsibility to ensure that everything is in order.
____22. If I fail at something, I am a failure as a person.
____23. Even if harm is very unlikely, I should try to prevent it at any cost.
____24. For me, having bad urges is as bad as actually carrying them out.
____25. I must think through the consequences of even my smallest actions.
____26. If an unexpected change occurs in my daily life, something bad will happen.
____27. If I don’t act when I foresee danger, then I am to blame for any consequences.
____28. If I can’t do something perfectly, I shouldn’t do it at all.
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1
Disagree
very much

2
Disagree
moderately

3
Disagree a
little

4
Neither
agree nor
disagree

5
Agree a
little

6
Agree
moderately

7
Agree very
much

____29. I must be ready to regain control of my thinking whenever an intrusive thought or
image occurs.
____30. Bad things are more likely to happen to me than to other people.
____31. I must work to my full potential at all times.
____32. It is essential for me to consider all possible outcomes of a situation.
____33. Even minor mistakes mean a job is not complete.
____34. If I have aggressive thoughts or impulses about my loved ones, this means I may
secretly want to hurt them.
____35. I must be certain of my decision.
____36. If someone does a task better than I do, that means I failed the whole task.
____37. If I have an intrusive thought while I'm doing something, what I'm doing will be ruined.
____38. In all kinds of daily situations, failing to prevent harm is just as bad as deliberately
causing harm.
____39. Avoiding serious problems (for example, illness or accidents) requires constant effort
on my part.
____40. Small problems always seem to turn into big ones in my life.
____41. For me, not preventing harm is as bad as causing harm.
____42. I should be upset if I make a mistake.
____43. I should make sure others are protected from any negative consequences of my
decisions or actions.
____44. If I exercise enough will-power, I should be able to gain complete control over my
mind.
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1
Disagree
very much

2
Disagree
moderately

3
Disagree a
little

4
Neither
agree nor
disagree

5
Agree a
little

6
Agree
moderately

7
Agree very
much

____45. For me, things are not right if they are not perfect.
____46. Having nasty thoughts means I am a terrible person.
____47. I often believe I am responsible for things that other people don’t think are my fault.
____48. If an intrusive thought pops into my mind, it must be important.
____49. Thinking about a good thing happening can prevent it from happening.
____50. If I do not take extra precautions, I am more likely than others to have
serious disaster.

or cause a

____51. If I don't do as well as other people, that means I am an inferior person.
____52. I believe that the world is a dangerous place.
____53. In order to feel safe, I have to be as prepared as possible for anything that could go
wrong.
____54. To avoid disasters, I need to control all the thoughts or images that pop into my mind.
____55. I should not have bizarre or disgusting thoughts.
____56. For me, making a mistake is as bad as failing completely.
____57. It is essential for everything to be clear cut, even in minor matters.
____58. Having a blasphemous thought is as sinful as committing a sacrilegious act.
____59. I should be able to rid my mind of unwanted thoughts.
____60. I should be 100% certain that everything around me is safe.
____61. I am more likely than other people to accidentally cause harm to myself or to others.
____62. For me, even slight carelessness is inexcusable when it might affect other people.
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1
Disagree
very much

2
Disagree
moderately

3
Disagree a
little

4
5
6
Neither
Agree a
Agree
agree nor
little
moderately
disagree
____63. If something unexpected happens, I will not be able to cope with it.

7
Agree very
much

____64. Having bad thoughts means I am weird or abnormal.
____65. I must be the best at things that are important to me.
____66. Having an unwanted sexual thought or image means I really want to do it.
____67. If my actions could have even a small effect on a potential misfortune, I am responsible
for the outcome.
____68. Even when I am careful, I often think that bad things will happen.
____69. Having intrusive thoughts means I'm out of control.
____70. It is terrible to be surprised.
____71. Even if I think harm is very unlikely, I should still try to prevent it.
____72. Harmful events will happen unless I am very careful.
____73. I should go to great lengths to get all the relevant information before I make a decision.
____74. I must keep working at something until it's done exactly right.
____75. Being unable to control unwanted thoughts will make me physically ill.
____76. Having violent thoughts means I will lose control and become
____77. To me, failing to prevent a disaster is as bad as causing it.
____78. If I don’t do a job perfectly, people won’t respect me.

violent.
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1
Disagree
very much

2
Disagree
moderately

3
Disagree a
little

4
Neither
agree nor
disagree

5
Agree a
little

6
Agree
moderately

____79. Even ordinary experiences in my life are full of risk.
____80. When things go too well for me, something bad will follow.
____81. If I take sufficient care, I can prevent any harmful accident from occurring.
____82. When anything goes wrong in my life, it is likely to have terrible effects.
____83. Having a bad thought is morally no different than doing a bad deed.
____84. No matter what I do, it won’t be good enough.
____85. I often think that I will be overwhelmed by unforeseen events.
____86. If I don't control my thoughts, I'll be punished.
____87. I need the people around me to behave in a predictable way.

7
Agree very
much
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APPENDIX C

OBSESSIVE-COMPULSIVE INVENTORY—REVISED
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OCI-R
Instructions: The following statements refer to experiences that many people have in their
everyday lives. Circle the number that best describes HOW MUCH that experience has
DISTRESSED or BOTHERED you during the PAST MONTH. The numbers refer to the
following verbal labels:
0
Not at all

1
A little

2
Moderately

3
A lot

4
Extremely

____ 1. I have saved up so many things that they get in the way.
____ 2. I check things more often than necessary.
____ 3. I get upset if objects are not arranged properly.
____ 4. I feel compelled to count while I am doing things.
____ 5. I find it difficult to touch an object when I know it has been touched by strangers or
certain people.
____ 6. I find it difficult to control my own thoughts.
____ 7. I collect things I don’t need.
____ 8. I repeatedly check doors, windows, drawers, etc.
____ 9. I get upset if others change the way I have arranged things.
____ 10. I feel I have to repeat certain numbers.
____ 11. I sometimes have to wash or clean myself simply because I feel contaminated.

____ 12. I am upset by unpleasant thoughts that come into my mind against my will.
____ 13. I avoid throwing things away because I am afraid I might need them later.
____ 14. I repeatedly check gas and water taps and light switches after turning them off.

____ 15. I need things to be arranged in a particular order.
____ 16. I feel that there are good and bad numbers.
____ 17. I wash my hands more often and longer than necessary.
____ 18. I frequently get nasty thoughts and have difficulty in getting rid of them.
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APPENDIX D

CENTER FOR EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES—DEPRESSION SCALE

143
CESD
Below is a list of the ways you might have felt or behaved. Please tell me how often you have
felt this way during the past week.
During the Past Week
0
Rarely or none of
the time (less than
1 day)

1
Some or a
little of the
time (1-2
days)

2
Occasionally or a
moderate amount of
time
(3-4 days)

3
Most or all of
the time (5-7
days)

____ 1. I was bothered by things that usually don’t bother me.
____ 2. I did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor.
____ 3. I felt that I could not shake off the blues even with help from my family or friends.
____ 4. I felt I was just as good as other people.
____ 5. I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing.
____ 6. I felt depressed.
____ 7. I felt that everything I did was an effort.
____ 8. I felt hopeful about the future.
____ 9. I thought my life had been a failure.
____ 10. I felt fearful.
____ 11. My sleep was restless.
____ 12. I was happy.
____ 13. I talked less than usual.
____ 14. I felt lonely.
____ 15. People were unfriendly.
____ 16. I enjoyed life.
____ 17. I had crying spells.
____ 18. I felt sad.
____ 19. I felt that people dislike me.
____ 20. I could not “get going.”
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APPENDIX E

POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE AFFECT SCHEDULE
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PANAS
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read
each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to the word. Indicate to what
extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment. Use the following scale to
record your answers.

1
Very Slightly
Or Not At All

____Interested
____Distressed
____Excited
____Upset
____Strong
____Guilty
____Scared
____Hostile
____Enthusiastic
____Proud
____Irritable
____Alert
____Ashamed
____Inspired
____Nervous
____Determined
____Attentive
____Jittery
____Active
____Afraid

2
A Little

3
Moderately

4
Quite A Bit

5
Extremely
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APPENDIX F

HIGH RESPONSIBILITY RAS
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This questionnaire lists different attitudes or beliefs which people sometimes hold. Read each
statement carefully and decide whether the statement in True (T) or false (F) as applied to you.
To decide whether a given attitude is typical of your way of looking at things, simply keep in
mind what you are like most of the time. Circle “T” for True as applied to you or “F” for False
as applied to you. Please only circle one answer for each item.

T or F 1. I occasionally feel responsible for things which go wrong.
T or F 2. Occasionally, I feel that if I don’t act when I foresee danger, then I am to blame for
any consequences if it happens.
T or F 3. Sometimes, I am too sensitive to feeling responsible for things going wrong.
T or F 4. Occasionally, I feel that if I think bad things, this is as bad as doing bad things.
T or F 5. I worry occasionally about the effects of things which I do or don’t do.
T or F 6. I occasionally feel that not acting to prevent disaster is as bad as making disaster
happen.
T or F 7. If I know that harm is possible, I should sometimes try to prevent it, however
unlikely it seems.
T or F 8. I must occasionally think through the consequences of even the smallest actions.
T or F 9. I occasionally take responsibility for things which other people don’t think are my
fault.
T or F 10. Some of the things that I do can have serious consequences.
T or F 11. I am sometimes close to causing harm.
T or F 12. I occasionally feel that I must protect others from harm.
T or F 13. I should sometimes not cause even the slightest harm to others.
T or F 14. I might be condemned for some of my actions.
T or F 15. If I can have even a slight influence on things going wrong, then I should
occasionally act to prevent it.
T or F 16. To me, not acting where disaster is a slight possibility is sometimes as bad as
making that disaster happen.
T or F 17. For me, I occasionally feel that even slight carelessness is inexcusable when it
might affect other people.
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T or F 18. In some kinds of daily situations, my inactivity might cause as much harm as
deliberate bad intentions.
T or F 19. Even if harm is a very unlikely possibility, I should occasionally try to prevent it at
any cost.
T or F 20. If I think it is possible that I have caused harm, I sometimes can’t forgive myself.
T or F 21. Some of my past actions have been intended to prevent harm to others.
T or F 22. I occasionally make sure other people are protected from all of the consequences of
things I do.
T or F 23. Occasionally, other people should not rely on my judgment.
T or F 24. If I cannot be certain I am blameless, I sometimes feel that I am to blame.
T or F 25. If I take sufficient care then I can occasionally prevent harmful accidents.
T or F 26. I occasionally think that bad things will happen if I am not careful enough.
Please complete steps (a) and (b) below
(a) Now that you have completed the questionnaire, please tally the number of statements
you answered “TRUE” (T) and record the number in the space below.
Please write your number of TRUE (T) statements: ____________
(b) Now, please find and read the appropriate feedback on the following page regarding
how responsible you feel for events.
Please indicate the feedback you received by circling the number corresponding to your
feedback. That is, circle “1” if you received and read feedback #1 and circle “2” if you
received and read feedback #2.

1

2
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LOW RESPONSIBILITY RAS
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This questionnaire lists different attitudes or beliefs which people sometimes hold. Read each
statement carefully and decide whether the statement in True (T) or false (F) as applied to you.
To decide whether a given attitude is typical of your way of looking at things, simply keep in
mind what you are like most of the time. Circle “T” for True as applied to you or “F” as
applied to you. Please only circle one answer for each item.
T or F 1. I almost always feel responsible for things which go wrong.
T or F 2. Almost always, I feel that if I don’t act when I foresee danger, then I am to blame
for any consequences if it happens.
T or F 3. Almost always, I am too sensitive to feeling responsible for things going wrong.
T or F 4. Almost always, I feel that if I think bad things, this is as bad as doing bad things.
T or F 5. I worry almost always about the effects of things which I do or don’t do.
T or F 6. I almost always feel that not acting to prevent disaster is as bad as making disaster
happen.
T or F 7. If I know that harm is possible, I should almost always try to prevent it, however
unlikely it seems.
T or F 8. I must almost always think through the consequences of even the smallest actions.
T or F 9. I almost always take responsibility for things which other people don’t think are my
fault.
T or F 10. Almost all of the things that I do can have serious consequences.
T or F 11. I am almost always close to causing harm.
T or F 12. I almost always feel that I must protect others from harm.
T or F 13. I should almost always not cause even the slightest harm to others.
T or F 14. I will almost always be condemned for my actions.
T or F 15. If I can have even a slight influence on things going wrong, then I should almost
always act to prevent it.
T or F 16. To me, not acting where disaster is a slight possibility is as bad as making that
disaster happen.
T or F 17. For me, I almost always feel that even slight carelessness is inexcusable when it
might affect other people.
T or F 18. In all kinds of daily situations, my inactivity will almost always cause as much
harm as deliberate bad intentions.
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T or F 19. Even if harm is a very unlikely possibility, I should almost always try to prevent it
at any cost.
T or F 20. If I think it is possible that I have caused harm, I almost always can’t forgive
myself.
T or F 21. Almost all of my past actions have been intended to prevent harm to others.
T or F 22. I almost always make sure other people are protected from all of the consequences
of things I do.
T or F 23. Almost always, other people should not rely on my judgment.
T or F 24. If I cannot be certain I am blameless, I almost always feel that I am to blame.
T or F 25. If I take sufficient care then I can almost always prevent harmful accidents.
T or F 26. I almost always think that bad things will happen if I am not careful enough.
Please complete steps (a) and (b) below
(a) Now that you have completed the questionnaire, please tally the number of statements
you answered “TRUE” (T) and record the number in the space below.
Please write your number of TRUE (T) statements: ____________
(b) Now, please find and read the appropriate feedback on the following page regarding
how responsible you feel for events.
Please indicate the feedback you received by circling the number corresponding to your
feedback. That is, circle “1” if you received and read feedback #1 and circle “2” if you
received and read feedback #2.

1

2

152

APPENDIX H

HIGH RESPONSIBILITY FEEDBACK
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Feedback #1: If you answered 5 or more statements as TRUE (T):

According to the RAS feedback (Salkovskis et al., 2000), you possess inflated responsibility
attitudes. You experience events that you have direct or indirect influence over as stressful. As
such, you attempt to avoid being “in charge” as these situations are overwhelming for you.
Often, this inflated feeling of responsibility makes it difficult for you to take action, as you do
not want to make a “costly” error. Past research (Salkovskis et al., 2000) has suggested that
individuals who score within this category (i.e., individuals who have inflated responsibility
attitudes) tend to prefer predictability, and are more likely to possess personality characteristics
similar to people who like organization and certainty. For example, individuals who have
inflated responsibility attitudes have been shown to take longer to make decisions, and often
have to re-examine their choices to be sure that their selection was correct (Lopatka &
Rachman, 1995).
Feedback #2: If you answered 4 or less statements as TRUE (T):
According to the RAS feedback (Salkosvkis et al., 2000), you do not possess inflated
responsibility attitudes. You experience events that you have direct or indirect influence over
as exciting. As such, you will approach situations that require you to be “in charge” as these
situations are stimulating for you. Feelings of responsibility do not make it difficult for you to
take action, as you do not feel overwhelmed by making a “costly” error. Past research
(Salkovskis et al., 2000) has suggested that individuals who score within this category (i.e.,
individuals who do not have inflated responsibility attitudes) tend to prefer spontaneity, and are
more likely to possess personality characteristics similar to people who like excitement and
taking risks. For example, individuals who do not have inflated responsibility attitudes have
been shown to take less time to make decisions, and often have confidence that their choice is
correct (Lopatka & Rachman, 1995).
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Feedback #1: If you answered 20 or more statements as TRUE (T):

According to the RAS feedback (Salkovskis et al., 2000), you possess inflated responsibility
attitudes. You experience events that you have direct or indirect influence over as stressful. As
such, you attempt to avoid being “in charge” as these situations are overwhelming for you.
Often, this inflated feeling of responsibility makes it difficult for you to take action, as you do
not want to make a “costly” error. Past research (Salkovskis et al., 2000) has suggested that
individuals who score within this category (i.e., individuals who have inflated responsibility
attitudes) tend to prefer predictability, and are more likely to possess personality characteristics
similar to people who like organization and certainty. For example, individuals who have
inflated responsibility attitudes have been shown to take longer to make decisions, and often
have to re-examine their choices to be sure that their selection was correct (Lopatka &
Rachman, 1995).
Feedback #2: If you answered 19 or less statements as TRUE (T):
According to the RAS feedback (Salkovskis et al., 2000), you do not possess inflated
responsibility attitudes. You experience events that you have direct or indirect influence over
as exciting. As such, you will approach situations that require you to be “in charge” as these
situations are stimulating for you. Feelings of responsibility do not make it difficult for you to
take action, as you do not feel overwhelmed by making a “costly” error. Past research
(Salkovskis et al., 2000) has suggested that individuals who score within this category (i.e.,
individuals who do not have inflated responsibility attitudes) tend to prefer spontaneity, and are
more likely to possess personality characteristics similar to people who like excitement and
taking risks. For example, individuals who do not have inflated responsibility attitudes have
been shown to take less time to make decisions, and often have confidence that their choice is
correct (Lopatka & Rachman, 1995).

